The Priority of Propositional Justification

Turri argues against what he calls an “orthodox” view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, according to which (Basis) it is sufficient for S to be doxastically justified in believing p that p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of having reason(s) R and S believes p on the basis of R. According to Turri, (Basis) is false and hence the orthodox view is wrong. Turri offers “an alternative proposal,” the definitive thesis of which is that the subject’s intellectual abilities explain why a given proposition, p, is justified for her, and argues that, contra the orthodoxy, this proposal leads to explaining propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification rather than vice versa. In this paper, I argue for the following claims: (i) There are good reasons to think that Turri misidentifies “the orthodox view” and his objection thereby misfires, (ii) Even if we assume that Turri’s identification of the orthodox view is correct, his counter-examples to that view are far from being decisive, and (iii) Turri’s own proposal is not “an alternative” to the orthodox view but can be accommodated by it

Harman on Mental Paint and the Transparency of Experience

Harman famously argues that a particular class of antifunctionalist arguments from the intrinsic properties of mental states or events (in particular, visual experiences) can be defused by distinguishing “properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object” and by realizing that the latter are not introspectively accessible (or are transparent). More specifically, Harman argues that we are or can be introspectively aware only of the properties of the object of an experience but not the properties of the experience of an object and hence that the fact that functionalism leaves out the properties of the experience of an object does not show that it leaves out anything mentally relevant. In this paper, I argue that Harman’s attempt to defuse the anti-functionalist arguments in question is unsuccessful. After making a distinction between the thesis of experiencing-act transparency and the thesis of mental-paint transparency, (and casting some doubt on the former,) I mainly target the latter and argue that it is false. The thesis of mental-paint transparency is false, I claim, not because mental paint involves some introspectively accessible properties that are different from the properties of the objects of experiences but because what I call the identity thesis is true, viz. that mental paint is the same as (an array of) properties of the object of experience. The identification of mental paint with properties of the object of experience entails that the antifunctionalist arguments Harman criticizes cannot be rightly accused of committing the fallacy of confusing the two

USABILITY OF LARGE URBAN FACILITIES IN SPATIAL TRANSFORMATION - CASE STUDY OF REGIONAL SHOPPING CENTERS IN ISTANBUL

Due to the dynamic nature of the urban development in developing countries in parallel to rapidly changing economic, social and technological environments, decisions based on master plans do usually fail. Therefore, spatial transformation is the number one prerequisite to create more livable cities in countries where land use and location decisions do greatly divert from master plans that ill-fully represent the nature of urban development in rapidly changing environment. It is very unfortunate that like many developing countries, central government as well as local governments in Turkey have adopted this approach which is totally inappropriate to their changing environment due to rapid urbanization. In middle and low income economies, urbanization has increased by an average of 3.5 and 3.7% per annum, respectively, compared with an average of 1.5% per annum in the industrialized countries (the rate in Turkey was 4.35% from 1965 to 1985). The percent of urban population in the largest city in Turkey, Istanbul, was 24% in 1980 compared to 18% in 1960. The population of Istanbul was 11.2 million in 2000 compared to 11.3 million of Paris and 11.1 million of Osaka, Kobe (World Development Report by World Bank, 1984). In the periphery of the metropolitan city of Istanbul, there are numerous neighborhoods and urban centers hat need spatial transformation or renewal for the betterment of urban space. Renewal was defined as clearance and redevelopment until the mid-1960s. This approach for the urban betterment was changed in the 1970s by establishing legal ground via improvement and development plans. In contrast to this, in parallel to the radical changes in economic policies in the 1980s, renewal policy for the problematic locations in large urban areas were again equaled regeneration, and spatial transformations were made for the capitalization of global interests in the name of urban rent by transformation projects (Dündar, 2001). The former— improvement and development plans— failed due to the reason said in the beginning. The latter— transformation projects— have found limited application (Portakal Çiçeði, Dikmen Vadisi, Zafer Plaza transformation projects and some others) due to two great limitations: finances and public acceptance towards transformation projects. To overcome these obstacles in general, some approaches are developed, such as ÝHT-ÝHTr-Real-estate planning tools, master plans for earthquakes and natural disasters (Istanbul Metropolitan City), KED Model (Çelikhan et al., 2004). However, these approaches have not found widespread application yet due to necessary legal changes they require and most importantly the finances needed for the transformations desired in urban areas. Under the economic and social conditions in developing countries, what expected from ideal transformation approaches are to create financial tools during the process and to offer the urban rent to land owners primarily in order to speed up the transformation process towards the desired direction by creating voluntarily participation at the utmost level and to reduce the legal problems due to the introduction of new developments and land use planned by the transformation projects to be applied. This study is originated from the idea that large urban developments attract new land uses and users to their proximity or repel current land uses and users around them. This process can be seen as a “voluntarily transformation” process. Since large shopping centers or malls are built in almost every largely populated urban area all over the world in the last 20-30 years due to new shopping habits and global capital investments, we studied the effects of large shopping malls on land use in their proximity as being large developments they create urban transformation process in their proximity, as a case study in Istanbul, Turkey. To support our approach, Dennis at al. (2002) interestingly reported in their study in Northern London that the fist step in urban renovation is to renovate retail shopping and shopping centers. In this context, we performed user surveys in residential and commercial areas as well as at real estate agents in the proximity two large shopping centers; namely, Akmerkez (Etiler, Beþiktaþ) and Tepe-Nautilus (Acýbadem, Kadýköy) in Istanbul. In addition, in the study areas the data on land use changes provided by State Statistics Institute of Turkey have been examined. It is concluded the shopping centers stimulated urban transformation on real estates in their close proximity, and in time they created transformations from residential to commercial within their primary influence boundaries, and beyond those up to a certain distance they became an attractive zone for residential use.

Supervenience And Reductive Physicalism

Supervenience physicalism attempts to combine non-reductionism about properties with a physical determination thesis in such a way as to ensure physicalism. I argue that this attempt is unsuccessful: the specific supervenience relation in question is either strong enough to ensure reductionism, as in the case of strong supervenience, or too weak to yield physical determination, as in the case of global supervenience. The argument develops in three stages. First, I propose a distinction between two types of reductionism, definitional and scientific, a distinction thanks to which we can reply to a standard objection against the ontological reductionism of strong supervenience. Second, I claim that because of “the problem of random distribution,” global supervenience needs strengthening to be an adequate relation to capture our physicalistic intuitions; and I show, in accordance with Stalnaker’s relevant proof, why a natural strengthening of global supervenience renders it equivalent to strong supervenience. Finally, I argue against Stalnaker about the possibility of a non-reductionist global supervenience. The upshot is that despite appearances, supervenience physicalism is a form of reductive physicalism

Reconstruction of Deligne classes and cocycles

In this thesis we mainly generalize two theorems from Mackaay-Picken and Picken (2002, 2004). In the first paper, Mackaay and Picken show that there is a bijective correspondence between Deligne 2-classes $\xi \in \check{H}^2(M,\mathcal{D}^2)$ and holonomy maps from the second thin-homotopy group $\pi_2^2(M)$ to $U(1)$. In the second one, a generalization of this theorem to manifolds with boundaries is given: Picken shows that there is a bijection between Deligne 2-cocycles and a certain variant of 2-dimensional topological quantum field theories. In this thesis we show that these two theorems hold in every dimension. We consider first the holonomy case, and by using simplicial methods we can prove that the group of smooth Deligne $d$-classes is isomorphic to the group of smooth holonomy maps from the $d^{th}$ thin-homotopy group $\pi_d^d(M)$ to $U(1)$, if $M$ is $(d-1)$-connected. We contrast this with a result of Gajer (1999). Gajer showed that Deligne $d$-classes can be reconstructed by a different class of holonomy maps, which not only include holonomies along spheres, but also along general $d$-manifolds in $M$. This approach does not require the manifold $M$ to be $(d-1)$-connected. We show that in the case of flat Deligne $d$-classes, our result differs from Gajers, if $M$ is not $(d-1)$-connected, but only $(d-2)$-connected. Stiefel manifolds do have this property, and if one applies our theorem to these and compare the result with that of Gajers theorem, it is revealed that our theorem reconstructs too many Deligne classes. This means, that our reconstruction theorem cannot live without the extra assumption on the manifold $M$, that is our reconstruction needs less informations about the holonomy of $d$-manifolds in $M$ at the price of assuming $M$ to be $(d-1)$-connected. We continue to show, that also the second theorem can be generalized: By introducing the concept of Picken-type topological quantum field theory in arbitrary dimensions, we can show that every Deligne $d$-cocycle induces such a $d$-dimensional field theory with two special properties, namely thin-invariance and smoothness. We show that any $d$-dimensional topological quantum field theory with these two properties gives rise to a Deligne $d$-cocycle and verify that this construction is surjective and injective, that is both groups are isomorphic

Against McGinn's Mysterianism

There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a fairly standard conception of the terms ‘naturalist’ and ‘constructive’, which McGinn himself seems to take for granted

Recognitional Identification and the Knowledge Argument

Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge about experiences is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. Some physicalists (e.g., John Perry) have countered by arguing that what Jackson’s Mary, the perfect scientist who acquires all physical knowledge about experiencing red while being locked in a monochromatic room, lacks before experiencing red is merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity, and that since lacking a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity does not entail lacking any pieces of knowledge of worldly facts, physicalism is safe. I will argue that what Mary lacks in her room is not merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity and that some physicalists have failed to see this because of a failure to appreciate that Mary’s epistemic progress when she first experiences red has two different stages. While the second epistemic stage can perhaps be plausibly considered as acquiring merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity, there is good reason to think that the first epistemic stage cannot be thus considered