Human Rights Shaming Through INGOs and Foreign Aid Delivery

Does the ``shaming" of human rights violations influence foreign aid delivery decisions across OECD donor countries? We examine the effect of shaming, defined as targeted negative attention by human rights international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), on donor decisions about how to deliver bilateral aid. We argue that INGO shaming of recipient countries leads donor governments, on average, to ``bypass" the recipient government in favor of non-state aid delivery channels, including international and local NGOs and international organizations (IOs). However, we expect this relationship to be conditional on a donor country's position in the international system. Minor power countries have limited influence in global affairs and are therefore more able to centrally promote human rights in their foreign policy. Major power countries, on the other hand, shape world politics and often confront ``realpolitik" concerns that may require government-to-government aid relations in the presence of INGO shaming. We expect aid officials of minor donor countries to be more likely to condition aid delivery decisions on human rights shaming than their counterparts of major donor countries. Using compositional data analysis, we test our argument using originally collected data on human rights shaming events in a time-series cross-sectional framework from 2004 to 2010. We find support for our hypotheses: On average, OECD donor governments increase the proportion of bypass when INGOs shame the recipient government. When differentiating between donor types we find that this finding holds for minor but not for major powers. These results add to both our understanding of the influences of aid allocation decision-making and our understanding of the role of INGOs on foreign-policy

The accountability of advocacy NGOs: insights from the online community of practice

Advocacy non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play an important role in society by keeping in check the power of corporations and governments and uncovering rights violations. They differ from other NGOs in terms of their agenda, funding structure and the stakeholders they serve, and operate in a context characterised by increasing demands for transparency, accountability and responsible advocacy. This study examines how the accountability agenda of advocacy NGOs is shaped by the need to maintain independence, preserve values and keep reputation unsullied when faced with financial and legitimacy pressures. A netnography method is employed to analyse the discussions taking place in the NGOs’ online community of practice to understand the implications of the accountability challenges faced by advocacy NGOs through the perceptions of NGO professionals. The study reveals that the accountability agenda of advocacy NGOs is determined by the interrelated threats of financial vulnerability, potential loss of independence, legitimacy challenges and the high level of public scrutiny. The findings highlight that imperfect accountability mechanisms (e.g. financial reporting and performance management systems) hinder the ability of advocacy NGOs to demonstrate their accountability

A Blessing and a Curse? Political Institutions in the Growth and Decay of Generalized Trust: A Cross-National Panel Analysis, 1980–2009

Despite decades of research on social capital, studies that explore the relationship between political institutions and generalized trust–a key element of social capital–across time are sparse. To address this issue, we use various cross-national public-opinion data sets including the World Values Survey and employ pooled time-series OLS regression and fixed- and random-effects estimation techniques on an unbalanced panel of 74 countries and 248 observations spread over a 29-year time period. With these data and methods, we investigate the impact of five political-institutional factors–legal property rights, market regulations, labor market regulations, universality of socioeconomic provisions, and power-sharing capacity–on generalized trust. We find that generalized trust increases monotonically with the quality of property rights institutions, that labor market regulations increase generalized trust, and that power-sharing capacity of the state decreases generalized trust. While generalized trust increases as the government regulation of credit, business, and economic markets decreases and as the universality of socioeconomic provisions increases, both effects appear to be more sensitive to the countries included and the modeling techniques employed than the other political-institutional factors. In short, we find that political institutions simultaneously promote and undermine generalized trust

DIFFERENTIAL PROGRAM IMPACT AS A FUNCTION OF TARGET NEED: OR WHY SOME GOOD POLICIES OFTEN SEEM TO FAIL

A growing body of evaluation research has been reporting negative or lack of positive effects from a wide range of social policies and programs. Yet within the data presented one can frequently detect that relative ineffectiveness is far from uniform across time periods and/or population groups. Copyright 1982 by The Policy Studies Organization.

The determinants of aid allocation by regional multilateral development banks and United Nations agencies

This paper examines which factors can explain the allocation of aid by four regional development banks as well as three United Nations agencies. The results suggest the following: Most donors examined also exhibit a bias apparent in bilateral aid allocation in favor of less populous countries. Some of them also share another bias of bilateral donors who give more aid to their former colonies. However, the three United Nations agencies contravene a third bias of bilateral aid allocation and provide more aid to countries geographically more distant from the centers of the Western world. While the regional development banks with the possible exception of the Inter-American one focus exclusively on economic need as measured by per capita income, the three United Nations agencies also take into account human development need in their aid allocation as measured by the Physical Quality of Life Index. Some tentative evidence is found that respect for political freedom is rewarded with higher aid receipts at the aggregate multilateral level and by the Inter-American Development Bank as well as perhaps, in a few estimations, by two of the three United Nations agencies. Neither respect for personal integrity rights nor low levels of perceived corruption play any role in the allocation of aid by the donors looked at. In general, higher military expenditures and arms imports are not associated with higher aid receipts, with a few notable exceptions