Some virtues of evidentialism

O evidencialismo é, primordialmente, uma tese sobre a justificação epistêmica e, secundariamente, uma tese sobre o conhecimento. Sustenta que a justificação epistêmica é superveniente da evidência. As versões do evidencialismo diferem quanto ao que conta como evidência, quanto ao que seja possuir algo como evidência e quanto ao que um dado corpo de evidência apóia. A tese secundária é a de que o apoio evidencial é necessário ao conhecimento. O evidencialismo ajuda a formular as questões epistemológicas de uma forma que é ótima para que se perceba o núcleo dos problemas. Oferece soluções, sem mascarar as dificuldades. Nós fornecemos ilustrações disso através da consideração dos problemas da justificação a priori e do ceticismo. O evidencialismo também oferece a base para que se compreenda uma grande variedade de fatos e conceitos epistemológicos. Nós fornecemos ilustração disso, mostrando que o evidencialismo pode explicar como a justificação pode ser anulada, como as atitudes distintas da crença podem ser objeto de avaliação e como a própria prática da filosofia é epistemicamente valios

PLEASURE AND INTRINSIC GOODNESS

The three major philosophical connections between concepts are analysis, epistemic mark, and general theoretical link. Each has been thought to relate pleasure to intrinsic goodness. The Introduction consists in a brief study of the nature of these connections. The body of the thesis examines whether pleasure and intrinsic goodness are so related. In Chapter III the question is whether the concept of pleasure enters into an analysis of the concept of being intrinsically good. This topic is approached through writings by Franz Brentano. It is argued that no such analysis is possible. Chapter III is concerned with whether pleasure can help us to identify the bearers of intrinsic goodness. Again, some of Brentano\u27s work is central to the topic, as is work by Charles Baylis. It is argued that pleasure is of no special help in discovering the intrinsic goods. Chapter IV begins with an attempt to give a clear and complete formulation of hedonism--the theory according to which only pleasure is intrinsically good. The formulation builds upon the efforts of Warren Quinn and Edward Oldfield. Then an argument against hedonism by Brentano is critically assessed. C. D. Broad\u27s objection to the effect that the pleasure of malice is not intrinsically good is then evaluated, as is G. E. Moore\u27s objection to the effect that beauty is also intrinsically good. It is contended that hedonism does not succumb to any of these objections. The Appendix considers whether instrumental value of any sort depends upon intrinsic goodness. It is argued that most familiar sorts do not so depend, but one can be shown to do so by a kind of First Cause argument

A Counterfactual approach to epistemic possibility

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester. Dept. of Philosophy, 2013.I defend a new account of epistemic possibility in terms of evidential support for a counterfactual relation: a proposition is epistemically possible on a body of evidence just in case that evidence supports that if the proposition were true, then the evidence might exist. In addition to avoiding problems faced by others in the literature, this account has desirable consequences for other important issues in epistemology. Epistemic possibility is a relationship between a body of information and a proposition—given some information, some propositions are possible while some are “ruled out”. I distinguish the project of analyzing this relationship from the recently controversial issue of which information is relevant in determining the truth of epistemic possibility sentences. I then present counterexamples to current accounts of the epistemic possibility relation based on knowledge or probabilistic relations, as well as reasons to doubt contextualism about epistemic possibility. My own view is designed to capture the reasoning that we often use when determining whether a proposition might be true. For example, a detective considering who might have committed a murder should think about how the evidence would have been if various suspects were guilty. If the detective has reason to believe that the evidence might have been just as it is if a suspect were guilty, then that suspect might be the murderer. If the evidence would have been different, then the suspect is ruled out. Given correct understandings of evidential support and counterfactuals, this theory gives intuitively correct results in a range of cases that serve as counterexamples to competing views. Paired with a plausible principle relating epistemic possibility to knowledge, this view also has desirable consequences for puzzles about knowledge. It preserves the intuition that knowledge is incompatible with the possibility of error, while maintaining consistency with fallibilism. It also allows for a simple solution to the lottery problem, as well as a unique and interesting response to skepticism. Thus, in addition to its plausibility as a theory of epistemic possibility, the counterfactual view I present solves difficult problems across epistemology

On the epistemic relevance of perceptual experience : a defense of experientialist internalism.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester. Department of Philosophy, 2015.My dissertation defends Experientialist Internalism (EI). EI is an intuitively plausible view about the justification of perceptual beliefs. It consists in two main theses. Experientialism: Perceptual experiences are items of ultimate nondoxastic evidence for typical justified perceptual beliefs; Perceptual Internalism: A perceptual belief B is justified for a subject S at a time T only if S is aware of evidence for B at T. By endorsing these theses, EI explains why perceptual experiences are often crucial factors in the justification of perceptual beliefs: a necessary condition on the justification of such beliefs is awareness of evidence for them, and perceptual experiences are items of evidence for them, items of evidence of which subjects are typically aware, and for which no further justification is required. I develop and support a specific version of EI in this dissertation. This version of EI explains in detail both how perceptual experiences can be items of ultimate nondoxastic evidence for perceptual beliefs and how such experiences can ultimately contribute to the justification of those beliefs. It emphasizes the presentational, unified, object-oriented phenomenology of perceptual experiences, as well as the need for subjects to be in some way aware of evidential connections between their perceptual experiences and the perceptual beliefs that are (thereby) justified for them. I motivate and support this view using a combination of intuitive evidence, evidence from thought experiments, and evidence from cognitive science. Additionally, I argue that my version of EI can overcome recent challenges to experientialism and to perceptual internalism. By explaining how perceptual experiences can contribute to the justification of perceptual beliefs, my version of EI resolves challenges related to what some philosophers have referred to as the “mystery” of perceptual justification. By requiring a minimal, nondoxastic awareness of evidence and of evidential connections, my view overcomes a dilemma claiming that perceptual internalism is either unmotivated or succumbs to vicious skeptical regress. Finally, by virtue of the same requirement, my view resolves the problem of the speckled hen, the problem of explaining why certain particularly complex perceptual experiences provide justification to only particular perceptual beliefs for typical perceivers

Consequentialism and doing and allowing

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester. Dept. of Philosophy, 2008.This dissertation examines two questions in basic moral theory. The first asks whether to accept that there is a difference between doing and allowing and that any supposed difference is relevant to moral evaluation, as commonsense morality claims. The second asks whether the moral relevance of the difference between doing and allowing is compatible with consequentialist moral theories. Initial appearances favor incompatibility because consequentialism is the view that only the value of the outcomes of an act are relevant to moral evaluation while appeals to the difference between doing and allowing imply that how an action is related to its outcomes is relevant to moral evaluation. I answer the first question with a qualified affirmative. Chapters 2 through 4 present arguments showing that the commonsense appeal to doing and allowing is reasonable though proof that the moral relevance of doing and allowing is metaphysically determined is elusive. In Chapters 5 and 6 I defend the reasonableness of the commonsense appeal by explaining doing as interference in the possession of a good and allowing as refraining from action that sustains possession of a good. I support the claim that doing harm is worse than allowing harm with respect to doing and allowing but it is not a conclusive difference. The qualification is that the Interference-Dependence account most clearly applies to non-distributable goods, which might restrict the scope of RT more than some defenders of commonsense morality would have it. Contrary to the common view that consequentialism and doing and allowing are incompatible, I answer the second question affirmatively. Chapter 7 argues that Act-Value-Adjusted-Consequentialism, which combines the values of the act and the act’s consequences, is compatible with the Interference-Dependence account of doing and allowing. An important result of the compatibility of the Interference-Dependence account and AVAC is that it implies the reasonableness of moral judgments that are consistent with commonsense morality without a consequence-independent constraint often thought necessary to support commonsense moral judgments. The compatibility result thus supports the view that consequentialism is the correct moral theory. Chapter 8 presents conclusions