Between the old metaphysics and the new empiricism: Collingwood's defence of the autonomy of philosophy

Collingwood has failed to make a significant impact in the history of twentieth century philosophy either because he has been dismissed as a dusty old idealist committed to the very metaphysics the analytical school was trying to leave behind, or because his later work has been interpreted as advocating the dissolution of philosophy into history. I argue that Collingwood’s key philosophical works are a sustained attempt to defend the view that philosophy is an autonomous discipline with a distinctive domain of inquiry and that Collingwood’s attempt to defend the autonomy of philosophy is intimately connected to his defence of intensional notions against the kind of meaning scepticism which came to prevail from the 1920s. I defend the philosophical claim that there is a third way between the idealist metaphysics with which Collingwood is often associated and the neo-empiricist agenda which characterised analytic philosophy in mid-century by defending the hermeneutic thesis that Collingwood’s work is a sustained attempt to articulate a conception of philosophy as an epistemologically first science. Since there is a via media between the old metaphysics and the new empiricism there is no need to choose between a certain kind of armchair metaphysics and a scientifically informed ontology

The Ontological Backlash: why did mainstream analytic philosophy lose interest in the philosophy of history?

This paper seeks to explain why mainstream analytic philosophy lost interest in the philosophy of history. It suggests that the reasons why the philosophy of history no longer commands the attention of mainstream analytical philosophy may be explained by the success of an ontological backlash against the linguistic turn and a view of philosophy as a form of conceptual analysis. In brief I argue that in the 1950s and 1960s the philosophy of history attracted the interest of mainstream analytical philosophers because the defence of the autonomy of historical explanation championed by the likes of Collingwood, Dray, Melden, Winch, Von Wright and others was in tune with the predominant conception of philosophy as a conceptual enterprise concerned primarily with clarifying different explanatory practices. As this conception of philosophy as an essentially conceptual enterprise became recessive, the purely methodological non-reductivism advocated by defenders of the autonomy of history was accused of ontological escapism and the discussion concerning the autonomy of psychological explanations became the province of the philosophy of mind and action

Reasons and causes: the philosophical battle and the meta-philosophical war

Since the publication of Davidson’s “Actions, Reasons and Causes” the philosophy of action has been dominated by the view that rational explanations are a species of causal explanations. Although there are dissenting voices, anti-causalism is for the most part associated with a position that tended to be defended in the 1960s and that was successfully buried by Davidson’s criticism of the logical connection argument. In the following I argue that the success of causalism cannot be fully accounted for by considering the outcome of first-order debates in the philosophy of action and that it is to be explained instead by a shift in meta-philosophical assumptions. It is the commitment to a certain second-order view of the role and character of philosophical analysis, rather than the conclusive nature of the arguments for causalism, that is largely responsible for the rise of the recent causalist consensus. I characterise the change in meta-philosophical assumptions in Strawsonian terms as a change from a descriptive to a revisionary conception of metaphysics and argue that since the disagreement between causalists and non-causalists cannot be settled at the level of first-order debates, causalists cannot win the philosophical battle against anti-causalists without fighting the meta-philosophical war

Policy Optimization in a Noisy Neighborhood: On Return Landscapes in Continuous Control

Deep reinforcement learning agents for continuous control are known to exhibit significant instability in their performance over time. In this work, we provide a fresh perspective on these behaviors by studying the return landscape: the mapping between a policy and a return. We find that popular algorithms traverse noisy neighborhoods of this landscape, in which a single update to the policy parameters leads to a wide range of returns. By taking a distributional view of these returns, we map the landscape, characterizing failure-prone regions of policy space and revealing a hidden dimension of policy quality. We show that the landscape exhibits surprising structure by finding simple paths in parameter space which improve the stability of a policy. To conclude, we develop a distribution-aware procedure which finds such paths, navigating away from noisy neighborhoods in order to improve the robustness of a policy. Taken together, our results provide new insight into the optimization, evaluation, and design of agents.Comment: NeurIPS 2023 Accepted Pape

Motor skills in children with primary headache: A pilot case-control study

Background: Headache is the most common painful manifestation in the developmental age, often accompanied by severe disability such as scholastic absenteeism, low quality of academic performance and compromised emotional functioning. The aim of the study is to evaluate praxic abilities in a population of children without aural migraine. Materials and methods: The test population consists of 10 subjects without migraine without aura (MwA), (8 Males) (mean age 8.40, SD ± 1.17) and 11 healthy children (7 Males) (mean age 8.27; SD ± 1.10; p = 0.800). All subjects underwent evaluation of motor coordination skills through the Battery for Children Movement Assessment (M-ABC). Results: The two groups (10 MwA vs 11 Controls) were similar for age (8.40 ± 1.17 vs 8.27 ± 1.10; p = 0.800), sex (p = 0.730), and BMI (p = 0.204). The migraine subjects show an average worse performance than the Movement ABC; specifically, migraineurs show significantly higher total score values (31.00 ± 23.65 vs 4.72 ± 2.61; p = 0.001), manual dexterity (12.10 ± 11.20 vs 2.04 ± 2.65; p = 0.009) and balance (14.85 ± 10.08 vs. 1.04 ± 1.05; p <0.001). The mean percentile of migraine performance is significantly reduced compared to controls (9.00 ± 3.82 vs 51.00 ± 24.34, p <0.001) (Table 1). Conclusion: Migraine can alter many cognitive and executive functions such as motor skills in developmental age

Serafino Zappacosta: An Enlightened Mentor and Educator

With this article, the authors aim to honor the memory of Serafino Zappacosta, who had been their mentor during the early years of their career in science. The authors discuss how the combination of Serafino Zappacosta's extraordinary commitment to teaching and passion for science created a fostering educational environment that led to the creation of the “Ruggero Ceppellini Advanced School of Immunology.” The review also illustrates how the research on the MHC and the inspirational scientific context in the Zappacosta's laboratory influenced the authors' early scientific interests, and subsequent professional work as immunologists