Iceland illustrates why political ‘hectoring’ from foreign countries is bound to fail in Greece

Iceland entered a period of financial crisis in 2008, with the country subsequently involved in a prolonged dispute over losses generated in the Netherlands and the UK by an Icelandic bank. Jon Danielsson writes that the crisis in Iceland has much in common with the ongoing crisis in Greece, not least the heavy pressure exerted on both countries by foreign governments. He argues that just as in Iceland, this pressure has been counterproductive in Greece, hardening opposition to any potential settlement

Balance sheet capacity and endogenous risk

Banks operating under Value-at-Risk constraints give rise to a welldefined aggregate balance sheet capacity for the banking sector as a whole that depends on total bank capital. Equilibrium risk and market risk premiums can be solved in closed form as functions of aggregate bank capital. We explore the empirical properties of the model in light of recent experience in the financial crisis and highlight the importance of balance sheet capacity as the driver of the financial cycle and market risk premiums

The fatal flaw in macropru: it ignores political risk

Political risk is a major cause of systemic financial risk. This column argues that both the integrity and the legitimacy of macroprudential policy, or ‘macropru’, depends on political risk being included with other risk factors. Yet it is usually excluded from macropru, and that could be a fatal flaw

Designating market maker behaviour in Limit Order Book markets

Financial exchanges provide incentives for limit order book (LOB) liquidity provision to certain market participants, termed designated market makers or designated sponsors. While quoting requirements typically enforce the activity of these participants for a certain portion of the day, we argue that liquidity demand throughout the trading day is far from uniformly distributed, and thus this liquidity provision may not be calibrated to the demand. We propose that quoting obligations also include requirements about the speed of liquidity replenishment, and we recommend use of the Threshold Exceedance Duration (TED) for this purpose. We present a comprehensive regression modelling approach using GLM and GAMLSS models to relate the TED to the state of the LOB and identify the regression structures that are best suited to modelling the TED. Such an approach can be used by exchanges to set target levels of liquidity replenishment for designated market makers

Why risk is so hard to measure

This paper analyzes the robustness of standard risk analysis techniques, with a special emphasis on the specifications in Basel III. We focus on the difference between Value– at–Risk and expected shortfall, the small sample properties of these risk measures and the impact of using an overlapping approach to construct data for longer holding periods. Overall, risk forecasts are extremely uncertain at low sample sizes. By comparing the estimation uncertainty, we find that Value–at–Risk is superior to expected shortfall and the time-scaling approach for risk forecasts with longer holding periods is preferable to using overlapping data

Why risk is so hard to measure

This paper analyzes the robustness of standard risk analysis techniques, with a special emphasis on the specifications in Basel III. We focus on the difference between Value– at–Risk and expected shortfall, the small sample properties of these risk measures and the impact of using an overlapping approach to construct data for longer holding periods. Overall, risk forecasts are extremely uncertain at low sample sizes. By comparing the estimation uncertainty, we find that Value–at–Risk is superior to expected shortfall and the time-scaling approach for risk forecasts with longer holding periods is preferable to using overlapping data

Brexit and systemic risk

Brexit is likely to cause considerable disruption for financial markets. Some worry that it may also increase systemic risk. This column revisits the debate and argues that an increase in systemic risk is unlikely. While legal ‘plumbing’ and institutional and regulatory equivalence are of concern, systemic risk is more likely to fall due to increased financial fragmentation and caution by market participants in the face of uncertainty

Low volatility makes a financial crisis more likely

Jon Danielsson, Marcela Valenzuela and Ilknur Zer provide empirical evidence of Minsky’s theory of instabilit

Model risk of risk models

This paper evaluates the model risk of models used for forecasting systemic and market risk. Model risk, which is the potential for different models to provide inconsistent outcomes, is shown to be increasing with market uncertainty. During calm periods, the underlying risk forecast models produce similar risk readings; hence, model risk is typically negligible. However, the disagreement between the various candidate models increases significantly during market distress, further frustrating the reliability of risk readings. Finally, particular conclusions on the underlying reasons for the high model risk and the implications for practitioners and policy makers are discussed