A Worst Practices Guide to Insider Threats: Lessons from Past Mistakes

Insider threats are perhaps the most serious challenges that nuclear security systems face. All of the cases of theft of nuclear materials where the circumstances of the theft are known were perpetrated either by insiders or with the help of insiders; given that the other cases involve bulk material stolen covertly without anyone being aware the material was missing, there is every reason to believe that they were perpetrated by insiders as well. Similarly, disgruntled workers from inside nuclear facilities have perpetrated many of the known incidents of nuclear sabotage. The most recent example of which we are aware is the apparent insider sabotage of a diesel generator at the San Onofre nuclear plant in the United States in 2012; the most spectacular was an incident three decades ago in which an insider placed explosives directly on the steel pressure vessel head of a nuclear reactor and then detonated them.While many such incidents, including the two just mentioned, appear to have been intended to send a message to management, not to spread radioactivity, they highlight the immense dangers that could arise from insiders with more malevolent intent. As it turns out, insiders perpetrate a large fraction of thefts from heavily guarded non-nuclear facilities as well. Yet organizations often find it difficult to understandand protect against insider threats. Why is this the case?Part of the answer is that there are deep organizational and cognitive biases that lead managers to downplay the threats insiders pose to their nuclear facilities and operations. But another part of the answer is that those managing nuclear security often have limited information about incidents that have happened in other countries or in other industries, and the lessons that might be learned from them.The IAEA and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) produce"best practices" guides as a way of disseminating ideas and procedures that have been identified as leading to improved security. Both have produced guides on protecting against insider threats.5 But sometimes mistakes are even moreinstructive than successes.Here, we are presenting a kind of "worst practices" guide of serious mistakes made in the past regarding insider threats. While each situation is unique, and serious insider problems are relatively rare, the incidents we describe reflect issues that exist in many contexts and that every nuclear security manager should consider. Common organizational practices -- such as prioritizing production over security, failure to share information across subunits, inadequate rules or inappropriate waiving of rules, exaggerated faith in group loyalty, and excessive focus on external threats -- can be seen in many past failures to protect against insider threats

Evolution of the Gulf, U.S.-Gulf Relations, and Prospects for the Future

The focus of this thesis is the establishment and evolution of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Furthermore, analyzing the U.S. relations with the GCC multilaterally and the Gulf States bilaterally. The final phase is to analyze the prospects of future relations between the U.S. and GCC collectively and individually

Self-Assembly of Arbitrary Shapes Using RNAse Enzymes: Meeting the Kolmogorov Bound with Small Scale Factor (extended abstract)

We consider a model of algorithmic self-assembly of geometric shapes out of square Wang tiles studied in SODA 2010, in which there are two types of tiles (e.g., constructed out of DNA and RNA material) and one operation that destroys all tiles of a particular type (e.g., an RNAse enzyme destroys all RNA tiles). We show that a single use of this destruction operation enables much more efficient construction of arbitrary shapes. In particular, an arbitrary shape can be constructed using an asymptotically optimal number of distinct tile types (related to the shape's Kolmogorov complexity), after scaling the shape by only a logarithmic factor. By contrast, without the destruction operation, the best such result has a scale factor at least linear in the size of the shape, and is connected only by a spanning tree of the scaled tiles. We also characterize a large collection of shapes that can be constructed efficiently without any scaling

Can The Insertion Of An E. coli Shine-Dalgarno Sequence Upstream Of M. ruber proA Of The proBA Operon Enhance Its Expression, As Measured By A Complementation Assay Using E. coli Null Strains?

The process by which the thermophilic bacteria Meiothermus ruber (M. ruber) synthesizes the amino acid proline is examined in this paper. In the well-studied E. coli system, proline biosynthesis involves three enzymes ProA, ProB and ProC; proA and proB form the proBA operon and both proA and proB possess an upstream Shine-Delgarno sequence; and ProB is functionally dependent on ProA as components of a ProBA complex. In previous studies in Dr. Scott’s lab, the putative M. ruber proA (locus tag Mrub1079), proB (Mrub1080) and proC (Mrub1345) genes were cloned into the pKt1 expression vector, transformed into the corresponding E. coli null strains, and tested for complementation. In addition, an Mrub1080-1079 clone was tested for complementation against E. coli proA - and proB - null strains. The M. ruber gene Mrub1345 successfully complemented E. coli proC - null strain but complementation of Mrub1079, Mrub1080 and Mrub1080-1079 clones produced inconclusive results. In this paper, we demonstrate conclusively that Mrub1079 and Mrub1080 complement their respective E. coli null strains, thereby confirming the function of the M. ruber genes in proline biosynthesis. The outcome of the complementation test was not enhanced by testing an intact proBA operon, or by adding an E. coli version of a Shine-Delgarno sequence upstream of the Mrub1079 in the Mrub1080-1079 clone