Dynamic game of offending and law enforcement: a stochastic extension

This article provides an extension of the Fend-Feichtinger-Tragler dynamic game of offending and law enforcement to a stochastic framework. This allows the analysis to reflect actual crime statistics which displays randomness in its distribution. Stochastic paths of crimes are derived. The asymptotic stationary distribution of crime records is also obtained. © 2010 World Scientific Publishing Company.postprin

An observable measure of Tobins marginal q

Examines the q-theory of investment. Mathematical representation of capital accumulation; Measurement of physical depreciatio

A Strategic Concession Game

This paper considers a two-player negotiation problem with complete information and non-transferable payoffs/utilities. There are gains to be made by both players if they make bilateral concessions in their actions, relative to the status quo Nash equilibrium (NE) outcome. The failure to agree on a jointly acceptable arrangement has been a major stumbling block to the exploitation of such gains. The paper develops a concession game which has a cooperative trait in the sense that bilateral concessions in actions are sought by both players, but the game proceeds in a non-cooperative fashion in determining the levels of concessions, given a prior agreement over the rules of the game among the players. The game is applicable to a large class of bargaining situations in which both players would benefit from mutual reductions in their decision variables. Two specific applications, a tariff negotiation game and a cartel output agreement are examined

Microeconomic Analytics: A Vade Mecum for Students Reading Modern Economics

One of the difficulties facing students of modern economics is the analytical notation and short-cut symbolism, its esoteric and often implicit conventions. This work explains the language of modern economic analysis to these students in a clear manner

Second order condition for the firm's long period equilibrium

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Industrial pollution problems in Pearl-River-Delta and mechanism design for an inter-regional management regime

Concurrent Session H301 - 1.2 Organizational Solutions: Issues in Public Managemen

Minimisation: triangle and tetrahedron equiangular properties

This note explores the geometric properties of the sensitivity theorem in parametrized optimization. Interpreting the analysis in terms of directional derivatives and simple projection, we show that it is possible to explain simply and clearly the subtle reasoning underlying the theorem, that a parameter change and the resulting optimal adjustments in the instruments give rise to a change in the objective function which is exactly equal to the change in the objective function brought about by the parameter change without any change in the instruments

Completing the "One line proof" of the dynamic envelope theorem

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