The East Lancashire Clinic Model: Supporting care homes to understand reactive behaviours (Innovative Practice)

The East Lancashire Clinic model is a consultancy-based approach to supporting care home staff to assess and respond to reactive behaviours of people with dementia and reduce the need to refer into secondary mental health services. The clinics are person centred and solution focused, aiming to promote recognition of unmet needs and early interventions implemented by staff. The pilot was able to resolve most cases and reduce referral rates into secondary care services. Through working collaboratively, it empowers staff to improve the care of all their residents, improves relationship with secondary care services and has potential to offer efficiency savings

Incentives to Invest and to Give Access to Non-Regulated Next Generation Networks

We analyze the incentives of a telecommunications incumbent to invest and give access to a downstream entrant to a next generation network, NGN. We model the industry as a duopoly, where a vertically integrated incumbent and a downstream entrant, that requires access to the incumbent's network, compete on Hotelling's line. The incumbent can invest in the deployment of a NGN that improves the quality of the retail services. Access to the old network is regulated, but access to the NGN is not. If the innovation is drastic, the incumbent always invests in the NGN, but does not give access to the entrant. If the innovation is non-drastic and if the access price to the old network is low, the incumbent voluntarily gives access to the NGN. If the innovation is non-drastic, there is no monotonic relation between the access price to the old network and the incumbent's incentives to invest. A regulatory moratorium emerges as socially optimal, if the innovation is large but non-drastic. We also analyze the case where both rms can invest in the deployment of a NGN

Prospects in Britain in the light of the Bus Services Act 2017

The aim of this paper is not to document a specific research project, but to provide an international audience with an overview of the Bus Services Act 2017 in Britain in the light of the extensive experience of deregulation and privatisation within the British bus and coach industry since the early 1980s. It provides a range of powers, mostly permissive rather than mandatory. The general emphasis of the Act displays marked shift from the previous focus on competition as a major policy aim, to one in which partnerships between operators and local transport authorities are encouraged. Procedures for franchising are simplified, in contrast to those under the 2000 and 2008 Acts, which did not result in any franchising scheme outside London being introduced. The changes relate to a number of themes examined in previous Thredbo conferences, including aspects of competition law, service tendering, data disclosure and network planning. This paper begins by examining the historical background to the Act, then discusses its main provisions. Data requirements for research to monitor the possible effects of its implementation are outlined. It is concluded that the Act has the potential to encourage greater bus use, but the extent of this is highly uncertain. All views expressed are those of the author personally, and do not represent those of the British government or any other organisation