The system of aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs in clinical care settings

Abstract A review of the literature on blood stream infections caused by contaminated intravenous infusates which are prepared in clinical care settings found that this common nursing procedure poses at times a significant and life-threatening risk to patients. The guidance and regulations surrounding the preparation of intravenous drugs in clinical care settings suggests that this procedure is extremely complex and poses many different potential hazards to patients. This thesis set out to determine how the infection risks are being addressed in practice by asking the questions: ‘What is the system of intravenous drug preparation in clinical care settings in NHS Scotland?’ and, ‘How does it work in practice?’ Several data sources were utilised: six locations, in specialities where the literature identified significant outbreaks had occurred, were examined for potential contamination risk. Observations (78) of infusate preparations were undertaken and, where available, written procedures were compared with observed practices. Finally, analyses were made of 71 questionnaires, completed by the nurses who prepare intravenous drugs, regarding their opinions of the procedures’ safety and when they perform redundancy checks. The conclusion of this study is that the system of preparing intravenous drugs in clinical care settings by nurses is, as a consequence of potential infusate contamination, error-prone and unreliable. The reasons for this conclusion are now detailed. o Due to a lack of mandatory environmental standards, and the provision of poor environments, there is a risk of infusate contamination from environmental sources and consequently, a risk to patients of infusate-related blood stream infections (IR-BSI). o Some in use equipment poses contamination risks to patients’ infusates. Equipment that could reduce the contamination risk is not always available and in some instances such safety-enhancing equipment has been removed. o There are no complete written procedures which mirror what is done in practice. At present, from a human-factors perspective, it is not easy for the nurse to do the right thing, or to be sure exactly what is the right thing to do. o The procedure, in practice, has the required elements of an aseptic procedure, but the execution of the procedure is more often not performed aseptically. o The procedure of intravenous drug preparation as observed is mainly an interrupted aseptic procedure and as such the recommencement of the aseptic procedure requires repeated hand hygiene. o The nurses’ opinions of safety vary, as did their assessment of the infection risk to their patients, but it is clear that intravenous drug preparation is not a much-loved nursing procedure and some nurses find it very stressful. o There is no asepsis quality control built into the system. Aseptic steps are the least likely to be performed as a redundancy check compared to the mandatory checks of ‘right patient, right drug and right dose’. o The information available to the nurses, from the drug companies, from the makers of equipment and from national agencies does not identify with sufficient clarity the infection risks, or detail how to negate them. Suggestions for improvement to the six procedures and environments are clear once the procedure steps are colour-coded as either aseptic or non-aseptic; validity testing of these improvements is however, still needed. The systems’ vulnerabilities observed in this research appear to stem from a chain of external influences including an underestimation of the problem size and the actions needed to prevent it in evidence-based guidelines and mandatory guidance. This leads to poor recognition of the risk of IR-BSI in clinical practice. The problem of infusate contamination causing IR-BSIs is further compounded by the fact that it is not caused by a single organism and does not always present as a disease in real time, that is, over the lifetime of the infusion. As a consequence, this presents surveillance difficulties in terms of definitions, data collection and analysis. Finally, although the diagnosis of a blood stream infection for an individual patient remains relatively easy, it is not easy to recognise a contaminated infusate as the origin of the problem. All these challenges make both the recognition of the problem and agreement on prevention strategies, extremely challenging. In summary, the main conclusion of this thesis is that the preparation of infusates in clinical care settings, which occurs approximately 3,000,000 times a year in NHSScotland, is from an aseptic perspective, error-prone and unreliable. Recommendations to optimise patient safety include, changing the procedure locally and, with the utmost urgency, the production of minimum environmental standards. The results of this study are relevant to all hospitals in Scotland and throughout the United Kingdom where the current regulations apply and similar procedures are performed

A comparison of the nationally important infection prevention and control documents in NHS England and NHS Scotland

Background: The devolution of health to Scotland in 1999, led for the first time in the NHS to different priorities and success indicators for infection prevention and control (IPC). This project sought to understand, compare and evaluate the national IPC priorities and available indicators of success. Aim: To identify the national infection prevention and control priorities alongside national indicators of success. Methods: Critical analysis of nationally produced documents and publicly available infection related data up to March 2018. Findings: For both NHS Scotland and England the local and national infection prevention and control priorities are evidenced by: a) People being cared for in an IPC safe environment, b) Staff following IPC safe procedures and c) organisations continuously striving not just to attain standards, but to improve on them. If national agencies that produce data were also charged with using a Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) model, then there would be further opportunities to detect and improve on successes

Transmission of Salmonella enteritidis after endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography because of inadequate endoscope decontamination

We report a historic nosocomial outbreak of Salmonella enteritidis affecting 4 inpatients who underwent endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography. The cause was attributed to inadequate decontamination of an on-loan endoscope used over a weekend. This report highlights the risks of using on-loan endoscopes, particularly regarding their commissioning and adherence to disinfection protocols. In an era of increasing antibiotic resistance, transmission of Enterobacteriaceae by endoscopes remains a significant concern

The where is norovirus control lost (WINCL) study: an enhanced surveillance project to identify norovirus index cases in care settings in the UK and Ireland

Background: Norovirus outbreaks have a significant impact on all care settings; little is known about the index cases from whom these outbreaks initiate. Aim: To identify and categorise norovirus outbreak index cases in care settings. Methods: A mixed-methods, multi-centre, prospective, enhanced surveillance study identified and categorised index cases in acute and non-acute care settings. Results: From 54 participating centres, 537 outbreaks were reported (November 2013 to April 2014): 383 (71.3%) in acute care facilities (ACF); 115 (21.4%) in residential or care homes (RCH) and 39 (7.3%) in other care settings (OCS). Index cases were identified in 424 (79%) outbreaks. Of the 245 index cases who were asymptomatic on admission and not transferred within/into the care setting, 123 (50%) had been an inpatient/resident for 4 days. Four themes emerged: missing the diagnosis, care service under pressure, delay in outbreak control measures and patient/resident location and proximity. Conclusion: The true index case is commonly not identified as the cause of a norovirus outbreak with at least 50% of index cases being misclassified. Unrecognised norovirus cross-transmission occurs frequently suggesting that either Standard Infection Control Precautions (SICPs) are being insufficiently well applied, and or SICPs are themselves are insufficient to prevent outbreaks

Unmasking leading to a health care worker Mycobacterium tuberculosis transmission.

BACKGROUND Mycobacterium tuberculosis is a major health burden worldwide. The disease can present as an individual case, community outbreak or more rarely a nosocomial outbreak. Even in countries with a low prevalence such as the UK, tuberculosis (TB) presents a risk to healthcare workers (HCWs). AIM To report an outbreak which manifested 12 months after a patient with pulmonary tuberculosis was admitted to Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham (QEHB). METHODS We present the epidemiological and outbreak investigations; the role of whole genome sequencing (WGS) in identifying the outbreak and control measures to prevent further outbreaks. FINDINGS Subsequent to a case of open tuberculosis in a patient transmission was confirmed in one healthcare worker (HCW) who had active TB; HCW cases of latent TB infection (LTBI) were also identified amongst 7 HCW contacts of the index case. Of note, all the LBTI cases had other risk factors for TB. Routine use of Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) identified the outbreak link between the index case to the HCW with active TB disease, and also informed our investigations. CONCLUSIONS Exposure most likely occurred during an aerosol generating procedure (AGP) which was done in accordance with national guidance at that time without using respiratory protection. Enhanced control measures were implemented following the outbreak