Voting over economic plans

We review and provide motivation for a one-sector model of economic growth in which decisions about capital accumulation are made by a political process. If it is possible to commit for at least three periods into the future, then for any feasible consumption plan, there is a perturbation that is majority-preferred to it. Furthermore, plans that minimize the maximum vote that can be obtained against them yield a political business cycle. If it is impossible to commit, voters select the optimal consumption plan for the median voter

Hands-On Physical Science for In-Service Teachers

The initiation of the Virginia Commonwealth University B.S. in Science program was reported in this journal Fall 1999 as a program designed to meet the academic content major of a teacher preparation program for elementary and middle school mathematics and science teachers [1]. This paper reports the current status of the interdisciplinary B.S. in Science degree program including program enrollment data and trends. Also described are refinements in the required curriculum, which include a newly developed geometry, a mathematical computing course, and an emerging teaching technology course featuring graphing calculators, CBLs, and computer software applications

Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Change

This paper shows that different institutional structures for aggregation of preferences under majority rule may generate social choices that are quite similar, so that the actual social choice may be rather insensitive to the choice of institutional rules. Specifically, in a multidimensional setting, where all voters have strictly quasi concave preferences, it is shown that the "uncovered set" contains the outcomes that would arise from equilibrium behavior under three different institutional settings. The three institutional settings are two candidate competition in a large electorate, cooperative behavior in small committees, and sophisticated voting behavior in a legislative environment where the agenda is determined endogenously. Because of its apparent institution free properties, the uncovered set may provide a useful generalization of the core when a core does not exist. A general existence theorem for the uncovered set is proven, and for the Downsian case, bounds for the uncovered set are computed. These bounds show that the uncovered set is centered around a generalized median set whose size is a measure of the degree of symmetry of the voter ideal points

Game Forms for Nash Implementation of General Social Choice Correspondences

Several game forms are given for implementing general social choice correspondences (SCC's) which satisfy Haskin's conditions of monotonicity and No Veto Power. The game forms have smaller strategy spaces than those used in previously discovered mechanisms: the strategy for an individual consists of an alternative, two subsets (of alternatives), and a player number. For certain types of economic and political SCC's, including a-majority rule, the Walrasian, and Lindahl correspondence, the strategy space reduces to an alternative and a vector, where the number of components of the vector is at most twice the dimension of the alternative space

A Variable Polytrope Index Applied to Planet and Material Models

We introduce a new approach to a century old assumption which enhances not only planetary interior calculations but also high pressure material physics. We show that the polytropic index is the derivative of the bulk modulus with respect to pressure. We then augment the traditional polytrope theory by including a variable polytrope index within the confines of the Lane-Emden differential equation. To investigate the possibilities of this method we create a high quality universal equation of state, transforming the traditional polytrope method to a tool with the potential for excellent predictive power. The theoretical foundation of our equation of state is the same elastic observable which we found equivalent to the polytrope index, the derivative of the bulk modulus with respect to pressure. We calculate the density-pressure of six common materials up to 10$^{18}$ Pa, mass-radius relationships for the same materials, and produce plausible density-radius models for the rocky planets of our solar system. We argue that the bulk modulus and its derivatives have been under utilized in previous planet formation methods. We constrain the material surface observables for the inner core, outer core, and mantle of planet Earth in a systematic way including pressure, bulk modulus, and the polytrope index in the analysis. We believe this variable polytrope method has the necessary apparatus to be extended further to gas giants and stars. As supplemental material we provide computer code to calculate multi-layered planets.Comment: 25 pages, 7 figures, 5 tables. This version has been accepted to Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society (MNRAS) Changes from version 1: Change in the title, some extraneous text and a table were cut, Fig. 4 now only describes rocky planets, more references were added. Also a supplemental Python code to create a multi-layered planet is available with this versio

Generalized symmetry conditions at a core point

Previous analyses have shown that if a point is to be a core of a majority rule voting game in Euclidean space, when preferences are smooth, then the utility gradients at the point must satisfy certain restrictive symmetry conditions. In this paper, these results are generalized to the case of an arbitrary voting rule, and necessary and sufficient conditions, expressed in terms of the utility gradients of "pivotal" coalitions, are obtained

Elections with Limited Information: A Multidimensional Model

We develop a game theoretic model of 2 candidate competition over a multidimensional policy space, where the participants have incomplete information about the preferences and strategy choices of other participants. The players consist of the voters and the candidates. Voters are partitioned into two classes, depending on the information they observe. Informed voters observe candidate strategy choices while uninformed voters do not. All players (voters and candidates alike) observe contemporaneous poll data broken down by various subgroups of the population. The main results of the paper give conditions on the number and distribution of the informed and uninformed voters which are sufficient to guarantee that any equilibrium (or voter equilibrium) extracts all information

A Theory of Voting in Large Elections

This paper provides a game-theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections. In our model, voters’ strategies form a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior. We first show that a QRE in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates, and then proceed to show that, with enough voters and the addition of a regularity condition on voters’ utilities, a Nash equilibrium profile of platforms exists when candidates seek to maximize their expected margin of victory. This equilibrium (1) consists of all candidates converging to the policy that maximizes the expected sum of voters’ utilities, (2) exists even when voters can abstain, and (3) is unique when there are only 2 candidates