100 research outputs found

    Introducing Competition in the French Electricity Supply Industry: The Destabilisation of a Public Hierarchy in an Open Institutional Environment

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    The French electricity supply industry is characterized by a vertically integrated monopoly and public ownership and when the government introduced market rules, it was with the aim of preserving the integration of the public incumbent as a national champion. This had two paradoxical effects in favour of competition development and the building of safeguards for entrants: 1/ the creation of a credible regulatory governance structure with effective power of control on network access which promoted market-rules, and the creation of a power exchange for balancing the incumbent’s dominant position; 2/ the credibility of the regulatory framework by the self-control of the incumbent in the use of its dominant position and on the capture of the regulator. These two effects result from the influence of the European institutional environment, in particular the intensive scrutiny of the European Commission, which is superposed on the national one.regulation, electricity

    European experiences with white certificate obligations: A critical review of existing evaluations

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    White certificate obligations impose energy savings targets on energy companies and allow them to trade energy savings certificates. They can be seen as a means of internalizing energy-use externalities and addressing energy efficiency market failures. This paper reviews existing evaluations of experiences with white certificate obligations in Great Britain, Italy and France. Ex ante microeconomic analysis find that the obligation is best modelled as a hybrid subsidy-tax instrument, whereby energy companies subsidize energy efficiency and pass-through the subsidy cost onto energy prices. Ex post static efficiency assessments find largely positive benefit-cost balances, with national differences reflecting heterogeneity in technical potentials. Compliance involved little trading between obligated parties. Whether the cost borne by obligated parties was recovered through increased energy revenue could not be ascertained. Ex post dynamic efficiency assessments find that in addition to addressing liquidity constraints through subsidies, white certificate obligations seem to have addressed informational and organisational market failures. Confidence in these conclusions is limited by the fact that no econometric analysis was performed. Yet the lack of publicly available data, a counterpart to the rationale of the instrument of harnessing private financing, makes any empirical evaluation of white certificate obligations challenging

    Energy/Environment Models: Relationship to Planning in Wisconsin, GDR, Rhone Alps

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    This report is a description and cross-regional comparison of the institutional structures and modeling methodologies of the three regions participating in the IIASA Research Program on Management of Regional Energy/Environment Systems. Descriptions are presented for the state of Wisconsin (USA), the German Democratic Republic, and the Rhone-Alpes Region (France), by specialists and policy makers from the respective regions. These descriptions demonstrate quite vividly the relationships between the institutional structure of a region and its use of models and planning tools

    Impact of Renewable Energy Policy and Use on Innovation: A Literature Review

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    Effects of Lisbon treaty on the European energy policy

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    Incentives to invest in liberalised electricity industries in the North and South. Differences in the need for suitable institutional arrangements

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    International audienceThe issue of investment is all too often underplayed in deregulation reforms focused on market rules and de-integration measures. This presentation criticises first the optimistic approach of the theory of investment incentives through market signals when it is applied to deregulated electricity industries. The greater part of the investment in base-load and peak equipment should be made profitable by income from very high prices during peak and extreme peak periods, that raises a problem of political acceptability. The problem is then addressed in the context of the mature electricity industries in the North. Given the maturity of markets there, a number of modifications to the pure market model could be envisaged to strengthen incentives to invest, but none of them is perfect. The main way is to focus on adaptation of market rules on the Supply of power at peaks and extreme peaks by considering "capacity adequacy" as a public good (with three solutions: capacity payment, reserve obligations, centralised procurement by auctioning for peak capacity). Observation of reforms suggests also the validity of some other Solutions based on a limitation of the competition by allowing long-term contracts and vertical integration between production and Supply. Finally the question is extended to the specific problem of developing Countries characterised by irregular growth. It is argued that reforms must be designed in view of the importance of the need for investment through long-term coordination and reduction of investment risks. Indeed experiences of Latin American liberalised industries show that they have to include a number of competition-based imperfections and to allow ongoing exercise of market power in order to allow prices to rise above competition prices. The single buyer model or some variants of it appear to be good alternatives if one wishes to avoid the twists and turns of the competition paradigm. The difficulty With this model arises from the institutional conditions necessary to make it efficient and not overcostly. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved
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