Sterile neutrino production via active-sterile oscillations: the quantum Zeno effect

We study several aspects of the kinetic approach to sterile neutrino production via active-sterile mixing. We obtain the neutrino propagator in the medium including self-energy corrections up to $\mathcal{O}(G^2_F)$, from which we extract the dispersion relations and damping rates of the propagating modes. The dispersion relations are the usual ones in terms of the index of refraction in the medium, and the damping rates are $\Gamma_1(k) = \Gamma_{aa}(k) \cos^2\theta_m(k); \Gamma_2(k) = \Gamma_{aa}(k) \sin^2\theta_m(k)$ where $\Gamma_{aa}(k)\propto G^2_F k T^4$ is the active neutrino scattering rate and $\theta_m(k)$ is the mixing angle in the medium. We provide a generalization of the transition probability in the \emph{medium from expectation values in the density matrix}: $P_{a\to s}(t) = \frac{\sin^22\theta_m}{4}[e^{-\Gamma_1t} + e^{-\Gamma_2 t}-2e^{-{1/2}(\Gamma_1+\Gamma_2)t} \cos\big(\Delta E t\big)]$ and study the conditions for its quantum Zeno suppression directly in real time. We find the general conditions for quantum Zeno suppression, which for $m_s\sim \textrm{keV}$ sterile neutrinos with $\sin2\theta \lesssim 10^{-3}$ \emph{may only be} fulfilled near an MSW resonance. We discuss the implications for sterile neutrino production and argue that in the early Universe the wide separation of relaxation scales far away from MSW resonances suggests the breakdown of the current kinetic approach.Comment: version to appear in JHE

Tradable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory Game

This paper analyzes polluters\u27 incentives to move from a traditional command and control (CAC) environmental regulatory regime to a tradable permits (TPP) regime. Existing work in environmental economics does not model how firms contest and bargain over actual regulatory implementation in CAC regimes, and therefore fail to compare TPP regimes with any CAC regime that is actually observed. This paper models CAC environmental regulation as a bargaining game over pollution entitlements. Using a reduced form model of the regulatory contest, it shows that CAC regulatory bargaining likely generates a regulatory status quo under which firms with the highest compliance costs bargain for the smallest pollution reductions, or even no reduction at all. As for a tradable permits regime, it is shown that all firms are better off under such a regime than they would be under an idealized CAC regime that set and enforced a uniform pollution standard, but permit sellers (low compliance cost firms) may actually be better off under a TPP regime with relaxed aggregate pollution levels. Most importantly, because high cost firms (or facilities) are the most weakly regulated in the equilibrium under negotiated or bargained CAC regimes, they may be net losers in a proposed move to a TPP regime. When equilibrium costs under a TPP regime are compared with equilibrium costs under a status quo CAC regime, several otherwise paradoxical aspects of firm attitudes toward TPP type reforms can be explained. In particular, the otherwise paradoxical pattern of allowances awarded under Phase II of the 1990 Clean Air Act\u27s acid rain program, a pattern tending to favor (in Phase II) cleaner, newer generating units, is explained by the fact that under the status quo regime, a kind of bargained CAC, it was the newer cleaner units that were regulated, and which therefore had higher marginal control costs than did the largely unregulated older, plants. As a normative matter, the analysis here implies that the proper baseline for evaluating TPP regimes such as those contained in the Bush Administration\u27s recent Clear Skies initiative is not idealized, but nonexistent CAC regulatory outcomes, but rather the outcomes that have resulted from the bargaining game set up by CAC laws and regulations