1,578 research outputs found
An Analytical Study of Coupled Two-State Stochastic Resonators
The two-state model of stochastic resonance is extended to a chain of coupled
two-state elements governed by the dynamics of Glauber's stochastic Ising
model. Appropriate assumptions on the model parameters turn the chain into a
prototype system of coupled stochastic resonators. In a weak-signal limit
analytical expressions are derived for the spectral power amplification and the
signal-to-noise ratio of a two-state element embedded into the chain. The
effect of the coupling between the elements on both quantities is analysed and
array-enhanced stochastic resonance is established for pure as well as noisy
periodic signals. The coupling-induced improvement of the SNR compared to an
uncoupled element is shown to be limited by a factor four which is only reached
for vanishing input noise.Comment: 29 pages, 5 figure
Partisan Views of the Economy
In this paper it is argued that political parties may have incentives to adopt a partisan view on the working of the economic system. Our approach is based on a dynamical spatial voting model in which political parties are policy oriented. This model revolves around two interrelated issues x and y. The policy maker sets x directly. There exist two views on the relationship between x and y. Model uncertainty confronts policy makers with the problem of the selection of a model to base their actions on. We show that if voters have imperfect information about the working of the economic system that model selection contains a strategic element. Policy makers are inclined to adopt a view on the working of the economic system which fits in with their preferences.
There is no inherent logic that places monetarists to the right of New Economists. They have different models of economic mechanism, but they need not have different political values. A conservative can be a Keynesian and a liberal a monetarist. These combinations are in fact surprisingly rare.
James Tobin, 1974,The New Economics One Decade Older, p. 62.
I am greatly indebted to Peter Broer, Ben Heydra, Jos Jansen and Wilko Letterie for many helpful suggestions. Furthermore, I would like to thank an anonymous referee for his comments
Self-interest And Public Interest: The Motivations Of Political Actors
Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics showed that the public, politicians, and bureaucrats are often public spirited. But this does not invalidate public-choice theory. Public-choice theory is an ideal type, not a claim that self-interest explains all political behavior. Instead, public-choice theory is useful in creating rules and institutions that guard against the worst case, which would be universal self-interestedness in politics. In contrast, the public-interest hypothesis is neither a comprehensive explanation of political behavior nor a sound basis for institutional design
Popularity functions, partisan effects, and support in parliament
This paper analyzes the popularity of the main political entities in Portugal. Estimation results of popularity functions validate the responsibility hypothesis, with unemployment, and to a lesser extent inflation, affecting popularity levels. There is also evidence of personality effects, of popularity erosion over consecutive terms and of honeymoon effects. Finally, we found that voters' evaluations of incumbents' performance regarding unemployment is affected by their support in Parliament when an incumbent faces more opposition in Parliament, voters are less likely to hold him responsible for unemployment increases.(undefined
Cliophysics: Socio-political Reliability Theory, Polity Duration and African Political (In)stabilities
Quantification of historical sociological processes have recently gained
attention among theoreticians in the effort of providing a solid theoretical
understanding of the behaviors and regularities present in sociopolitical
dynamics. Here we present a reliability theory of polity processes with
emphases on individual political dynamics of African countries. We found that
the structural properties of polity failure rates successfully capture the risk
of political vulnerability and instabilities in which 87.50%, 75%, 71.43%, and
0% of the countries with monotonically increasing, unimodal, U-shaped and
monotonically decreasing polity failure rates, respectively, have high level of
state fragility indices. The quasi-U-shape relationship between average polity
duration and regime types corroborates historical precedents and explains the
stability of the autocracies and democracies.Comment: 4 pages, 3 figures, 1 tabl
- …