A note on chances and limitations of psychometric AI

Human-level artificial intelligence (HAI) surely is a special research endeavor in more than one way: In the first place, the very nature of intelligence is not entirely clear; there are no criteria commonly agreed upon necessary or sufficient for the ascription of intelligence other than similarity to human performance (and even this criterion is open for a plethora of possible interpretations); there is a lack of clarity concerning how to properly investigate HAI and how to proceed after the very first steps of implementing an HAI system; etc. In this note I assess the ways in which the approach of Psychometric Artificial Intelligence [1] can (and cannot) be taken as a foundation for a scientific approach to HAI

Explaining and inducing savant skills: privileged access to lower level, less-processed information

I argue that savant skills are latent in us all. My hypothesis is that savants have privileged access to lower level, less-processed information, before it is packaged into holistic concepts and meaningful labels. Owing to a failure in top-down inhibition, they can tap into information that exists in all of our brains, but is normally beyond conscious awareness. This suggests why savant skills might arise spontaneously in otherwise normal people, and why such skills might be artificially induced by low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation. It also suggests why autistic savants are atypically literal with a tendency to concentrate more on the parts than on the whole and why this offers advantages for particular classes of problem solving, such as those that necessitate breaking cognitive mindsets. A strategy of building from the parts to the whole could form the basis for the so-called autistic genius. Unlike the healthy mind, which has inbuilt expectations of the world (internal order), the autistic mind must simplify the world by adopting strict routines (external order)

The savant syndrome: an extraordinary condition. A synopsis: past, present, future

Savant syndrome is a rare, but extraordinary, condition in which persons with serious mental disabilities, including autistic disorder, have some ‘island of genius’ which stands in marked, incongruous contrast to overall handicap. As many as one in 10 persons with autistic disorder have such remarkable abilities in varying degrees, although savant syndrome occurs in other developmental disabilities or in other types of central nervous system injury or disease as well. Whatever the particular savant skill, it is always linked to massive memory. This paper presents a brief review of the phenomenology of savant skills, the history of the concept and implications for education and future research

Wittgenstein, Pretend Play and the transferred use of Language

This essay sketches the potential implications of Wittgensteinian thought for conceptualizations of socalled fictive mental states, e.g. mental calculating, imagination, pretend play, as they are currently discussed in developmental psychology and philosophy of mind. In developmental psychology the young child's pretend play and make-belief are seen as a manifestation of the command of an underlying individualistic "theory of mind". When saying "This banana is a telephone" the child's mind entertains simultaneously two mental representations, a primary or veridical representation about the real properties of banana's and a pretend representation. It is the task of psychology to explain how this "double knowledge" does not result in conceptual chaos. Various sorts of internal mechanisms are postulated. In this essay it is argued that the threat of chaos is misconceived, and that the solutions are irrelevant. Following Wittgenstein's sparse remarks about the secondary sense of words, I argue that pretend language does not refer to underlying individual mental representations but to the child's creative transference of words used in one, primary, domain of application to another, secondary domain. The command and use of the secondary domain logically presupposes the command and use of the primary domain. Since the latter domain is necessarily public and social, fictive mental states cannot be dealt with purely individualistically as current mentalism assumes