Savings banks as an institutional import: the case of nineteenth-century Ireland

The article examines the early history of provident institutions or trustee savings banks in Ireland. Combining aggregate data and an archive-based study of one savings bank, it describes the growth and performance of this institutional import . By and large, Irish savings banks catered for the lower-middle and middle classes, not the poor as intended by the founders of the movement. The article also explains how the collapse of three savings banks in 1848 dealt savings banks in Ireland as a whole a blow from which they never really recovered.

What do people die of during famines: the Great Irish Famine in comparative perspective

The Irish Famine killed over a million people who would not have died otherwise. The nosologies published by the 1851 Irish census provide a rich source for the causes of death during these catastrophic years. This source is extremely rich and detailed, but also inaccurate and deficient to the point where many scholars have given up using it. In this article we try to make adjustments to the death-by-cause tabulations and provide more accurate ones. These tables are then used to analyse the reasons why so many people died and why modern famines tend to be less costly in terms of human life.

FAMINE AND MARKET IN ANCIEN R GIME FRANCE

How and how well do food markets function in famine conditions? The controversy surrounding this question may benefit from historical perspective. Here we study two massive famines that struck France between 1693 and 1710, killing over two million people. In both cases the impact of harvest failure was exacerbated by wartime demands on the food supply; we ask whether the crises were exacerbated yet further by a failure of markets to function as they did in normal times. The evidence, we conclude, is most consistent with the view that markets in fact helped alleviate these crises, albeit modestly.Aujourd hui ces mati res paraissent d une telle aridit qu elles provoquent le vide, m me au sein du parlement, si par hasard on les y discute On ne voit plus des carts de prix comparables ceux des grandes ann es de famine de la fin du r gne de Louis XIV: 1693 et 1709.Germain Martin (French historian) in 1908 Today these issues seem so stupifyingly dull that they produce an empty house, even in parliament, if by chance they are discussed there . One no longer sees gaps in prices comparable to those of the years of famine at the end of the reign of Louis XIV, in 1693 and 1709. Martin, Famines, p. 150.

The Panics of 1854 and 1857: A View from the Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank

Using records of individual depositors accounts, this article provides a detailed microeconomic analysis of two banking panics. The panics of 1854 and 1857 were not characterized by an immediate mass panic of depositors and had important time dimensions. We examine depositor behavior using a hazard model. Contagion was the key factor in 1854 but it created only a local panic. The 1857 panic began with runs by businessmen and banking sophisticates followed by less informed depositors. Evidence suggests that this panic was driven by informational shocks in the face of asymmetric information about the true condition of bank portfolios.