Spillback Effects of Expansion When Product-Types and Firm-Types Differ

Contrary to perspectives that credit firms with only limited abilities to undertake significant change successfully, recent research has demonstrated that firms often improve their performance after undertaking major expansion to their operations. In this paper, we build on a study by Mitchell and Singh (1993) to test for differences in expansion effects, depending on whether the new goods substitute for old products and whether the firm is a generalist or specialist participant in the industry. The analysis helps us understand when a business can undertake major change successfully. The results have implications for ecological and other definitions of the core of a business and highlight the necessity for firms to undertake changes even at considerable risk to their existing operations.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/68398/2/10.1177_014920639502100105.pd

Keeping the Board in the Dark: CEO Compensation and Entrenchment

We study a model in which a CEO can entrench himself by hiding information from the board that would allow the board to conclude that he should be replaced. Assuming that even diligent monitoring by the board cannot fully overcome the information asymmetry visà- vis the CEO, we ask if there is a role for CEO compensation to mitigate the inefficiency. Our analysis points to a novel argument for high-powered, non-linear CEO compensation such as bonus pay or stock options. By shifting the CEO’s compensation into states where the firm’s value is highest, a high-powered compensation scheme makes it as unattractive as possible for the CEO to entrench himself when he expects that the firm’s future value under his management and strategy is low. This, in turn, minimizes the severance pay needed to induce the CEO not to entrench himself, thereby minimizing the CEO’s informational rents. Amongst other things, our model suggests how deregulation and technological changes in the 1980s and 1990s might have contributed to the rise in CEO pay and turnover over the same period

The theory of the firm and its critics: a stocktaking and assessment

Includes bibliographical references."Prepared for Jean-Michel Glachant and Eric Brousseau, eds. New Institutional Economics: A Textbook, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.""This version: August 22, 2005."Since its emergence in the 1970s the modern economic or Coasian theory of the firm has been discussed and challenged by sociologists, heterodox economists, management scholars, and other critics. This chapter reviews and assesses these critiques, focusing on behavioral issues (bounded rationality and motivation), process (including path dependence and the selection argument), entrepreneurship, and the challenge from knowledge-based theories of the firm

α-Arrestins Aly1 and Aly2 Regulate Intracellular Trafficking in Response to Nutrient Signaling

Arrestins, known regulators of endocytosis, take on novel functions in nutrient-regulated endosomal recycling. Yeast α-arrestins, Aly1 and Aly2, redistribute the Gap1 permease from endosomes to the cell surface and interact with clathrin/AP-1. Aly2 is regulated by the Npr1 kinase and acts through mechanisms distinct from Aly1

Active learning and optimal climate policy

This paper develops a climate-economy model with uncertainty, irreversibility, and active learning. Whereas previous papers assume learning from one observation per period, or experiment with control variables to gain additional information, this paper considers active learning from investment in monitoring, specifically in improved observations of the global mean temperature. We find that the decision maker invests a significant amount of money in climate research, far more than the current level, in order to increase the rate of learning about climate change. This helps the decision maker make improved decisions. The level of uncertainty decreases more rapidly in the active learning model than in the passive learning model with only temperature observations. As the uncertainty about climate change is smaller, active learning reduces the optimal carbon tax. The greater the risk, the larger is the effect of learning. The method proposed here is applicable to any dynamic control problem where the quality of monitoring is a choice variable, for instance, the precision at which we observe GDP, unemployment, or the quality of education

Ownership structure, investment behaviour and firm performance in Japanese manufacturing industries

Abstract Using data spanning the 1996-98 fiscal years of 247 of Japan's largest manufacturers, we empirically evaluate the extent to which a firm's investment behaviour and financial performance are influenced by its ownership structure. To do so, we examine six distinct categories of Japanese shareholders: foreign investors, investment funds, pension funds, banks and insurance companies, affiliated companies and insiders. Our findings strongly indicate that the relationship between the equity stakes of a particular category of investor and a firm's financial performance and investment behaviour is considerably more complex than is depicted in simple principal-agent representations. Such a result emphasizes the importance of making finely grained and contextually relevant distinctions when modelling and evaluating corporate governance relations

Institutional Labor Economics, the New Personnel Economics, and Internal Labor Markets: A Reconsideration

The author illustrates the utility of institutional labor economics and makes a case for a reconsideration of it. Two recent developments motivate this effort: the rise of New Personnel Economics (NPE) as a significant subfield of labor economics and the substantial shifts in work organization that have taken place since the 1990s. Understanding how and why firms have reorganized work opens the door for a renewed interest in institutional approaches. The author explains that the rules of institutional labor markets (ILMs) emerge from the competition between organizational interest groups—unions, personnel professionals, and the government—and competing views of firms’ objectives—resulting in the rise of ILMs, the slow diffusion of High Performance Work Systems, strategies used to obtain a high level of commitment from workers, the use of contingent employees, and the spread of new promotion rules in response to equal employment opportunity pressures. As such, the role of power and influence in establishing work rules is of central concern, though more conventional NPE considerations also remain important