Seller Competition by Mechanism Design

In the market game presented here, sellers offer trade mechanisms to buyers, and buyers randomize over the sellers they visit. The distribution of buyers across sellers is endogenous and depends on all of the transaction opportunities existing in the market. Sellers choose from a broad class of trade mechanisms; the only constraints imposed on mechanisms is that they are direct, incentive compatible, and anonymous. In the (subgame perfect) equilibrium of this market, sellers hold auctions with an efficient reserve price but charge an entry fee. The entry fee depends on the number of buyers and sellers, the distribution of buyer valuations, and the buyer cost of entering the market. As the size of the market increases, the entry fee decreases and vanishes in the limit. The model sheds light on the endogenous formation of trading institutions in decentralized markets.competition, mechanism design, auctions

Auctions with Variable Supply: Uniform Price versus Discriminatory

We examine an auction in which the seller determines the supply after observing the bids. We compare the uniform price and the discriminatory auction in a setting of supply uncertainty. Uncertainty is caused by the interplay of two factors: the seller's private information about marginal cost, and the seller's incentive to sell the profit-maximizing quantity given the received bids. In every symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, bidders submit higher bids in the uniform price auction than in the discriminatory auction. In the two-bidder case this result extends to the set of rationalizable strategies. As a consequence, we find that the uniform price auction generates higher expected revenue for the seller and higher trade volume.sealed bid multi-unit auctions, variable supply auctions, discriminatory and uniform price auctions, subgame perfect equilibria, rationalizable strategies

Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply - Experimental Evidence

In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller. Somewhat surprisingly but again predicted by theory, it also yields a higher number of transactions, which makes it the more efficient auction format.

Teaching Futures Markets with the “ZIP Code” Trading Game

The price dynamics of futures markets and the spot-futures convergence are among the hardest concepts for students to fully understand in a traditional lecture. In this paper we present a classroom exercise designed to enable students to better grasp the intricacies of futures market trading. The simulation mirrors trading on an electronic market exchange in that students can freely submit bids and offers or enter into contracts at pre-existing quotes. We present questions and problems related to transaction data generated during the experiment to aid instructors in explaining: the mechanics of opening and closing position, the calculation of gains and losses, the daily settlement process, the futures-spot price convergence, the behavior of arbitrageurs and speculators, as well as the concepts of market efficiency and insider trading. Finally, we present experimental results from a large cohort of students in a Masters of Finance program

Long-Run Equilibrium Shift and Short-Run Dynamics of U.S. Home Price Tiers during the Housing Bubble

We use vector error correction models to examine the interdependence between the high and the low price tiers during the latest housing market boom and bust. For 118 of the 364 US statistical areas analyzed, the tiered price indexes are bound by a long-run relationship. In general, low tier homes appreciated more than high tier homes in the past two decades. In contrast to previous periods of high volatility, however, low tier homes appreciated more during the boom and lost more value during the bust of the market. We find a shift in the long-run equilibrium during the bubble —the cointegration parameter that ties the tiers together is greater in absolute value during the bubble period compared to the periods of more moderate appreciation and depreciation rates. Moreover, the shift in the long-run equilibrium can be explained by differences in subprime originations across housing markets. We also find that short run price dynamics is driven by momentum in both segments of the market

Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply - Experimental Evidence

In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller. Somewhat surprisingly but again predicted by theory, it also yields a higher number of transactions, which makes it the more efficient auction format.auctions, experiment, discriminatory, uniform

On the Disclosure of Ticket Sales in Charitable Lotteries

We show that a policy of disclosing the ticket sales during a fundraising lottery raises total revenue when there are more than two bettors. The optimal timing of the disclosure is when about half of the players have purchased lottery tickets

Long-run Equilibrium Shift and Short-run Dynamics of U.S. Home Price Tiers During the Housing Bubble

We use vector error correction models to examine the interdependence between the high and the low price tiers during the latest housing market boom and bust. For 118 of the 364 US statistical areas analyzed, the tiered price indexes are bound by a long-run relationship. In general, low tier homes appreciated more than high tier homes in the past two decades. In contrast to previous periods of high volatility, however, low tier homes appreciated more during the boom and lost more value during the bust of the market. We find a shift in the long-run equilibrium during the bubble —the cointegration parameter that ties the tiers together is greater in absolute value during the bubble period compared to the periods of more moderate appreciation and depreciation rates. Moreover, the shift in the long-run equilibrium can be explained by differences in subprime originations across housing markets. We also find that short run price dynamics is driven by momentum in both segments of the market