Cosmologies with Two-Dimensional Inhomogeneity

We present a new generating algorithm to construct exact non static solutions of the Einstein field equations with two-dimensional inhomogeneity. Infinite dimensional families of $G_1$ inhomogeneous solutions with a self interacting scalar field, or alternatively with perfect fluid, can be constructed using this algorithm. Some families of solutions and the applications of the algorithm are discussed.Comment: 9 pages, one postscript figur

Race and Regulation Podcast Episode 9 - Board Diversity and Community Lending

The racial wealth gap in the U.S. is driven in part by a lack of access to credit among communities of color. But as Brian D. Feinstein of the Wharton School relays in this episode, new empirical research indicates that increasing the level of diversity on regional Federal Reserve Bank boards improves credit access for underbanked minority communities. He draws out the major implications of this research not only for narrowing the racial wealth gap, but for understanding the role that diversity in institutional leadership, including on corporate boards, can play in advancing racial equity more broadly

State Foreclosure Law: A Neglected Element of the Housing Finance Debate

Proponents of robust mortgage finance regulation would do well to look to the states, and specifically to the regulatory effects of state-mandated judicial foreclosure. Judicial foreclosure, which is authorized in almost half of U.S. states, requires that lenders seeking to foreclose on a mortgage file an action in state court. This not only provides borrowers with a forum for holding lenders accountable for their behavior and obligations, but puts the onus on the lender to show that the requirements for foreclosure have been met. It also aids borrowers by delaying the foreclosure process and allowing them to remain in their homes for longer periods while in default. In this brief, Professor Brian Feinstein empirically examines the effects of judicial foreclosure on lender behavior and mortgage costs for consumers. The findings indicate that judicial foreclosure alters lender behavior in ways that are beneficial to borrowers, and that mirror regulatory goals. Lenders exhibit greater caution in loan-approval decisions and offer fewer subprime loans. These results are amplified for lower-income borrowers. Importantly, the costs imposed on lenders by judicial foreclosure do not appear to get passed on to borrowers in the form of higher rates.https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi/1062/thumbnail.jp

Congress in the Administrative State

In an era of increased concern over presidential power, congressional oversight of the executive branch constitutes a substantial—but underappreciated—means of influencing agency decision-making. Scholars too often have overlooked it, and Congress is sub-optimally designed for its provision, but oversight has a significant impact on agency behavior. This Article provides a corrective. It presents the legal mechanisms that give oversight hearings their force and situates these hearings in their historical and legal context. In light of this framework and historical practice, the Article posits that ex post oversight hearings facilitate political control over the administrative state. Because oversight gets its bite from an implicit threat of legislative sanctions should an agency not change its behavior following hearings, however, committees’ decisions whether to pursue oversight hinge on the credibility of this threat. To test this theory, the Article introduces an original dataset of over 14,000 agency “infractions,” i.e., agency actions that are potential subjects of hearings. Analysis of these data reveals, first, that oversight is most likely to occur when the particular preference alignment of Congress, the relevant committee, and the agency make the threat of new legislation credible. A second empirical analysis finds that, when oversight hearings do occur, they can get results; infractions that are subject to hearings are 18.5% less likely to recur compared to otherwise similar infractions that are not subject to hearings. These findings call into question the received wisdom regarding Congress’s role in governance. Whereas scholars focused on the political branches’ formal powers see Congress as a branch in decline, a more nuanced picture emerges when one also considers “soft powers,” like oversight. These findings offer a blueprint for greater congressional involvement in administration: to increase Congress’s role in governance, committee membership rosters should be representative of the larger legislature and committees with overlapping jurisdictions should be established. By redesigning its internal structure, Congress can promote more frequent oversight and, because oversight can be consequential, thereby strengthens Congress as a check on presidential administration

Legitimizing Agencies

The project of bolstering the administrative state’s perceived legitimacy is central to administrative law. To enhance agencies’ legitimacy with the public, generations of judges and scholars have variously called for changes designed to insulate technocrats from political influence, involve interested members of the public, and subject agencies to greater political control. Despite the pitch of debate in elite legal circles, however, little is known about the views of ordinary citizens—the very people whose beliefs constitute popular legitimacy. This Article provides evidence of Americans’ actual views concerning what features contribute to agencies’ perceived legitimacy. It presents the results of a set of experiments in which each participant views a policy vignette with varied information concerning the structures and procedures involved in generating the policy. The results support the century-old idea that empowering politically insulated, expert decision-makers legitimizes agencies. With the insulation of civil servants from appointees and the independent-agency form under strain, this finding implies that, for proponents of a robust administrative state, an independent and technocratic civil service is worth defending. There also is some evidence that public participation in agency decision-making bolsters agencies’ perceived legitimacy. By contrast, the theory—influential on the Supreme Court—that greater presidential involvement enhances legitimacy receives no support