Myths and meanings of voting power : comments on a symposium

These are comments on the Symposium 'Power Indices and the European Union' in the July 1999 issue of this Journal. We point out several common inter-connected confusions and errors concerning the meaning of voting power. We stress the vital distinction between two different intuitive notions of voting power. We emphasize the need for a unified approach to the study of a priori and actual voting power. We show that the family of 'strategic' measures proposed by some of the participants in the Symposium are a natural generalization of the Banzhaf measure

A Special Case of Penrose’s Limit Theorem When Abstention is Allowed

limit theorems, ternary voting games, voting power, weighted voting games, C 71, D71,

Majority shareholder protection by variable qualified majority rules

Shapley-Shubik index, Shapley value, Reorganization, Ban of registration, Application for judical review, C71, G32, G34, G38, K10,

Models and reality: the curious case of the absent abstention

We discuss two inter-related puzzling features of the literature on a priori voting power. First, the mathematical model used in virtually all this literature does not recognize abstention as an option distinct from both a 'yes' and a 'no' vote. Second, real-life decision rules of voting bodies---in particular the US legislature and the UN Security Council---are misrepresented as though they did not allow abstention as a tertium quid. We suggest that these misrepresentations may be examples of what philosophers of science call 'theory-laden observation'

Groups can make a difference: voting power measures extended

Voting power, Banzhaf measure of voting power, Measures of a posteriori voting power, Groups of voters,