Capital mobility, wage bargaining, and social insurance policies in an economic union

economic integration, social insurance policies, capital mobility, wage bargaining, tax competition,

Optimal transportation policy with strategic locational choice

SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre- DSC:3597.9512(CEPR-DP--933) / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreGBUnited Kingdo

Market failure in a creditrationed economy

SIGLEBibliothek Weltwirtschaft Kiel C 158765 / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

Group Welfare and the Formation of a Common Labor Market: Some Global Results

Consider a collection of isolated or autarkic regions. The original residents or natives of each region are by assumption a group with a welfare function defined over group members' consumption. Now suppose the regions form a common labor market and a federal government, and one type from each group can freely migrate to other regions. Under what circumstances is this change even potentially beneficial to all groups? We derive a necessary and sufficient condition that depends only on the exogenous parameters of our model. Earlier treatments of these issues focus on relationships among endogenous variables. Our condition underlies those relationships. We also show that there is nothing pathological about the conditions under which federalism must make some or all groups worse off. When it is possible to make all groups better off, we show that the change can be supported by Wildasin's (1991) corrected Nash equilibrium in redistributive transfers. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006federalism, factor mobility, redistribution, globalization, welfare economics,

The cost of public funds in Australia

A model of labour supply is used to calculate Australias marginal cost of public funds, which is the appropriate cut-off benefit/cost ratio for an additional public project. The labour supply model incorporates effective average and marginal tax rates faced by the representative household in each gross income decile. These rates are estimated from the ABS 1988-89 Household Expenditure Survey. A simulation analysis is performed to calculate the effect on labour supply of a 1 per cent increase in marginal tax rates. The estimated changes in tax revenues and deadweight loss in each decile are used to estimate the marginal cost of public funds.

Immigration and income redistribution: A political economy analysis

This paper examines the effect of immigration on the extent of income redistribution via majority voting on the income tax. The tax outcome depends on the size of the native majority and the initial amount of redistribution in the economy, which in turn determines the skill composition of immigrants. As a main result, we derive conditions for multiple tax equilibria: if the native majority of either skilled or unskilled is not too strong and immigrants are allowed to vote, both a high-tax and a low-tax outcome is possible. In a referendum, natives will then vote against immigrant voting. At best, natives are indifferent towards immigrant voting. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007Political economy, Immigration, Income redistribution,

The Role of Symmetry between the Revenue and the Expenditure Side of the Government Budget in the Debate about the Potential Negative Effects of Tax Competition

capital mobility, public input provision, tax competition,