Introduzione

In this Introduction, we provide an overview of the papers included in the special issue of the e-journal Esercizi Filosofici, entitled \u201cLa dimensione pragmatica in filosofia, linguistica e semiotica\u201d (The pragmatic dimension in philosophy, linguistics, and semiotics). The paper is divided into three parts, which are concerned with the application of pragmatics to philosophy, linguistics and semiotics respectively

How the Context Matters. Literal and Figurative Meaning in the Embodied Language Paradigm

The involvement of the sensorimotor system in language understanding has been widely demonstrated. However, the role of context in these studies has only recently started to be addressed. Though words are bearers of a semantic potential, meaning is the product of a pragmatic process. It needs to be situated in a context to be disambiguated. The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis that embodied simulation occurring during linguistic processing is contextually modulated to the extent that the same sentence, depending on the context of utterance, leads to the activation of different effector-specific brain motor areas. In order to test this hypothesis, we asked subjects to give a motor response with the hand or the foot to the presentation of ambiguous idioms containing action-related words when these are preceded by context sentences. The results directly support our hypothesis only in relation to the comprehension of hand-related action sentences

RIFLESSIONI SU LINGUAGGIO E COGNIZIONE SPAZIALE Un confronto tra lingue vocali e lingue dei segni

Depending on which theoretical paradigm is used, the relationship between spatial language and spatial thought could be presented in different ways. What is the nature of this relationship? Are spatial cognitive abilities a prerequisite for spatial language or, vice-versa, is it spatial language that shapes and affects our spatial reasoning? This paper is aimed at highlighting the dynamic interaction between spatial language and spatial cognition. That is, we need some spatial abilities in order to acquire spatial language. We share most of these core spatial abilities with other animals. These structures are the basis for spatial language, and this explains the presence of universal features in spatial descriptions in languages all over the world. On the other hand, the acquisition of language affects human spatial cognition, making us species-specific. This coevolutionary relationship holds true both in phylogeny and in ontogeny. Only the ontogenetic perspective will be discussed in this paper by means of a comparison between spoken and sign languages. In particular, both of these linguistic modalities rely on the same spatial reasoning, and therefore have universal structures for the encoding of space. However, data showing that different language modalities affect cognition in a different way will also be presented. That is to say, although there are universal structures in the linguistic encoding of space, the learning of a sign language will affect spatial reasoning in a peculiar way, leading to a significant enhancement in spatial cognition. In light of the data reviewed, it seems that the relationship between language and thought is complex and bidirectional. Spatial language is grounded in our biology and in our cognition; on the other hand spatial language itself affects spatial cognition

Is Embodiment All That We Need?Insights from the Acquisition of Negation

Simulation of propositional content does not sufficiently explain real-life linguistic activity, even for action-related language. In addition, how we get from propositional content to implicit and inferential meaning needs to be explained. Indeed, simulative understanding is immediate, automatic and reflex-like while an explicit interpretative act, even if not always needed, is still a part of many linguistic activities. The aim of this paper is to present the hypothesis that speaking is a complex ability realized by means of at least two different mechanisms that are likely developed at different and consecutive steps of cognitive and linguistic development. The first mechanism has a neural explanation grounded in the notion of embodied simulation. The second implies socio-cognitive skills such as Theory of Mind. In order to fully develop the second mechanism, a symbolic communication and interaction with a cultural community are needed. This hypothesis will be tested by looking at the acquisition of linguistic negation

Parole che risuonano. Usi linguistici e simulazione motoria

One of the great merits of the embodied language paradigm is that of highlighting the fact that language understanding has to be led back to action and perception. The comprehension of an action-related sentence activates the same neural structures that enable the execution of that action. However, embodied language studies have been mostly focused on descriptive usages of language. Notions such as those of usage, context or pragmatic intrusion have not been sufficiently considered. A usage-based model of language will be here presented. Embodied language studies will be discussed in the light of this model

From a bodily-based format of knowledge to symbols. The evolution of human language

Although ontogeny cannot recapitulate phylogeny, a two-level model of the acquisition of language will be here proposed and its implication for the evolution of the faculty of language will be discussed. It is here proposed that the identification of the cognitive requirements of language during ontogeny could help us in the task of identifying the phylogenetic achievements that concurred, at some point, to the acquisition of language during phylogeny. In this model speaking will be considered as a complex ability that arises in two different steps. The first step of competence widely relies on a bodily-based format of knowledge. The second step relies on more abstract meta-representations and implies high-level socio-cognitive skills. It is hypothesized that in order to reach the second level of language competence, symbolic communication and interaction with a cultural community are needed. Hence, the origins of species-specific human complex language and cognition are in both the brain and culture. Moreover, in this model, data from the embodied language research will be discussed in the light of a usage-based account of language

A Peircean account of concepts: Grounding abstraction in phylogeny through a comparative neuroscientific perspective

The nature of concepts has always been a hotly debated topic in both philosophy and psychology and, more recently, also in cognitive neuroscience. Different accounts have been proposed of what concepts are. These accounts reflect deeply different conceptions of how the human mind works. In the last decades, two diametrically opposed theories of human cognition have been discussed and empirically investigated: the Computational Theory of Mind, on the one hand (Fodor 1983 The modularity of mind: an essay on faculty psychology; Pylyshyn 1984 Computation and cognition: toward a foundation for cognitive science), and Embodied Cognition (Barsalou 2008 Annu. Rev. Psychol. 59, 617-645. (doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639); Gallese & Lakoff 2005 Cogn. Neuropsychol. 22, 455-479 (doi: 10.1080/02643290442000310); Shapiro 2011 Embodied cognition), on the other hand. The former proposes that concepts are abstract and amodal symbols in the language of thought, while the latter argues for the embodied nature of concepts that are conceived of as grounded in actions and perception. The embodiment of both concrete and abstract concepts has been challenged by many (e.g. Mahon & Caramazza 2008 J. Physiol. 102, 59-70. (doi: 10.1016/j.jphysparis.2008.03.004); Caramazza et al. 2014 Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 37, 1-15. (doi: 10.1146/annurev-neuro-071013-013950)). These challenges will be here taken seriously and addressed from a comparative perspective. We will provide a phylogenetic and neurobiologically inspired account of the embodied nature of both abstract and concrete concepts. We will propose that, although differing in certain respect, they both might have a bodily foundation. Commonalities between abstract and concrete concepts will be explained by recurring to the Peircean notions of icon and abductive inference (CP 2.247). According to Peirce, icons are the kind of signs on which abductive inferences rest (Peirce CS 1931 in Collected papers of Charles S. Peirce, Hartshorne C, Weiss P, Burks AW. (eds), 40; Peirce CS 1997 In The 1903 Harvard lectures on pragmatism (ed. A. Turrisi)). It will be claimed that the mechanism of Embodied Simulation (Gallese & Sinigaglia 2011 Trends Cogn. Sci. 15, 512-519. (doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2011.09.003)) can be described as an icon (Cuccio V & Caruana F. 2015 Il corpo come icona. Abduzione, strumenti ed Embodied Simulation. Versus, n. 119, 93-103), and it will then be suggested that on these, basic natural signs rest, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, the capacity to conceptualize.This article is part of the theme issue 'Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain'