The Generalization in the Generalized Event Count Model, with Comments on Achen, Amato, and Londregan.

We use an analogy with the normal distribution and linear regression to demonstrate the need for the Generalized Event Count (GEC) model. We then show how the GEC provides a unified framework within which to understand a diversity of distributions used to model event counts, and how to express the model in one simple equation. Finally, we address the points made by Christopher Achen, Timothy Amato, and John Londregan. Amato's and Londregan's arguments are consistent with ours and provide additional interesting information and explanations. Unfortunately, the foundation on which Achen built his paper turns out to be incorrect, rendering all his novel claims about the GEC false (or in some cases irrelevant)

Relevance, conflict, and UN voting buying : latent variable methods for international politics

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester. Dept. of Political Science, 2011.The first chapter introduces split population binary choice models to address the issue of irrelevant dyads in the dyadic analysis of conflict with binary dependent variables. The advantage of employing a statistical model instead of directly identifying relevant dyads manifests itself in the selection of relevant dyads: Rather than researchers making take-it-or-leave-it decisions, covariates are used to estimate relevance as a latent variable. An application of the model to the trade conflict debate shows that the unconditional probability of conflict, the quantity of interest for traditional binary choice models based on all dyads, is non-monotonic with respect to trade when generated by the split population model. This finding provides one explanation for why trade is found either to increase or decrease the probability of conflict in existing research, as monotonicity by chance is imposed on an underlying non-monotonic relationship. In the second chapter, I develop a statistical model to address unobserved dyad-specific heterogeneity in the dyadic analysis of conflict. The model unifies the estimation of dyad-specific effects and latent relevance within the split population framework. It is estimated through a Bayesian hierarchical approach, and therefore shies away from the methodological problems related to fixed effects models. I apply the proposed model to reexamine the debate of the Kantian peace, and demonstrate that existing approaches generate biased inferences about international organizations, showing that international organizations increase conflict. The new statistical model, on the other hand, recovers the constraining effect of international organizations on international conflict. The third chapter introduces a statistical technique to measure the influence of U.S. aid on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. The proposed model simultaneously estimates the influence of aid and country ideal points, in contrast with existing research that ignores the theoretical and empirical importance of country ideal points in explaining voting patterns. I find that U.S. aid induces voting compliance, but the substantive effect of aid varies a great deal with resolutions and recipients, and it is often negligible. Furthermore, the disaggregated analyses show that U.S. aid is more effective at influencing certain resolutions (e.g., Middle East votes) and recipients (e.g., Asian countries) than others (e.g., human rights votes and countries involved in militarized conflict with the U.S., respectively)

Bargaining under watchful eyes : international conflict and third party observation.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester. Dept. of Political Science, 2013.The dissertation asks the question: do states behave differently when they are being observed? It expands upon the theoretical literature on international conflict by examining the way in which observation by hostile third parties affects crisis bargaining between states. The dissertation consists of three essays that combine theoretical and empirical components to analyze the key research question. Essay one presents a formal theoretical model of state behavior under observation. It shows that states tend to bargain harder when they believe that they are being observed, in order to keep potential future opponents unsure about their strength. This has the effect of increasing the likelihood of war. I elucidate the theoretical mechanisms with an application to the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Essay two uses a new estimator, the local logit, to assess the empirical implications of the previous chapter statistically. It shows that the probability that a conflict escalates is increasing in the likelihood of observation when the attacker's costs for fighting are moderate or high, and that once information is revealed by war, subsequent conflicts become less likely. Finally, essay three applies the framework to mediation both theoretically and empirically. It demonstrates that a mediator can solve the problems uncovered in the first two essays by preventing the dissemination of information. The empirical results suggest that dyads that are more likely to be observed are less likely to experience mediation, but are more likely to resolve the conflict with at least one state making concessions when mediation does occur

Strategic dilemmas : states, non-state actors, and international conflict

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester. Dept. of Political Science, 2009.This dissertation consists of three distinct papers that share common elements both in terms of scientic approach and substance. The first paper examines why and when states strategically consolidate disputed territory currently under their control. I find that when territory is of military importance targets of territorial challenges are increasingly likely to consolidate as they face militarily stronger challengers. In the second paper I theoretically examine the trade-offs in policy choice for states in dispute with violent non-state actors that are hosted by another state. A key result of this paper is that the use of harsh punishments (i.e., military strikes) against the host state are unsustainable in several important scenarios even when they would successfully compel host compliance. The third and final paper examines how the survival of terrorist groups is affected by factors of central theoretical interest such as state sponsorship. Contrary to the assertions of numerous scholars and observers, state sponsorship is not necessarily a blessing for groups. Rather, if a groups relies on its sponsor for its sole safe haven, this dependence is found to be harmful to the organization's survival prospects

Replication data for: Aggregation Among Binary, Count, and Duration Models: Estimating the Same Quantities from Different Levels of Data

Binary, count, and duration data all code discrete events occurring at points in time. Although a single data generation process can produce all of these three data types, the statistical literature is not very helpful in providing methods to estimate parameters of the same process from each. In fact, only a single theoretical process exists for which known statistical methods can estimate the same parameters—and it is generally used only for count and duration data. The result is that seemingly trivial decisions about which level of data to use can have important consequences for substantive interpretations. We describe the theoretical event process for which results exist, based on time independence. We also derive a set of models for a time-dependent process and compare their predictions to those of a commonly used model. Any hope of understanding and avoiding the more serious problems of aggregation bias in events data is contingent on first deriving a much wider arsenal of statistical models and theoretical processes that are not constrained by the particular forms of data that happen to be available. We discuss these issues and suggest an agenda for political methodologists interested in this very large class of aggregation problems