Understanding Scientific Practices: The Role of Robustness Notions

This article explores the role of `robustness-notions¿ in an account of the engineering sciences. The engineering sciences aim at technological production of, and intervention with phenomena relevant to the (dis-)functioning of materials and technological devices, by means of scientific understanding thereof. It is proposed that different kinds of robustness-notions enable and guide scientific research: (1) Robustness is as a metaphysical belief that we have about the physical world ¿ i.e., we believe that the world is robust in the sense that the same physical conditions will always produce the same effects. (2) `Same conditions ¿ same effects¿ functions as a regulative principle that enables and guides scientific research because it points to, and justifies methodological notions. (3) Repetition, variance and multiple-determination function as methodological criteria for scientific methods that justify the acceptance of epistemological and ontological results. (4) Reproducibility and stability function as ontological criteria for the acceptance of phenomena described by A¿B. (5) Reliability functions as an epistemological criterion for the acceptance of epistemological results, in particular law¿like knowledge of a conditional form: ¿A¿B, provided Cdevice, and unless other known and/or unknown causally relevant conditions.¿ The crucial question is how different kinds of robustness¿notions are related and how they play their part in the production and acceptance of scientific results. Focus is on production and acceptance of physical phenomena and the rule-like knowledge thereof. Based on an analysis of how philosoophy of science tradtionally justified scientific knowledge, I propose a general schema that specifies how inferences to the claim that a scientific result has a certain epistem ological property (such as truth) are justified by scientific methods that meet specific methodological criteria. It is proposed that `same conditions ¿ same effects¿ as a regulative criterion justifies `repetition, variation and ultiple¿determination¿ as methodological criteria for the production and acceptance of (ontological and epistemological) scientific result

Rigorous Results, Cross-Model Justification, and the Transfer of Empirical Warrant: The Case of Many-Body Models in Physics

This paper argues that a successful philosophical analysis of models and simulations must accommodate an account of mathematically rigorous results. Such rigorous results may be thought of as genuinely model-specific contributions, which can neither be deduced from fundamental theory nor inferred from empirical data. Rigorous results provide new indirect ways of assessing the success of models and simulations and are crucial to understanding the connections between different models. This is most obvious in cases where rigorous results map different models on to one another. Not only does this put constraints on the extent to which performance in specific empirical contexts may be regarded as the main touchstone of success in scientific modelling, it also allows for the transfer of warrant across different models. Mathematically rigorous results can thus come to be seen as not only strengthening the cohesion between scientific strategies of modelling and simulation, but also as offering new ways of indirect confirmation

Models and representation

The problem of representation has generated a sizable literature, which has been growing fast in particular over the last decade. The aim of this chapter is to review this body of work and assess the strengths and weaknesses of the different proposals