Pest categorisation of Pseudococcus cryptus

The EFSA Panel on Plant Health performed a pest categorisation of Pseudococcus cryptus Hempel (Hemiptera: Pseudococcidae), the citriculus mealybug, for the EU. P. cryptus originates from Southeast Asia but is now established in East Africa, the Middle East and South America. The pest is not currently known to occur in the EU (there was a record once, in 2006, in a zoo/botanical garden from southern Spain). P. cryptus is not listed in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2072. It is polyphagous, feeding on plants in more than 90 genera in 51 families, and exhibits a preference for citrus (Citrus spp.) and palms (especially Cocos nucifera, Elaeis guineensis and Areca catechu). It is an important pest of citrus in Japan and parts of the Middle East, although in Israel, it is controlled by natural enemies. It is sexually reproductive, has six overlapping generations each year in Israel, and each female lays up to approximately 150 eggs, depending on temperature and host species. The main natural dispersal stage is the first instar, which crawls over the host plant or may be dispersed further by wind and animals. Plants for planting, fruits, vegetables and cut flowers provide potential pathways for entry into the EU. Climatic conditions in EU member states around the Mediterranean Sea where there is host plant availability, especially citrus, are conducive for establishment. The introduction of P. cryptus is expected to have an economic impact in the EU through reduction in yield and quality of important crops (mainly citrus) and damage to various ornamental plants. Phytosanitary measures are available to reduce the likelihood of entry and further spread. P. cryptus meets the criteria that are within the remit of EFSA to assess for this species to be regarded as a potential Union quarantine pest

Pest categorisation of Maconellicoccus hirsutus

The EFSA Panel on Plant Health performed a pest categorisation of Maconellicoccus hirsutus (Hemiptera: Pseudococcidae), the pink hibiscus mealybug, for the EU. M. hirsutus is native to Southern Asia and has established in many countries in tropical and subtropical regions throughout the world. Within the EU, the pest has been reported from Cyprus and Greece (Rhodes). M. hirsutus is not listed in Annex II of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2072. It is highly polyphagous, feeding on plants assigned to 229 genera in 78 plant families, and shows some preference for hosts in the families Malvaceae, Fabaceae and Moraceae. Economically important crops in the EU such as cotton (Gossypium spp.), citrus (Citrus spp.), ornamentals (Hibiscus spp.), grapes (Vitis vinifera), soybean (Glycinae max), avocado (Persea americana) and mulberry trees (Morus alba) may be significantly affected by M. hirsutus. The lower and upper developmental temperature threshold of M. hirsutus on Hibiscus rosa-sinensis are 14.5 and 35.0°C, respectively, with optimal female development estimated to be at 29.0°C. There are about 10 generations a year in the subtropics but as many as 15 may occur under optimal conditions. Plants for planting, fruits, vegetables and cut flowers provide potential pathways for entry into the EU. Climatic conditions in EU member states around the Mediterranean Sea and host plant availability in those areas are conducive for establishment. The introduction of M. hirsutus is expected to have an economic impact in the EU through damage to various ornamental plants, as already observed in Cyprus and Greece, and reduction in yield and quality of many significant crops. Phytosanitary measures are available to reduce the likelihood of entry and further spread. Some uncertainties include the area of establishment, whether it could become a greenhouse pest, impact, and the influence of natural enemies. M. hirsutus meets the criteria that are within the remit of EFSA to assess for it to be regarded as a potential Union quarantine pest

On the Privacy Risks of Publishing Anonymized IP Network Traces

Abstract. Networking researchers and engineers rely on network packet traces for understanding network behavior, developing models, and evaluating network performance. Although the bulk of published packet traces implement a form of address anonymization to hide sensitive information, it has been unclear if such anonymization techniques are sufficient to address the privacy concerns of users and organizations. In this paper we attempt to quantify the risks of publishing anonymized packet traces. In particular, we examine whether statistical identification techniques can be used to uncover the identities of users and their surfing activities from anonymized packet traces. Our results show that such techniques can be used by any Web server that is itself present in the packet trace and has sufficient resources to map out and keep track of the content of popular Web sites to obtain information on the network-wide browsing behavior of its clients. Furthermore, we discuss how scan sequences identified in the trace can easily reveal the mapping from anonymized to real IP addresses.

A generic anonymization framework for network traffic

Lack of trust is one of the main reasons for the limited cooperation between different organizations. The privacy of users is of paramount importance to administrators and organizations, which are reluctant to cooperate between each other and exchange network traffic traces. The main reasons behind reluctance to exchange monitored data are the protection of the users ’ privacy and the fear of information leakage about the internal infrastructure. Anonymization is the technique to overcome this reluctance and enhance the cooperation between different organizations with the smooth exchange of monitored data. Today, several organizations provide network traffic traces that are anonymized by software utilities or ad-hoc solutions that offer limited flexibility. The result of this approach is the creation of unrealistic traces, inappropriate for use in evaluation experiments. Furthermore, the need for fast on-line anonymization has recently emerged as cooperative defense mechanisms have to share network traffic. Our effort focuses on the design and implementation of a generic and flexible anonymization framework that provides extended functionality, covering multiple aspects of anonymization needs and allowing fine-tuning of privacy protection level. The proposed framework is composed by an anonymization application programming interface (AAPI). The performance results show that AAPI outperforms existing tools, while offering significantly more anonymization primitives.

Defending Against Next Generation through Network/Endpoint Collaboration and Interaction

Over the past few years we have seen the use of Internet worms, i.e., malicious self-replicating programs, as a mechanism to rapidly invade and compromise large numbers of remote computers [SPW02]. Although the first worms released on the Internet were large-scale, easy-to-spot massive security incidents [MSB02, MPS+03, SM04, BCJ+05b], also known as flash worms [SMPW04], it is currently envisioned (and we see already see signs, in the wild) that future worms will be increasingly difficult to detect, and will be known as stealth worms. This may be partly because the motives of early worm developers are thought to have been centered around self-gratification brought by the achievement of compromising large numbers of remote computers, while the motives of recent worm and malware developers have progressed to more mundane (and sinister) financial and political gains. Therefore, although recent attackers still want to be able to control a large number of compromised computers, they prefer to compromise these computers as quietly as possible, over a longer period of time, so as to impede detection by current defense mechanisms. To achieve stealthy behavior, these attackers have started using, or at least have the capacity to use, a wide variety of mechanisms that will make their worms more difficult to detect. Such mechanisms might include: ·Encryption: Attackers may communicate with the potential victim using a secure (encrypted) connection, making it difficult for networkbased Intrusion Detection Systems [Roe99, XCA +06] to spot their attempted attack. ·Metamorphism: The body of worms usually contains some initial code that will be executed when the worm invades the victim computer. Metamorphism obfuscates this code by adding various instructions to it, and/or by substituting blocks of instructions with equivalent blocks of other instructions [SFOl]. In this way, two "copies " of the worm would appear to be completely different from each other, confusing worm detection systems that depend on all copies of a worm being practically identical [SEVS04, KK04

First data on the occurrence of Diabrotica virgifera virgifera Le Conte (Coleoptera: Chrysomelidae) in Greece

The western corn rootworm, Diabrotica virgifera virgifera Le Conte (Coleoptera: Chrysomelidae), is a major pest of cultivated corn in North America. It invaded Europe (Belgrade, Serbia) in the early 90s and since then it has rapidly dispersed to several European countries. In 2009, a survey, supported by the Hellenic Ministry of Rural Development and Food in several corn-producing prefectures of Greece, revealed the presence of D. virgifera virgifera for the fi rst time in the country. The survey included sampling of young plants, visual inspection of corn fields and deployment of pheromone traps. The western corn rootworm, which, during the survey, was recorded only in pheromone traps, was first detected in the area of Thessaloniki (northern Greece) in July 2009, and subsequently in Serres, Florina and Pieria prefectures. © Benaki Phytopathological Institute

Cell-free DNA levels in acute myocardial infarction patients during hospitalization

Objectives: The objectives of this study were to investigate cell-free DNA daily concentration changes following an acute myocardial infarction (AMI) and to assess any correlations with complications during hospitalization. Methods and results: Serial cell-free DNA level determinations were performed by quantitative Real-Time PCR in 47 AMI patients once daily during hospitalization (235 samples) and once in 100 healthy subjects. Cell-free DNA concentrations are significantly higher in patients throughout hospitalization compared to healthy subject levels (2.644 (SE 0.0952) vs. 1.519 (SE 0.0566), P<0.001). The median maximum cell-free DNA concentration was 3.5-fold higher (Mann Whitney P=0.0035) in 20/47 patients with complicated post AMI course - group I - (1719.7, range 117.32-4996212.1 GenEq/ml plasma) compared with 27/47 patients without complications - group II - (492.9, range 56.434715.15 GenEq/ml plasma). Substantial differences exist between cell-free DNA concentrations measured on tpre (the day before the complication) and tc: (the day the complication occurred) as well as tpost (the day after the complication) in group I whereby cell-free DNA rises significantly in tc and remains elevated in tpost (tpre, vs. tc, 2.445 vs. 2.965, P=0.0171 and tpre vs. tpost 2.445 vs. 2.913, P=0.023). Conclusions: Cell-free DNA concentrations were elevated in AMI patients compared to healthy control subjects, rise significantly when complications occur and have a potential clinical value in monitoring patient progress during hospitalization