Convicting Juveniles to Life Without Parole

When does a juvenile legally become an adult? This is literally a life-or-death question because the United States Supreme Court held that the Constitution prohibits the imposition of capital punishment on a juvenile. Despite the enormous consequences, the Supreme Court has spent little time defining what it means to be a juvenile. Instead, the Court has simply accepted the relatively recently adopted conventional wisdom that a person is considered an adult on his or her eighteenth birthday. But there is no rational or scientific basis for drawing the line between being an adult and being a juvenile at age eighteen. Indeed, recent scientific research—the same brain research the United States Supreme Court has used to adopt legal principles that both protect and harm adolescents—proves that brain maturation actually occurs from ages ten to twenty-seven. This article will explore whether the line between a juvenile and an adult should remain at eighteen. It begins by exploring the history of distinguishing childhood from adulthood. Next, this article details the legal system’s differing treatment of certain ages. Then, it details the criminal justice system’s treatment of persons below the age of eighteen. Next, this article discusses the science behind cognitive development. Then, it discusses Supreme Court decisions that affect rights of individuals based on age. Finally, the article concludes that drawing the line of adulthood at age eighteen without consideration of an individual’s characteristics is arbitrary under the Constitution

First detections of the [NII] 122 {\mu}m line at high redshift: Demonstrating the utility of the line for studying galaxies in the early universe

We report the first detections of the [NII] 122 {\mu}m line from a high redshift galaxy. The line was strongly (> 6{\sigma}) detected from SMMJ02399-0136, and H1413+117 (the Cloverleaf QSO) using the Redshift(z) and Early Universe Spectrometer (ZEUS) on the CSO. The lines from both sources are quite bright with line-to-FIR continuum luminosity ratios that are ~7.0\times10^{-4} (Cloverleaf) and 2.1\times10^{-3} (SMMJ02399). With ratios 2-10 times larger than the average value for nearby galaxies, neither source exhibits the line-to-continuum deficits seen in nearby sources. The line strengths also indicate large ionized gas fractions, ~8 to 17% of the molecular gas mass. The [OIII]/[NII] line ratio is very sensitive to the effective temperature of ionizing stars and the ionization parameter for emission arising in the narrow-line region (NLR) of an AGN. Using our previous detection of the [OIII] 88 {\mu}m line, the [OIII]/[NII] line ratio for SMMJ02399-0136 indicates the dominant source of the line emission is either stellar HII regions ionized by O9.5 stars, or the NLR of the AGN with ionization parameter log(U) = -3.3 to -4.0. A composite system, where 30 to 50% of the FIR lines arise in the NLR also matches the data. The Cloverleaf is best modeled by a superposition of ~200 M82 like starbursts accounting for all of the FIR emission and 43% of the [NII] line. The remainder may come from the NLR. This work demonstrates the utility of the [NII] and [OIII] lines in constraining properties of the ionized medium.Comment: Accepted for publication in ApJ Letters; 16 pages, 2 tables, 3 figure

Brief of Scholars of the History and Original Meaning of the Fourth Amendment as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402 (U.S. Aug. 14, 2017)

Obtaining and examining cell site location records to find a person is a “search” in any normal sense of the word — a search of documents and a search for a person and her personal effects. It is therefore a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in that it constitutes “examining,” “exploring,” “looking through,” “inquiring,” “seeking,” or “trying to find.” Nothing about the text of the Fourth Amendment, or the historical backdrop against which it was adopted, suggests that “search” should be construed more narrowly as, for example, intrusions upon subjectively manifested expectations of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.Entrusting government agents with unfettered discretion to conduct searches using cell site location information undermines Fourth Amendment rights. The Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches.” The Framers chose that language deliberately. It reflected the insecurity they suffered at the hands of “writs of assistance,” a form of general warrant that granted state agents broad discretion to search wherever they pleased. Such arbitrary power was “unreasonable” to the Framers, being “against the reason of the common law,” and it was intolerable because of its oppressive impact on “the people” as a whole. As emphasized in one of the seminal English cases that inspired the Amendment, this kind of general power to search was “totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.” James Otis’s famous speech denouncing a colonial writ of assistance similarly condemned those writs as “the worst instrument of arbitrary power,” placing “the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.” Thus, although those who drafted and ratified the Fourth Amendment could not have anticipated cellphone technology, they would have recognized the dangers inherent in any state claim of unlimited authority to conduct searches for evidence of criminal activity. Cell site location information provides insight into where we go and what we do. Because this information is constantly generated and can be retrieved by the government long after the activities it memorializes have taken place, unfettered government access to cell site location information raises the specter of general searches and undermines the security of “the people.

Clinical Faculty in the Legal Academy: Hiring, Promotion, and Retention

The Chair of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Section on Clinical Legal Education appointed us in 2005 to the Task Force on the Status of Clinicians and the Legal Academy (Task Force) to examine who is teaching in clinical programs and using clinical methodologies in American law schools and to identify the most appropriate models for clinical appointments within the legal academy. Our charges reflected two ongoing concerns: 1) the need to collect valid, reliable, and helpful data that would inform discussions on the breadth of clinical education in the legal academy and the status of clinical educators within the academy; and 2) the need to have a foundation for complex conversations on how American law schools should view and value their clinical teachers. The first primarily describes the present, while the second carries implications for the future