Frontiers in Regulating Building Emissions: An Agenda for Cities

Recent developments in Congress and the Supreme Court have highlighted the folly of relying solely on the federal government to contain global climate change. If the United States is to help rein in the climate crisis, state and local governments will need to accelerate their efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In many urban areas, where most Americans now live, the most important step that local governments can take to curtail these emissions is to reduce energy use in buildings. Recognizing this, a number of American cities have adopted building performance standards (“BPSs”) in recent years, which limit the annual amount of energy a building can use or emissions it can release. With an eye toward encouraging the proliferation of BPSs, this Article surveys the key decisions that a city must make in designing a BPS and argues that future laws must do more to integrate resilience goals. As the climate crisis accelerates, local lawmakers must develop policies that simultaneously reduce emissions and protect their constituencies from the climate impacts that we can no longer fend off

Whither Article XX? regulatory autonomy under non-GATT agreements after China—raw materials

On January 30, 2012 the Appellate Body to the World Trade Organization (WTO) released a decision in China—Measures Relating to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (Raw Materials) in which it condemned China’s refusal to freely export certain raw materials mined within its territory. Apart from the significant political implications of the decision, the Raw Materials report went a good distance towards answering a persistent question in trade law circles: when, if at all, can the savings clause contained in Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) be invoked to justify a violation of another WTO agreement? Answering the question is important because if GATT Article XX is generally available as a defense against non-GATT violations, it would ensure that the specialized WTO agreements are as tolerant of public policy motivated trade restrictions as is the GATT. That, in turn, would assuage concerns that certain specialized agreements such as the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT) or the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), which lack their own savings clauses, are insufficiently sensitive to non-trade concerns, such as environmental protection. Stated otherwise, permitting broad recourse to Article XX outside of the GATT would soften the perceived rigidity of the specialized agreements, thereby preventing the WTO from inappropriately encroaching upon members’ domestic regulatory space