LAW REVIEWS, CITATION COUNTS, and TWITTER (Oh my!): Behind the Curtains of the Law Professor’s Search for Meaning

In this article we discuss “the game.” “The game” is the quest for measuring scholarship success using metrics such as law review ranking, citation counts, downloads, and other indicia of scholarship “quality.” We argue that this game is rigged, inherently biased against authors from lower ranked schools, women, minorities, and faculty who teach legal writing, clinical, and library courses. As such, playing “the game” in a Sisyphean effort to achieve external validation is a losing one for all but a few. Instead, we argue that faculty members should reject this entrenched and virulent hierarchy, and focus on the primary purposes of writing, which are to foster innovation in a fashion that is both pleasing to the author and that improves society. We discuss this rigged game, and seek to reframe our academic life to focus on enhancing innovation and discourse. We would start by skipping abstract writing

Antitrust Analysis of NOPEC Legislation

This Article analyzes the proposed No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act of 2019 (NOPEC). This legislation, which was introduced in the United States Senate and House of Representatives, addresses the antitrust issues involved in suing the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), their member states and their state owned oil companies (SOEs), other states and their SOEs, and private companies for their participation in an international cartel that has long been involved in regulating the production and distribution of oil and other petroleum products. It is our view that this proposed legislation provides a relatively moderate approach to applying U.S. antitrust law to the activities of the likely participants in this cartel. The legislation does not completely cure all the legal problems, but it does remove substantial roadblocks that have allowed this cartel to operate in disregard of U.S. antitrust law

Misuse and abuse of the Tunney Act: the adverse consequences of the microsoft fallacies

Journal ArticleThere have been two Microsoft cases leading to final judgements. Throughout the Tunney Act processes in both cases, however, there was little discussion regarding the standards of judicial review that should apply in a Tunney Act consent decree proceeding where no litigation has taken place. There was also little examination of whether the Tunney Act is the appropriate tool for a case in which there has been litigation, findings of fact or conclusions of law, and more than one appeal. Regarding the government's first case against Microsoft, this article will argue that the court used an inappropriate standard of judicial review for proceedings under the Tunney Act. Regarding the second case against Microsoft, this article will contend that the Tunney Act was misused because it was applied in circumstances where Congress did not intend for it to be applied

Why Economists Should Support Populist Antitrust Goals

Antitrust policy can be a powerful tool to tackle important social and economic problems. For decades antitrust enforcement has been shackled by the so-called Consumer Welfare Standard (“CWS”) that has limited the goals considered to be “legitimate.” The CWS limits antitrust goals to those that impact demand in markets, and primarily in output markets. Recently, new voices have come forward to suggest that antitrust policy should address several other important social objectives. Such goals include the traditional antitrust goals that motivated passage of the antitrust statutes, and which were discussed in Pre-Rehnquist Court opinions, including dispersion of economic and political power, and protection of small business. Additionally, it has been suggested that antitrust law should contribute to alleviating inequality, protecting labor when mergers occur or in the presence of monopsony, protect macroeconomic growth and stability when financial entities merge, and possibly contribute to efforts to advance sustainability. While some argue that the CWS is flexible enough to support some or all of these objectives, we disagree. There are at least five reasons why the CWS is severely limited or defective, preventing it from being an appropriate standard for modern antitrust. First (Section III below), it is a “material welfare” approach derived from Alfred Marshall, meaning an approach that cannot incorporate important issues that affect welfare such as political democracy and sustainability. This is made clear in the writings of Marshall and Pigou, the originators of the theory imported into antitrust by Judge Bork. Second (Section IV), the CWS assumes that the marginal utility of money (or the marginal social welfare with respect to a change in anyone’s surplus) is constant and equal among individuals impacted by anticompetitive practices. As a consequence, the CWS treats as inconsequential transfers of income between groups resulting from alleged restraints or mergers. Third (Section V), CWS is biased in favor of the wealthy, despite Section IV’s findings that CWS is neutral with respect to marginal transfers. Fourth (Section VI), CWS uses an indefensible measure of efficiency. Fifth (Section VII), CWS ignores the input market when analyzing restraints in the output market.We suggest that there are three questions that must be addressed when considering an antitrust criterion. First: is there credible social science research showing that the policy goals embodied in the criterion result in material increases in human well-being (the basis of economic welfare)? Second: can competition policy substantially advance the criterion? Finally, does the criterion provide a method for dealing with tradeoffs between the goals it embodies, if such tradeoffs are present? The CWS is so seriously limited that it does not even allow consideration of the first requirement. A more general welfare approach certainly can address the first two questions and may hold promise for satisfying the third

Why Bad Regulation Is to Blame for California’s Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law Fails to Protect Against Market Power When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use)

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How to Block Cartel Formation and Price-Fixing

Abstract written by the AEI-Brookings Joint Center: Allowing foreign buyers of goods produced by international cartels to pursue civil antitrust damages in U.S. courts would better deter cartel formation and price-fixing than do sanctions currently imposed by global criminal and civil justice systems.Technology and Industry, Regulatory Reform, Other Topics

Electron multiplication CCD detector technology advancement for the WFIRST-AFTA coronagraph

The WFIRST-AFTA (Wide Field InfraRed Survey Telescope-Astrophysics Focused Telescope Asset) is a NASA space observatory. It will host two major astronomical instruments: a wide-field imager (WFI) to search for dark energy and carry out wide field near infrared (NIR) surveys, and a coronagraph instrument (CGI) to image and spectrally characterize extrasolar planets. In this paper, we discuss the work that has been carried out at JPL in advancing Electron Multiplying CCD (EMCCD) technology to higher flight maturity, with the goal of reaching a NASA technology readiness level of 6 (TRL-6) by early-to-mid 2016. The EMCCD has been baselined for both the coronagraph's imager and integral field spectrograph (IFS) based on its sub-electron noise performance at extremely low flux levels - the regime where the AFTA CGI will operate. We present results from a study that fully characterizes the beginning of life performance of the EMCCD. We also discuss, and present initial results from, a recent radiation test campaign that was designed and carried out to mimic the conditions of the WFIRST-AFTA space environment in an L2 orbit, where we sought to assess the sensor's end of life performance, particularly degradation of its charge transfer efficiency, in addition to other parameters such as dark current, electron multiplication gain, clock induced charge and read noise