Climate Change and the Trading System: After Doha and Doha

The international trade dispute over Ontario’s “green energy” policies is a harbinger of similar problems to come; an early example of the emerging conflict between industry rules aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and existing trade deals between national governments. We live in a world without formalized and sweeping multilateral climate change treaties between major economies, but one with many sweeping trade treaties between them. That discrepancy is setting up the conditions for more trade disputes in the future. Governments have every incentive to position climate change policies, as Ontario has, as support for new growth industries and the creation of local “green jobs.” But they also have every incentive to want to prevent the leakage of those envisioned economic benefits to outside parties, at the very least when those outside parties come from places that do not share the burden of climate change mitigation. The current trade-law framework has lent itself to the interpretation, by arbitration panels, that “free riders” — that is, industries and countries that bear little to no responsibility for shouldering the costs of climate change policies — are nevertheless entitled to share in the commercial benefits that may be created by climate policies in jurisdictions that do make efforts to reduce carbon emissions. In short, if a corporation or state-owned enterprise from a country lacking climate change policies wants to take advantage of the economic benefits of Ontario’s feed-in-tariff program, it would seem there is little Ontario can do to stop it, without running afoul of trade agreements. The result is a worst-case scenario. The problem of climate change continues to worsen, while governments — national and sub-national — face disincentives for implementing regulations and subsidies that might help mitigate the problem. This is because they cannot be sure that they will not be left to shoulder the cost while foreign actors, without similar environmental commitments, take advantage of the attendant economic benefits. There is also the real possibility that some governments may disguise anti-trade motives by cloaking them under the cover of environmental policy. These conflicts need not happen and, if we are committed to slowing climate change, it cannot be allowed to happen. The global trading community must find ways to exempt domestic climate change policies from traditional tariff and trade commitments, while also guarding against the potential abuse of that exemption. One possibility is exempting from tariff restrictions “border carbon adjustments” (BCAs), which apply varying tariffs to goods moving across borders based on the carbon emitted across the supply chain. The corporate sector’s increasing sophistication in quantifying supply-chain emissions, as part of corporate competitive efforts, makes BCAs more feasible for governments to implement. And there is already some evidence to suggest that BCAs can be accommodated within the current WTO rules, although some bending of the rules may be required. Still, the climate change threat is grave and urgent. If ever there was a reason to bend global trade rules, accommodating earnest climate-change-mitigation efforts is arguably the best one yet

Taxing Capital in the Age of Intangibles

The rise of the intangibles economy has led to a significant erosion of corporate tax revenue in the innovation-intensive advanced economies, even as the share of national income flowing to capital rose. For developing countries, the erosion is worse and comes on top of substantial erosion of corporate tax revenues from the tangibles economy due to weak tax administration and corruption. In this paper, we take up the questions of how big is the taxing problem that the intangibles economy has raised, and whose problem is it. Further, we consider how well the proposed OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework measures up in responding to this problem. We conclude that the importance of tax reform in the modern digitalizing economy goes beyond preventing base erosion and profit shifting for it is about sustainable development and future prosperity. And whether we are there yet is a matter of wait and see

New-New Trade Policy

When national competitiveness is invoked as a policy objective, trade experts have learned to retort that countries don`t trade, firms do. This focus on the importance of the firm in international trade is consistent with the most recent developments in trade theory, but policy needs to catch up. Recognizing the growing anomalies in observed trade patterns relative to traditional models of trade based on national comparative advantage, the "new trade theory" of the 1980s looked at industries not countries, leading Nobel prize-winner Paul Krugman, a pioneer in this literature, to suggest the need for a new trade policy. Recent work on what some call the "new-new trade theory" focuses on the trading behaviour of individual firms, making a tight link between trade and productivity. In this paper we demonstrate how focusing on firms should be the foundation for a new-new trade policy, one that creates exciting opportunities for trade and investment promotion strategies, along with the need for much more targeted consultation strategies. We also discuss the implications of the new-new theory for regulatory coordination, and on new ways to cooperate with interlocutors in developing countries on the evolution of 21st century trade policy.New-new Trade Theory, Trade Policy