The Consequences of Non-Classical Measurement Error for Distributional Analysis

This paper analyzes the consequences of non-classical measurement error for distributional analysis. We show that for a popular set of distributions negative correlation between the measurement error (u) and the true value (y) may reduce the bias in the estimated distribution at every value of y. For other distributions the impact of non-classical measurement di¤ers throughout the support of the distribution. We illustrate the practical importance of these results using models of unemployment duration and income.Distribution functions,Non-classical measurement error,

Involuntary unemployment and the marginal welfare cost of taxation in Belgium.

Belgium; Cost; Welfare;

Academic self-concept, gender and single-sex schooling

This paper assesses gender differences in academic self-concept for a cohort of children born in 1958 (the National Child Development Study). We address the question of whether attending single-sex or co-educational schools affected students’ perceptions of their own academic abilities (academic self-concept). Academic selfconcept was found to be highly gendered, even controlling for prior test scores. Boys had higher self-concepts in maths and science, and girls in English. Single-sex schooling reduced the gender gap in self-concept, while selective schooling was linked to lower academic self-concept overall

Trust, Primary Commodity Dependence and Segregation

Many third world countries seem to fail to create a growth-promoting and peaceful institutional framework and are plagued by ethnic, religious or social conflict. This paper focuses on the impact of primary commodities on group behavior and, thus, on the nature of the resulting societies. Strategies are analyzed in a basic one-shot game with two players and two strategies, in which priors vis-a-vis the other player matter. We show that poverty, foreign interference and trust influence a group's willingness to cooperate. Under some circumstances (partial) segregation and (political) strife prove to be utility-maximizing and equilibrium strategies.Non Cooperative Games; Natural Resources; Trust.

Mobility as distributional difference

We propose a new class of mobility measures which we call “measures of distributional difference.” Members of this new class measure mobility as integrated weighted distributional difference. We demonstrate that many leading measures of mobility proposed in the literature are members of this class. Our approach therefore permits a considerable unification of a diverse literature. Moreover, our tools enable us to make explicit the implicit weighting properties of leading members of this class whose original forms do not lend themselves to such an analysis. This leads us to question the attractiveness of some popular mobility indices.income mobility measures, distributional difference.

Boycotts, power politics or trust building: how to prevent conflict?

In a game of imperfect information, the paper analyzes whether different types of intervention by third parties can ensure that political (ethnic, religious, social, . . . ) groups within a country will pursue a cooperative strategy and how easy it is to predict their effects. We conclude that a strong boycott is the most effective instrument, then comes a weak boycott, followed by power politics. Finally, apart from requiring very detailed information on the relevant parameters of the economy, the use of confidence building measures has a serious flaw: it is incapable of averting civil war.Non Cooperative Games; Third-party Intervention; Conflict Prevention