Natures Solution to Climate Change

A strategy to protect whales can limit greenhouse gases and global warmin

The price is not right

The 2015 Paris Agreement requires all nations to combat climate change and to adapt to its effects. Countries promise to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions through their Nationally Determined Contributions. Pledges to reduce emissions, however, have implications for economic growth. We estimate the link between economic growth and CO2 pollution levels and find that this relationship is highly non-linear. A country's GHG emissions rise rapidly as its economic activity rises, relative to global activity, meaning that fast-growing countries contribute most heavily to current GHG emissions. Then, using real per-capita GDP as our metric, we estimate how much the carbon price should be in order to remove the economic growth benefit from excess GHG emissions. We find that the implied prices are far higher than the prices on any existing market for emissions as well as estimates of the social cost of carbon. Our findings also have important implications for the global dialogue regarding responsibility for climate mitigation as well as for the choice of policies to support mitigation efforts

Risky choice in the limelight

This paper examines how risk behavior in the limelight differs from that in anonymity. In two separate experiments we find that subjects are more risk averse in the limelight. However, risky choices are similarly path dependent in the different treatments. Under both limelight and anonymous laboratory conditions, a simple prospect theory model with a path-dependent reference point provides a better explanation for subjects’ behavior than a flexible specification of expected utility theory. Additionally, our findings suggest that ambiguity aversion depends on being in the limelight, that passive experience has little effect on risk taking, and that reference points are determined by imperfectly updated expectations

Trust as a Means of Improving Corporate Governance and Efficiency

Agency problems within the firm are a significant hindrance to efficiency. We propose trust between coworkers as a superior alternative to the standard tools used to mitigate agency problems: increased monitoring and incentive-based pay. We show how trust induces employees to work harder, relative to those at firms that use the standard tools. In addition, we show that employees at trusting firms have higher job satisfaction, and that these firms enjoy lower labor cost and higher profits. Finally, we show how trust may also be easier to use within the firm than the standard agency-mitigation tools

Should Subsidized Private Transfers Replace Government Social Insurance?

ansfers between individuals or through organized charities are increasingly viewed as an alternative for government social insurance programs. This paper models the incentive effects of government subsidized private transfers and finds that while there is a significant welfare benefit to subsidizing private transfers, there is also a significant welfare cost to this policy. It is shown analytically, as well as through simulations, that the optimal subsidy to private transfers is positive for a wide range of parameter values. This result indicates that subsidized private transfers in net terms are welfare enhancing

IMF Institute Six Puzzles in Electronic Money and Banking

This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. The literature on the economic effects of electronic money and banking lacks organization and a common analytical framework. This paper identifies the main issues raised by e-money and e-banking and presents them as six puzzles. Our solutions to the puzzles build a framework for analyzing the effects of e-money and e-banking, and for choosing the appropriate approach to regulating electronic money and banking. Although electronic money and banking will likely not fulfill the more dire predictions in the literature, such as the possible loss of central banks ’ ability to control the money supply, they nonetheless wil

Should Subsidized Private Transfers Replace Government Social Insurance?

Private transfers between individuals or through organized charities are increasingly viewed as an alternative for government social insurance programs. This paper models the incentive effects of government subsidized private transfers and finds that while there is a significant welfare benefit to subsidizing private transfers, there is also a significant welfare cost to this policy. It is shown analytically, as well as through simulations, that the optimal subsidy to private transfers is positive for a wide range of parameter values. This result indicates that subsidized private transfers in net terms are welfare enhancing.

Trust As a Means of Improving Corporate Governance and Efficiency

Agency problems within the firm are a significant hindrance to efficiency. We propose trust between coworkers as a superior alternative to the standard tools used to mitigate agency problems: increased monitoring and incentive-based pay. We show how trust induces employees to work harder, relative to those at firms that use the standard tools. In addition, we show that employees at trusting firms have higher job satisfaction, and that these firms enjoy lower labor cost and higher profits. Finally, we show how trust may also be easier to use within the firm than the standard agency-mitigation tools.Moral hazard;altruism, wage, profit sharing, compensation, wages, worker, benefits, employee compensation, executive compensation, morality, ethics, financial incentives