Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU: A note on Methodology

How much influence do interest groups have on policy outcomes in the European Union (EU)? This question is highly relevant for both debates on the democratic legitimacy of the EU and our understanding of policy-making processes in this entity. Nevertheless, because of the difficulties inherent in measuring interest group influence, it has been addressed by only a small number of studies. The purpose of this research note is to stimulate further research by clearly identifying the methodological problems and suggesting ways of how to overcome them. In doing so, I distinguish three broad approaches to measuring interest group influence: process-tracing, assessing `attributed influence' and gauging the degree of preference attainment. Although the review reveals that all three approaches have their shortcomings, I conclude that the difficulty of measuring influence should not be exaggerated either. Methodological triangulation, `method-shopping' and larger-scale data collection should allow us to improve on the state of the art

Investment discrimination and the proliferation of preferential trade agreements

The proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements has arguably been the main change to the international trading system since the end of the Uruguay Round in the mid-1990s. We argue that investment discrimination plays a major role in this development. Preferential trade agreements can lead to investment discrimination because of tariff differentials on intermediary products and as a result of provisions that relax investment rules for the parties to the agreement. Excluded countries are sensitive to the costs that this investment discrimination imposes on domestic firms and react by signing a trade agreement that aims at leveling the playing field. We test our argument using a spatial econometric model and a newly compiled data set that includes 166 countries and covers a period of eighteen years (1990–2007). Our findings strongly support the argument that investment discrimination is a major driver of the proliferation of trade agreements

Electoral cycle timing and popular support for a treaty are crucial in determining whether parties advocate referendums on European integration

David Cameron is committed to holding a referendum on the UK’s EU membership should he win a majority at the next general election. In an effort to understand why parties call for referendums on European integration, Andreas Dür and Nikitas Konstantinidis look at data from the ratification of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty in 2004. They find that the amount of time until the next election has a significant impact on whether parties choose to support referendums or not, and that parties are far more likely to advocate a referendum on unpopular and controversial issues

Investment discrimination and the proliferation of preferential trade agreements

The proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements has arguably been the main change to the international trading system since the end of the Uruguay Round in the mid-1990s. We argue that investment discrimination plays a major role in this development. Preferential trade agreements can lead to investment discrimination because of tariff differentials on intermediary products and as a result of provisions that relax investment rules for the parties to the agreement. Excluded countries are sensitive to the costs that this investment discrimination imposes on domestic firms and react by signing a trade agreement that aims at leveling the playing field. We test our argument using a spatial econometric model and a newly compiled data set that includes 166 countries and covers a period of eighteen years (1990–2007). Our findings strongly support the argument that investment discrimination is a major driver of the proliferation of trade agreements

Understanding the role of joint bodies in EU external relations

Many international agreements made by the European Union establish new institutional mechanisms such as committees and working groups. Drawing on new research, Andreas Dür and Markus Gastinger explain how these ‘joint bodies’ help facilitate cooperation between the EU and third countries, and what they mean for the balance of power between the EU’s institutions

The question of interest group influence

"Interest groups are a major channel through which citizens can express their opinions to decision-makers. Their participation in policymaking may improve decision-making processes by supporting policies that are in line with citizen preferences and blocking policies that solely reflect the interests of the governing elite. At the same time, however, intense interest group pressures may make it difficult for policy-makers to implement the most efficient policies since such policies often impose costs on parts of the public.Competition among interest groups over the distribution of economic gains may also slow down the rate of economic growth (Olson 1982). Finally, if some groups constantly win, interest group politics may undermine the legitimacy of electorally accountable decision making in a democracy. A normative assessment of the role of interest groups in democracies thus crucially depends upon how much power interest groups have, and how power is distributed among different groups. Moreover, an understanding of the role of interest groups in the policymaking process is essential for explanations of policy outcomes. Finally, analysts trying to advise government on policies also have to be aware of the power of interest groups, as this factor determines the political feasibility of different suggestions. In short, research into variations in influence across groups and political systems is important for a series of reasons. Recognising this fact, political scientists have long engaged in theoretical debates on this issue." (excerpt

Conceptualizing and Measuring the Political Salience of EU Legislative Processes

Salience, which can be broadly understood as the importance actors attribute to a political matter, is a key concept in political science. It has been shown to affect diverse matters such as the behaviour of interest groups and decision-makers in concrete policymaking processes as well as citizen attitudes and their voting behaviour. However, quite regularly salience is differently conceptualized and operationalized within and between different political science subfields, which raises questions of theoretical (non-) complementarity and conceptual boundaries as well as of measurement validity. In this paper we review how salience is conceptualized and measured in studies on public opinion, interest groups, political communication and EU legislative policy-making. Empirically, we probe the (non-) complementarity of different conceptualizations with original data on EU legislative policymaking. To do so, we draw on datasets developed in a large project on EU interest group politics (INTEREURO). For a sample of 125 legislative processes initiated by the European Commission (between 2008 and 2010) we combine evidence on salience collected through in-depth analyses of five media-outlets and interviews with 70 Commission experts as well as with 143 interest group representatives

The politics of trade agreement design: revisiting the depth-flexibility nexus

Existing research indicates the interrelated nature of different dimensions of the design of international institutions. In particular, it shows the greater flexibility of deep agreements. We argue—and demonstrate empirically—that the positive relationship between depth and flexibility holds for preferential trade agreements (PTAs). But we add two qualifications to the conventional wisdom that depth and flexibility go hand in hand. First, we argue that the positive relationship between depth and flexibility proves weaker for democracies than for nondemocracies. Second, when making deep agreements more flexible, countries also add strings to the use of the additional flexibility provisions. An original data set on the design of 587 PTAs allows us to test our arguments. Both descriptive evidence and multivariate statistics support the theoretical expectations. The findings contribute to the literatures on the design of international institutions and the causes and consequences of PTAs

Contrary to popular opinion, business actors are less successful than citizen groups at lobbying EU legislators

How powerful are business interests in lobbying for changes to EU legislative proposals? Andreas Dür, Patrick Bernhagen and David Marshall present findings from an analysis of 70 legislative proposals introduced by the European Commission between 2008 and 2010. They note that contrary to popular opinion, business actors proved far less successful than citizen groups at achieving their desired outcomes in EU legislative decisions. They reason that this may be because with the single market completed in most areas, the contemporary European legislative agenda tends to be dominated by proposals aimed at protecting consumers or the environment

How interest groups influence public opinion

Interest groups have a role in shaping public opinion across Europe, but does an interest group's reputation affect its ability to influence the views of the public? Drawing on evidence from two survey experiments, Andreas Dür explains that interest groups only appear to matter due to the arguments they put forward, with the reputations of particular groups having a surprisingly low impact on whether citizens find their arguments convincing. This suggests that citizens do not identify with interest groups in the same way as they may identify with political parties