BALANCING POLICY FOR ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Environmental Economics and Policy,

A BARGAINING FRAMEWORK FOR THE GLOBAL COMMONS

The global commons represents a class of environmental problems that require international cooperation. Global environmental problems arise because the actions of some individuals or governments in one location hold serious implications for individuals and governments in other locations. There are global environmental policy problems because adversely-affected individuals (and governments) attempt to alter the behaviors of those responsible for global pollution. We develop a framework with which to analyze such global environmental problems. Our goal is to craft a resource management policy that will satisfy both those who seek a change and those who prefer the current situation. This environmental incentive policy will align the interests of the two parties. Incentive alignment is the policy problem in the global commons. That is, we must find ways to align interests through realigning incentives for individual and group behaviors.Environmental Economics and Policy,

Land Use Policy as Volitional Pragmatism

Land-use conflicts highlight several myths about property rights. The central myth is that property rights are linked to natural rights, that property rights are durable and unchanging, and that any interference with these property rights requires public compensation. However, particular settings and circumstances lead to conflicting rights claims which the courts must sort through to determine where the more compelling rights claim resides. Situations are not protected because they have property rights. Rather, those situations found worthy of protection by the courts acquire the status of a property right. Property rights are not discovered, but are created by the courts. Applied economists must build models of property rights conflicts predicated upon an epistemology of volitional pragmatism.Land Economics/Use,

CONTRACTING FOR NONPOINT-SOURCE POLLUTION ABATEMENT

This study presents an incentive scheme to control agricultural nonpoint-source pollution. The analysis is based on a principal-agent framework with two parties: farmers and a regulating authority. Our incentive scheme proposes collective penalties as a way to control pollution. Unlike previous analyses of incentive schemes to control agricultural pollution, we suggest nonindividual contracts between farmers and a regulating authority, where farmers can trade pollution abatement efforts. Findings show that the information requirement of a regulatory agency can be substantially reduced if contracts can be made nonindividual.Environmental Economics and Policy,

Creating a nation-state, and an economy, in South Sudan

South Sudan is in the news again. Conflict has flared up and we are reminded that political problems and ethnic tension are never the causes of anything. Rather, they are the predictable effects of dysfunctional economies and incoherent governance. Civil conflict arises and persists when young males cannot find superior livelihood prospects. Predatory behavior is an expected response to material want and unwanted leisure

Getting the ‘sand’ out of Africa’s food system

African agriculture receives considerable attention from the international donor community yet few of these initiatives pay attention to the price farmers receive for their product. If we want to increase productivity in the agricultural sector then it is time to look beyond farming to other constraints hindering the industry’s development

UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL COMMONS

We want to clarify the way in which we think about the global commons, particularly the problem of global warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions and tropical deforestation. We develop a policy framework in which the policy goal is the sustainability of the earth's ability to absorb greenhouse gases. The framework considers the unequal incidence of benefits and costs of particular policies. We identify several resource management regimes and suggest that management under a common property regime is most appropriate. We conclude by identifying and briefly discussing types of policies that can achieve sustainability.Environmental Economics and Policy,

12 The Benefit-Cost Dilemma

Previous speakers have discussed the water resource situation from several perspectives. We have heard about the expected conflicts over water use, we have heard about water quality and quantity issues, and we have heard from a distinguished legal scholar about the institutional environment of water allocation in the West. It is my task to turn your attention to the evaluation process wherein changes in the status quo would be considered. I come with a message quite unlikely to gladden your heart. To be blunt, I come to remind you of the conceptual and empirical difficulties inherent in a benefit-cost analysis. This is not a tirade against agency benefit-cost practices-though I will take a friendly jab from time to time. Rather it is a reminder to economists and politicians that one of our favorite analytic devices is not only theoretically weak, but operationally deficient in several important respects

Social Goals, Problem Perception, and Public Intervention: The Fishery

Impacts of institutional constraints are discussed. A further discussion takes place on the goals of fisheries, possible social goals, and a nine mile contiguous zone within the context of the social objectives