Vico's Problem with the Role of Cartesian Epistemology in the Methodology of Science

This article reexamines Vico’s early critique of Cartesian reasoning and of how the Cartesian method, which comes from epistemology, creates problems for the sciences once embedded into their methodologies and given a foundational role. The focus will be on De nostri temporis studiorum ratione (1709), where Vico argues against generalizing the Cartesian method and overemphasizing clarity and distinctness in the search for truth. To this end, Vico’s relation to Cartesianism is first carefully contextualized. Then, Vico is presented as a hylomorphist when it how scientific disciplines and their instruments interrelate, something key for understanding why he questions the “instrumentalization” of the Cartesian method in the first place. Afterwards, Vico’s account of the impossibility of maximal scientific progress when the Cartesian method is prioritized across the sciences is presented, as probabilistic reasoning and the importance of the imagination and memory take centerstage. Lastly, the article looks at Vico’s opposition to the geometrical method’s role in physics and his defense of visual thinking in mathematics. The hope throughout is to advance a picture of the early Vico as being not only a neo- Baconian pragmatist, but a hypermodern ”meta-Cartesian” thinker concerned with humanity’s optimizing its creative potential in order to achieve scientific advances

Cognition, Thought and Object: A Reappraisal of Transcendental Logic’s Nature

In this article, I re-examine Kant’s many senses of cognition, thought, and object in order to better understand his account of logic, and, in particular, transcendental logic. In laying out the multiple and conflicting ways Kant defines each of those terms, the relation between transcendental logic and pure general logic can be revealed as analogous to, and, indeed, linked to, the isomorphism that exists between the categories of the understanding and the logical forms of judgment, which are equivalent if one ignores the manifold of intuition This means transcendental logic is a general logic, even as a logic (some) cognizing

What's the Deal with Standup Comedy?

The artform of standup comedy can be seen as having much in common with the discipline of philosophy, particularly with the way philosophy is carried out or “performed,” whether professionally or otherwise. There are, for instance, certain basic similarities between how standup comedians and philosophers value ideals of clarity and precision when it comes to the issue of determining what kind of language is best to employ if one seeks to either effectively deliver a funny joke, as in the case of standup comedy, or if one seeks to effectively articulate and present an argument that can later be assessed as sound, as in the case of philosophy. The reason this is of note is because it is rooted in another similarity that serves not only to bring these two activities significantly closer but to isolate standup comedy from most artforms when it comes to how it conceives of matters pertaining to interpretation and purpose. More specifically, this is the fact that standup comedians and philosophers alike hope, and even expect on some level, that, in the best of cases, their respective jokes and reasoned arguments will compel some form of unanimous approval from those who properly understand and engage with their content. When this observation is combined with the additional observation that jokes can also serve as vehicles for imparting wisdom of a genuinely philosophical nature despite the fact that generating laughter rather than seeking truth per se represents standup comedy’s ostensive primary goal, this leads one to wonder how porous the boundaries that otherwise serve to distinguish these two activities might be. In particular, in light of the nature and scope of the many similarities that can be said to exist between them, which I lay out and discuss in the article, it seems that standup comedy could even be reasonably argued to be the artform closest to philosophy

Uncovering the Nexus Between Arendt’s Views on Thinking, Judgment, and Action

In this article, I examine the ethical and political dimensions of Hannah Arendt’s fundamental categories of thinking, judgment, and action, with the aim of uncovering and defending the coherence of the otherwise enigmatic nature of their interplay. In so doing, I attempt to resolve many of the tensions and ambiguities that appear to permeate Arendt’s account of judgment, by offering an analysis of its aesthetic structure that will later allow me to offer a new interpretation of the precise relation that holds between thinking and judgment, as well as of judgment’s relation with regard to both morality and politics in general, making extended use of a writing analogy that involves thought experimentation. In this light, the category of judgment will be shown to serve as the bridge that seamlessly connects Arendt’s private conception of thinking, which is personal, contemplative, and anti-teleological, with the intersubjective realm of political action in the public sphere. The nexus binding the three categories together will be shown to consist specifically of an ontogenetic chain of interdependence that begins with thinking and culminates in action, where each successor category in the sequence can be viewed as a higher-order version of its immediate predecessor category. From this, I then explain the way they are able to collectively create a positive feedback loop that turns on the axis of our progress as thinkers, as well as on the state of our moral development as individuals, and which, in the process, creates potential openings for genuine political progress

Some Problems with the Analytic Turn to Hegel

In this state-of-the-field article, I examine some of the problems plaguing present-day analytic Hegel studies and try to find out what can be done to remedy the situation as scholars collectively (and finally) begin grappling with the metaphysico-logical core of Hegel’s thought. In so doing, I go over the various currents of Hegelian interpretation and describe some of the limitations behind the usual analytic approaches which have often tended to downplay key aspects of Hegel’s thought, like his dialectical logic, and which have also partly helped create enthusiasm for metaphysically deflationary approaches to Hegel’s thought. I then propose three practical directives for the betterment of the field in terms of future research, ones which essentially advocate for the generalized adoption of a more historicist approach to certain matters, one that is not mutually exclusive with the overarching scholarly desire to extract something that is philosophically relevant or contemporarily useful from Hegel’s thought, which is what seems to drive analytic Hegel studies in general

Vico on the Meaning and Nature of Scientific Cognition

In this article, I reconstruct and interpret the early Vico’s oft-neglected theory of scientific cognition, as found in his 1710 metaphysical treatise On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians, a work whose aim was to be the handmaid to experimental physics. In particular, I offer a new reading of his verum-factum principle, which holds that the true and the made are interchangeable, by examining this doctrine in light of its unexpected connections to much later trends in philosophy. I also present his criticism of Descartes’ cogito and, finally, Vico’s own solution to the problem of skepticism, which is meant to provide a new foundation for the sciences

EFFICACY OF THE NATIONAL PROGRAM OF IRON SUPPLEMENTATION IN THE ANAEMIA CONTROL IN INFANTS ASSISTED BY CHILD EDUCATION CENTERS

Introduction: iron deficiency occurs in endemic proportion among hildren and is one of the causal factors of inappropriate cognitive, social, motor and reduced learning ability, putting infants as a priority group for nutritional intervention programs aiming to control iron deficiency. Thus, in 2005 the Ministry of Health established the National Program of Iron Supplementation (PNSF) available for the universe of children of 6-24 months old attended in Basic Health Units. Objective: to estimate the prevalence of anaemia and analyse the efficacy of profilatic supplementation with ferrous sufate. Methods: a prospective follow-up study intervention that was developed in the city of Guarujá – SP, Brazil in the universe of children between 6-24 months old attended in the Public Basic Health Units whose parents authorized their participation. The supplement was offered in accordance with the standards of PNSF and diagnosis of anaemia was performed before and 6 months after the intervention period. As a criterion for anaemia was used the standards of the World Health Organization that defines moderate anaemia to haemoglobin (Hb) between 11.0 and 9,5gHb/dL and severe anaemia to below 9,5gHb/dL. Results: a total of 136 children under two years, (81% of total) participated in the study. No statistically significant difference was found between the mean Hb concentration before and after the intervention period (p=0.684). The initial mean Hb was 11,6g/dL (SD=1.82) and the final 11.5g/dL (SD=1.31). Although only 11 of the 49 anemic reached normal values, 33 of them showed an increase in Hb concentration. Conclusion: there was an increase in Hb concentration among children with severe anaemia. There was no change in the situation of children with moderate anaemia. Supplementation with ferrous sulphate was not sufficiently effective in controlling iron deficiency in infants