Why believe in contentless beliefs?

This paper motivates the idea that the most basic kind of believing is a contentless attitude. It gives reasons for thinking that the most basic sort of belief – the sort that both we and other animals adopt toward situations – does not represent those situations in truth-evaluable ways. I call such attitudes pure intentional attitudes. They are not propositional attitudes, which I take to be linguistically mediated intentional attitudes

Avenues for Investigating the Neural Crest and Its Derivatives in Non-model (Unconventional) Vertebrates: A Craniofacial Skeleton Perspective

One of the early, profound insights regarding the biology of the neural crest was the observation of its contribution to the skeletal structures of the cranium and jaws. The critical nature of these structures made the comparative analysis of the cranial neural crest and its derived structures essential investigative aims toward our understanding of the development and evolution of vertebrates and vertebrate-specific structures. Though classically applied to a relatively wide range of taxa in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the application of traditional methodologies for complex comparative developmental and anatomical analyses subsequently become more limited by their time-consuming nature, resource scarcity, and a greater emphasis on the genetic and molecular regulation of patterning and morphogenesis in a select number of tractable model organisms. Recently, however, this trend has been reversed, and the value of genetic and molecular-based questions applied to non-model (unconventional) vertebrate organisms has been re-appreciated. This is particularly true of comparative investigations of cranial neural crest biology. Herein, we present methodologies for the analysis of the cranial neural crest and its structural derivatives employable in modern investigations of both model and unconventional vertebrate organisms

Positive illusions and the happy mind

This chapter addresses the controversial question of whether happy minds gain happiness by cultivating positive illusions, that is, views of self that exaggerate one’s good qualities and degree of control over life and that involve unrealistically optimistic outlooks. Much evidence indicates that positive illusions contribute to well-being, but there are limits and contrary findings, and it is not viable to claim that engaging in endless rounds of self-flattering self-deception is a reliable guide to happiness. Illusions do confer benefits, including self-fulfilling prophecies and interpersonal appeal. We contrast two theories: a direct route by which self-deception makes one happy, and an indirect route by which positive illusions contribute to pragmatic, objective benefits, which in turn increase happiness. The evidence is mixed as to which route is more relevant. We note some negative effects of positive illusions, such as when they reduce effort and achievement