Circulating β-endorphin, adrenocorticotrophic hormone and cortisol levels of stallions before and after short road transport: stress effect of different distances

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Since transport evokes physiological adjustments that include endocrine responses, the objective of this study was to examine the responses of circulating β-endorphin, adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH) and cortisol levels to transport stress in stallions.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Forty-two healthy Thoroughbred and crossbred stallions were studied before and after road transport over distances of 100, 200 and 300 km. Blood samples were collected from the jugular vein: first in a single box immediately before loading (pre-samples), then immediately after transport and unloading on arrival at the breeding stations (post-samples).</p> <p>Results</p> <p>An increase in circulating β-endorphin levels after transport of 100 km (<it>P </it>< 0.01), compared to basal values was observed. Circulating ACTH levels showed significant increases after transport of 100 km (<it>P </it>< 0.001) and 200 km (<it>P </it>< 0.001). Circulating cortisol levels showed significant increases after road transport over distances of 100, 200 and 300 km (<it>P </it>< 0.001). An effect of transport on β-endorphin, ACTH and cortisol variations was therefore evident for the different distances studied. No significant differences (<it>P </it>> 0.05) between horses of different ages and different breeds were observed for β-endorphin, ACTH and cortisol levels.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>The results obtained for short term transportation of stallions showed a very strong reaction of the adrenocortical system. The lack of response of β-endorphin after transport of 200–300 km and of ACTH after transport of 300 km seems to suggest a soothing effect of negative feedback of ACTH and cortisol levels.</p

State owned enterprises as bribe payers: the role of institutional environment

Our paper draws attention to a neglected channel of corruption—the bribe payments by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This is an important phenomenon as bribe payments by SOEs fruitlessly waste national resources, compromising public welfare and national prosperity. Using a large dataset of 30,249 firms from 50 countries, we show that, in general, SOEs are less likely to pay bribes for achieving organizational objectives owing to their political connectivity. However, in deteriorated institutional environments, SOEs may be subjected to potential managerial rent-seeking behaviors, which disproportionately increase SOE bribe propensity relative to privately owned enterprises. Specifically, our findings highlight the importance of fostering democracy and rule of law, reducing prevalence of corruption and shortening power distance in reducing the incidence of SOE bribery