Optimal Income Redistributions, That Are Not Pareto-Optimal

The purpose of this paper is to give necessary conditions for income redistributions that are optimal in some sense, but not Pareto-optimal. A distinction is made between optimal distributions and distributions that can be improved upon through transfers. A further distinction is made between cooperative and non-cooperative redistributions; the last ones including Nash-equilibria. For noncooperative redistributions there is, depending on the initial income-distribution, the possibility of free-riders

Anything goes with heterogeneous, but not always with homogeneous oligopoly

Corchón and Mas-Colell [1996. On the stability of best reply and gradient systems with applications to imperfectly competitive models. Economics Letters 51, 59-65] showed that in heterogeneous oligopoly (almost) everything is possible. In order to obtain a similar result for homogeneous oligopoly, either one needs an externality in the cost function, or the reaction correspondences should fulfill a special condition.Cournot oligopoly (In)Stability (Limit)Cycles Morse theory

von Stackelberg’s equilibria for Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with buyouts

Solves von Stackelberg equilibria in a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game. Shows that, initially, the environment is characterized by efficient rationing and capacity constraints. Since interest lies in sustaining monopoly outcomes from non-co-operative behaviour, introduces the buyout option, where rivals can absorb one another’s output before any consumer. Reveals that the outcomes change drastically in that players together are able to reach the monopoly profits.Economic theory, Game theory, Management buy-outs, Monopolies