After the Authorization for Use of Military Force

This paper offers an alternative vision for the future of U.S. counterterrorism policy in which use-of-force authorizations are a last, rather than first, resort.On September 18, 2001, one week after the deadliest terrorist attacks in U.S. history, President George W. Bush signed into law the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). The AUMF authorized the President: to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.Although its delegation of power to the president was sweeping, the AUMF in fact reflected a compromise between Congress and the Bush Administration—which had sought an even broader and more open-ended grant of authority. Even as fires continued to burn at Ground Zero, Congress pushed back, only authorizing military force against those who could be tied to the groups directly responsible for the September 11 attacks. Despite widespread misrepresentations to the contrary, Congress pointedly refused to declare a "war on terrorism." Instead, the use of force Congress authorized was to be directed at those who bore responsibility for the 9/11 attacks— namely al Qaeda and the Taliban. It was also for a specific purpose: preventing those "nations, organizations, or persons" responsible for the September 11 attacks from committing future acts of terrorism against the United States.A dozen years later, the AUMF remains the principal source of the U.S. government's domestic legal authority to use military force against al Qaeda and its immediate associates, both on the battlefields of Afghanistan and far beyond. But even as the statutory framework has remained unchanged, the facts on the ground have evolved dramatically: The Taliban regime in Afghanistan—behind which al Qaeda had taken refuge—has been removed from power; those individuals most directly responsible for the September 11 attacks have been incapacitated; and, perhaps most importantly, the "core" of al Qaeda has been "decimated. " With the drawdown of U.S. troops in Afghanistan continuing apace, we are getting closer to the day when the AUMF will have served its purpose and the United States will no longer be engaged in an ongoing armed conflict with the Taliban or al Qaeda.Given the evolving sophistication of ordinary U.S. law enforcement and intelligence-gathering tools over the past decade, along with the U.S. president's settled powers under both domestic and international law to use military force in self-defense, the burden should be on those seeking additional use-of-force authority to demonstrate why these existing capacities are inadequate. And even then, any use-of- force authority should be enacted by Congress only after public debate and extensive deliberation, carefully calibrated to the specific threat posed by an identifiable group, and limited in scope and duration, so as to avoid making the very mistake that Congress so assiduously sidestepped after September 11.In short, the paper calls for a new framework statute to replace the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) are unnecessary, provocative, and counterproductive—perpetuating war at a time when we should be seeking to end it. Congress certainly may choose, as it did in the AUMF, to authorize the use of military force against specific, organized groups so as to address an established and sustained threat that existing authorities are inadequate to quell. But until and unless the political branches identify a group that poses such a threat, the many other counterterrorism tools at the government's disposal—including law enforcement, intelligence-gathering, capacity-building, and, when necessary, self-defense capabilities provide a much more strategically sound—and legally justifiable—means of addressing the terrorist threat.In the paper, we provide background on the AUMF and its interpretation over time, explain why the Hoover proposal and other calls for an expanded AUMF are unnecessary and unwise, and outline three alternative approaches for the next generation of U.S. counterterrorism policy

Efficacy and safety of metabolic interventions for the treatment of severe COVID-19: in vitro, observational, and non-randomized open-label interventional study

Background: Viral infection is associated with a significant rewire of the host metabolic pathways, presenting attractive metabolic targets for intervention. Methods: We chart the metabolic response of lung epithelial cells to SARS-CoV-2 infection in primary cultures and COVID-19 patient samples and perform in vitro metabolism-focused drug screen on primary lung epithelial cells infected with different strains of the virus. We perform observational analysis of Israeli patients hospitalized due to COVID-19 and comparative epidemiological analysis from cohorts in Italy and the Veteran's Health Administration in the United States. In addition, we perform a prospective non-randomized interventional open-label study in which 15 patients hospitalized with severe COVID-19 were given 145 mg/day of nanocrystallized fenofibrate added to the standard of care. Results: SARS-CoV-2 infection produced transcriptional changes associated with increased glycolysis and lipid accumulation. Metabolism-focused drug screen showed that fenofibrate reversed lipid accumulation and blocked SARS-CoV-2 replication through a PPARα-dependent mechanism in both alpha and delta variants. Analysis of 3233 Israeli patients hospitalized due to COVID-19 supported in vitro findings. Patients taking fibrates showed significantly lower markers of immunoinflammation and faster recovery. Additional corroboration was received by comparative epidemiological analysis from cohorts in Europe and the United States. A subsequent prospective non-randomized interventional open-label study was carried out on 15 patients hospitalized with severe COVID-19. The patients were treated with 145 mg/day of nanocrystallized fenofibrate in addition to standard-of-care. Patients receiving fenofibrate demonstrated a rapid reduction in inflammation and a significantly faster recovery compared to patients admitted during the same period. Conclusions: Taken together, our data suggest that pharmacological modulation of PPARα should be strongly considered as a potential therapeutic approach for SARS-CoV-2 infection and emphasizes the need to complete the study of fenofibrate in large randomized controlled clinical trials. Funding: Funding was provided by European Research Council Consolidator Grants OCLD (project no. 681870) and generous gifts from the Nikoh Foundation and the Sam and Rina Frankel Foundation (YN). The interventional study was supported by Abbott (project FENOC0003). Clinical trial number: NCT04661930

Don’t Expand the War on Terror

Congress should reject open-ended war and embrace a return to peace. Instead of expanding the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Congress should consider repealing it once the withdrawal of our combat troops from Afghanistan has been completed. Law enforcement, intelligence gathering and other nonmilitary counterterrorism tools ought to be at the forefront of our fight against terrorism

Don’t Expand the War on Terror

Congress should reject open-ended war and embrace a return to peace. Instead of expanding the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Congress should consider repealing it once the withdrawal of our combat troops from Afghanistan has been completed. Law enforcement, intelligence gathering and other nonmilitary counterterrorism tools ought to be at the forefront of our fight against terrorism

Evaluation of differences in injury patterns according to seat position in trauma victims survived traffic accidents

Purpose: Investigation of injury patterns epidemiology among car occupants may help to develop different therapeutic approach according to the seat position. The aim of the study was to evaluate and compare differences in the incidence of serious injuries, between occupants in different locations in private cars. Methods: A retrospective study including trauma patients who were involved in motor vehicle accidents and admitted alive to 20 hospitals (6 level Ⅰ trauma centers and 14 level Ⅱ trauma centers). We examined the incidence of injures with abbreviated injury score 3 and more, and compared their occurrence between seat locations. Results: The study included 28,653 trauma patients, drivers account for 60.8% (17,417). Front passenger mortality was 0.47% higher than in drivers. Rear seat passengers were at greater risk (10.26%) for traumatic brain injuries than front seat passengers (7.48%) and drivers (7.01%). Drivers are less likely to suffer from serious abdominal injuries (3.84%) compared to the passengers (front passengers - 5.91%, rear passengers – 5.46%). Conclusion: Out of victims who arrived alive to the hospital, highest mortality was found in front seat passengers. The rate of serious chest injuries was higher as well. Rear seat passengers are at greater risk for serious traumatic brain injuries. All passengers have a greater incidence of abdominal injuries. These findings need to be addressed in order to develop “customized” therapeutic policy in trauma victims. Keywords: Traffic accidents, Injury pattern, Seat positio