Maximizing Welfare in Social Networks under a Utility Driven Influence Diffusion Model

Motivated by applications such as viral marketing, the problem of influence maximization (IM) has been extensively studied in the literature. The goal is to select a small number of users to adopt an item such that it results in a large cascade of adoptions by others. Existing works have three key limitations. (1) They do not account for economic considerations of a user in buying/adopting items. (2) Most studies on multiple items focus on competition, with complementary items receiving limited attention. (3) For the network owner, maximizing social welfare is important to ensure customer loyalty, which is not addressed in prior work in the IM literature. In this paper, we address all three limitations and propose a novel model called UIC that combines utility-driven item adoption with influence propagation over networks. Focusing on the mutually complementary setting, we formulate the problem of social welfare maximization in this novel setting. We show that while the objective function is neither submodular nor supermodular, surprisingly a simple greedy allocation algorithm achieves a factor of $(1-1/e-\epsilon)$ of the optimum expected social welfare. We develop \textsf{bundleGRD}, a scalable version of this approximation algorithm, and demonstrate, with comprehensive experiments on real and synthetic datasets, that it significantly outperforms all baselines.Comment: 33 page

Organizing the innovation process : complementarities in innovation networking

This paper contributes to the developing literature on complementarities in organizational design. We test for the existence of complementarities in the use of external networking between stages of the innovation process in a sample of UK and German manufacturing plants. Our evidence suggests some differences between the UK and Germany in terms of the optimal combination of innovation activities in which to implement external networking. Broadly, there is more evidence of complementarities in the case of Germany, with the exception of the product engineering stage. By contrast, the UK exhibits generally strong evidence of substitutability in external networking in different stages, except between the identification of new products and product design and development stages. These findings suggest that previous studies indicating strong complementarity between internal and external knowledge sources have provided only part of the picture of the strategic dilemmas facing firms

Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games

In this paper we introduce a novel flow representation for finite games in strategic form. This representation allows us to develop a canonical direct sum decomposition of an arbitrary game into three components, which we refer to as the potential, harmonic and nonstrategic components. We analyze natural classes of games that are induced by this decomposition, and in particular, focus on games with no harmonic component and games with no potential component. We show that the first class corresponds to the well-known potential games. We refer to the second class of games as harmonic games, and study the structural and equilibrium properties of this new class of games. Intuitively, the potential component of a game captures interactions that can equivalently be represented as a common interest game, while the harmonic part represents the conflicts between the interests of the players. We make this intuition precise, by studying the properties of these two classes, and show that indeed they have quite distinct and remarkable characteristics. For instance, while finite potential games always have pure Nash equilibria, harmonic games generically never do. Moreover, we show that the nonstrategic component does not affect the equilibria of a game, but plays a fundamental role in their efficiency properties, thus decoupling the location of equilibria and their payoff-related properties. Exploiting the properties of the decomposition framework, we obtain explicit expressions for the projections of games onto the subspaces of potential and harmonic games. This enables an extension of the properties of potential and harmonic games to "nearby" games. We exemplify this point by showing that the set of approximate equilibria of an arbitrary game can be characterized through the equilibria of its projection onto the set of potential games

Complexity of Discrete Energy Minimization Problems

Discrete energy minimization is widely-used in computer vision and machine learning for problems such as MAP inference in graphical models. The problem, in general, is notoriously intractable, and finding the global optimal solution is known to be NP-hard. However, is it possible to approximate this problem with a reasonable ratio bound on the solution quality in polynomial time? We show in this paper that the answer is no. Specifically, we show that general energy minimization, even in the 2-label pairwise case, and planar energy minimization with three or more labels are exp-APX-complete. This finding rules out the existence of any approximation algorithm with a sub-exponential approximation ratio in the input size for these two problems, including constant factor approximations. Moreover, we collect and review the computational complexity of several subclass problems and arrange them on a complexity scale consisting of three major complexity classes -- PO, APX, and exp-APX, corresponding to problems that are solvable, approximable, and inapproximable in polynomial time. Problems in the first two complexity classes can serve as alternative tractable formulations to the inapproximable ones. This paper can help vision researchers to select an appropriate model for an application or guide them in designing new algorithms.Comment: ECCV'16 accepte

Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities

We study equilibrium in large games of strategic complementarities (GSC) with differential information. We define an appropriate notion of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium and prove its existence. Furthermore, we characterize order-theoretic properties of the equilibrium set, provide monotone comparative statics for ordered perturbations of the space of games, and provide explicit algorithms for computing extremal equilibria. We complement the paper with new results on the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the sense of Balder and Rustichini (J Econ Theory 62(2):385–393, 1994) or Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77(2):330–353, 1997) for large GSC and provide an analogous characterization of the equilibrium set as in the case of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Finally, we apply our results to riot games, beauty contests, and common value auctions. In all cases, standard existence and comparative statics tools in the theory of supermodular games for finite numbers of agents do not apply in general, and new constructions are required

Supermodular Functions on Finite Lattices

The supermodular order on multivariate distributions has many applications in financial and actuarial mathematics. In the particular case of finite, discrete distributions, we generalize the order to distributions on finite lattices. In this setting, we focus on the generating cone of supermodular functions because the extreme rays of that cone (modulo the modular functions) can be used as test functions to determine whether two random variables are ordered under the supermodular order. We completely determine the extreme supermodular functions in some special cases.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43343/1/11083_2005_Article_9026.pd