CO2 abatement, competitiveness and leakage in the European cement industry under the EU ETS: Grandfathering vs. output-based allocation

A recurrent concern raised by the European GHG Emissions Trading System (ETS) is the fear of EU industry competitiveness loss: a loss in domestic production and a loss in profits. This paper analyses how production and profits in the European cement industry may depend upon allocation approaches. We analyse two contrasting allocation methods of free allowances. Under "grandfathering", the number of allowances a firm gets is independent of its current behaviour. Under "output-based allocation", it is proportional to its current production level. Whereas almost all the quantitative assessments of the EU ETS assume grandfathering, the real allocation methods used by Member States, notably because of the updating every five years and of the special provision for new plants and plant closings, stand somewhere between these two polar cases. We study the impacts of these two polar allocation methods by linking a detailed trade model of homogeneous products with high transportation costs (GEO) with a bottom-up model of the cement industry (CEMSIM). The two allocation approaches have very different impacts on competitiveness and emissions abatements. Grandfathering 50% of past emissions to cement producers is enough to maintain aggregate profitability (EBITDA) at its business-as-usual level, but with significant production losses and CO2 leakage. For an output-based allocation over 75% of historic unitary (tCO2/tonne-cement) emissions, impact on production levels and EBITDA is insignificant, abatement in the EU is much lower but there is almost no leakage. Policy needs to recognise to what extent different allocation approaches may change the impacts of emissions trading, and adopt approaches accordingly.Grandfathering, Output-based allocation, competitiveness, leakage

Changing the Allocation Rules in the EU ETS: Impact on Competitiveness and Economic Efficiency

We assess five proposals for the future of the EU greenhouse gas Emission Trading Scheme (ETS): pure grandfathering allocation of emission allowances (GF), output-based allocation (OB), auctioning (AU), auctioning with border adjustments (AU-BA), and finally output-based allocation in sectors exposed to international competition combined with auctioning in electricity generation (OB-AU). We look at the impact on production, trade, CO2 leakage and welfare. We use a partial equilibrium model of the EU 27 featuring three sectors covered by the EU ETS – cement, steel and electricity – plus the aluminium sector, which is indirectly impacted through a rise in electricity price. The leakage ratio, i.e. the increase in emissions abroad over the decrease in EU emissions, ranges from around 8% under GF and AU to -2% under AU-BA and varies greatly among sectors. Concerning the overall economic cost, OB appears to be the least efficient policy, even when taking into account its ability to prevent CO2 leakage. On the other hand, this policy minimises production losses and wealth transfers among stakeholders, which is likely to soften oppositions. GF and AU are the most efficient policies from an EU perspective, even when leakage is accounted for. From a world welfare perspective and whatever the emission reductioEmission Trading, Allowance Allocation, Leakage, Spillover, Climate Policy, Kyoto Protocol, Border Adjustment

Leakage from climate policies and border tax adjustment:lessons from a geographic model of the cement industry

We present a spatial international trade model, GEO, which computes transportation costs bynot treating markets as dimensionless points and explicitly represents capacity shortages andinvestment decisions in new production capacities. We link it to CEMSIM, a partialequilibrium model of the world cement industry developed by the IPTS. We assume that theKyoto Protocol Annex B countries (except the USA and Australia), create a CO2 tax at 15euros per tonne. This policy entails significant emissions reductions (around 20%) in thesecountries. A significant leakage occurs, with an emissions increase in the rest of the world ofaround 20% of the emissions reduction in Annex B-USA&Australia. We thus run twoscenarios combining a CO2 tax with border-tax adjustments (BTA). With the more ambitiousBTA tested, not only is there no leakage, but emissions in the rest of the world decreaseslightly. However, compared to business-as-usual, non-Annex B price-competitiveness andproduction decrease a little and these countries loose some market shares, so they couldattack this system as distorting competition in favour of Annex B countries. A less ambitiousBTA is thus tested, which cannot be criticised on this ground and prevents almost all leakage.The only drawback of both BTA policies is that the cement price in Annex BUSA&Australia increases a little more than without BTA, further impacting the cementconsumers in these countries.Cement; leakag;, spillover; climate change mitigation;Kyoto Protocol; border-tax adjustment;international trade; transportation cost

CO2 abatement, competitiveness and leakage in the European cement industry under the EU ETS: Grandfathering vs. output-based allocation

International audienceA recurrent concern raised by the European GHG Emissions Trading System (ETS) is the fear of EU industry competitiveness loss: a loss in domestic production and a loss in profits. This paper analyses how production and profits in the European cement industry may depend upon allocation approaches. We analyse two contrasting allocation methods of free allowances. Under "grandfathering", the number of allowances a firm gets is independent of its current behaviour. Under "output-based allocation", it is proportional to its current production level. Whereas almost all the quantitative assessments of the EU ETS assume grandfathering, the real allocation methods used by Member States, notably because of the updating every five years and of the special provision for new plants and plant closings, stand somewhere between these two polar cases. We study the impacts of these two polar allocation methods by linking a detailed trade model of homogeneous products with high transportation costs (GEO) with a bottom-up model of the cement industry (CEMSIM). The two allocation approaches have very different impacts on competitiveness and emissions abatements. Grandfathering 50% of past emissions to cement producers is enough to maintain aggregate profitability (EBITDA) at its business-as-usual level, but with significant production losses and CO2 leakage. For an output-based allocation over 75% of historic unitary (tCO2/tonne-cement) emissions, impact on production levels and EBITDA is insignificant, abatement in the EU is much lower but there is almost no leakage. Policy needs to recognise to what extent different allocation approaches may change the impacts of emissions trading, and adopt approaches accordingly

Leakage from climate policies and border tax adjustment:<br />lessons from a geographic model of the cement industry

We present a spatial international trade model, GEO, which computes transportation costs bynot treating markets as dimensionless points and explicitly represents capacity shortages andinvestment decisions in new production capacities. We link it to CEMSIM, a partialequilibrium model of the world cement industry developed by the IPTS. We assume that theKyoto Protocol Annex B countries (except the USA and Australia), create a CO2 tax at 15euros per tonne. This policy entails significant emissions reductions (around 20%) in thesecountries. A significant leakage occurs, with an emissions increase in the rest of the world ofaround 20% of the emissions reduction in Annex B-USA&Australia. We thus run twoscenarios combining a CO2 tax with border-tax adjustments (BTA). With the more ambitiousBTA tested, not only is there no leakage, but emissions in the rest of the world decreaseslightly. However, compared to business-as-usual, non-Annex B price-competitiveness andproduction decrease a little and these countries loose some market shares, so they couldattack this system as distorting competition in favour of Annex B countries. A less ambitiousBTA is thus tested, which cannot be criticised on this ground and prevents almost all leakage.The only drawback of both BTA policies is that the cement price in Annex BUSA&Australia increases a little more than without BTA, further impacting the cementconsumers in these countries

NGO Mobilisation Around the SDGs

NGO mobilisation is required to ensure the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are implemented at the national level. This study investigates how NGOs mobilise in European countries, with a special focus on France and Germany, in order to encourage action and to identify obstacles and ways forward. It appears that although NGOs are increasingly aware of the SDGs and have started to take dedicated action on them, this mobilisation is still biased towards development organisations and, more generally, towards organisations working on international issues

Changing the Allocation Rules in the EU ETS: Impact on Competitiveness and Economic Efficiency

We assess five proposals for the future of the EU greenhouse gas Emission Trading Scheme (ETS): pure grandfathering allocation of emission allowances (GF), output-based allocation (OB), auctioning (AU), auctioning with border adjustments (AU-BA), and finally output-based allocation in sectors exposed to international competition combined with auctioning in electricity generation (OB-AU). We look at the impact on production, trade, CO2 leakage and welfare. We use a partial equilibrium model of the EU 27 featuring three sectors covered by the EU ETS - cement, steel and electricity - plus the aluminium sector, which is indirectly impacted through a rise in electricity price. The leakage ratio, i.e. the increase in emissions abroad over the decrease in EU emissions, ranges from around 8% under GF and AU to -2% under AU-BA and varies greatly among sectors. Concerning the overall economic cost, OB appears to be the least efficient policy, even when taking into account its ability to prevent CO2 leakage. On the other hand, this policy minimises production losses and wealth transfers among stakeholders, which is likely to soften oppositions. GF and AU are the most efficient policies from an EU perspective, even when leakage is accounted for. From a world welfare perspective and whatever the emission reduction, AU-BA is the least costly policy, while OB-AU, AU and GF entail similar costs

The Collaborative Economy in Poland and Europe: A Tool for Boosting Female Employment?

The collaborative economy is a relatively new economic approach based on peer-to-peer transactions. It includes the shared creation, production and consumption of goods and services accessible for all through online platforms and smartphone applications. It is a burgeoning business model that is experiencing increased interest in all European countries. Statistics show that Poland already has an above-average number of women who are interested in self-employment. Furthermore, formal female employment in Poland is quite low by European standards. This situation implies great potential for the development of the participation of women in the collaborative economy. The paper "The Collaborative Economy in Poland and Europe: A Tool for Boosting Female Employment?" by Karolina Beaumont discusses the challenges of the collaborative economy as a system stimulating female social and economic empowerment and assesses the opportunities offered by the collaborative economy in increasing the female labour participation rate amongst Polish women

Technology Diffusion, Abatement Cost and Transboundary Pollution

This paper studies countries' incentives to develop advanced pollution abatement technology when technology may spillover across countries and pollution abatement is a global public good. We are motivated in part by the problem of global warming: a solution to this involves providing a global public good, and will surely require the development and implementation of new technologies. We show that at the Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game with R&D investment and emission abatement, whether the free rider effect prevails and under-investment and excess emissions occur depends on the degree of technology spillovers and the effect of R&D on the marginal abatement costs. There are cases in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, Nash equilibrium investments in emissions reductions exceed the first-best case