Competition, Innovation and Racing for Priority at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office resolves patent priority disputes in patent interference cases. Using a random sample of cases declared between 1988 and 1994, we establish a connection between patent interferences and patent races, and then use the data to consider some key issues in dynamic competition and innovation. We look at the incidence and distribution of patent races by technology, evidence for strategic delay of innovation by incumbent firms, and evidence that patent races moderate incentives to delay. Our results have implications for patent policy in general and for evaluating the U.S. “first to invent†patent priority rule.Patent race, Patent interference, US Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, Patent litigation; Innovation; Research and development

Deregulation, Restructuring and Changing R&D Paradigms in the US Electric Utility Industry

This paper studies the impact of electricity deregulation and restructuring on research and development (R&D) expenditures of investor owned utilities. The differing pace of deregulation in the fifty states provides heterogeneity in institutional structure and competitive forces, and showcases the response of R&D funding to changing institutional environments. Based on a panel of all major investor-owned utilities from 1989-1997, this paper analyzes various political constraints, institutional change, and firm-specific financial and structural factors that have contributed to the decline of R&D expenditure in the U.S. electric utility industry. R&D is modeled as a two-stage process where firms first decide whether to invest in research depending on their critical mass and state characteristics, and then conditional on a positive decision, decide on the level of expenditure. A variation of the Heckman model is estimated in a panel data setting, allowing for separate effects of selection and intensity. The primary findings are: First, greater deregulation and competition has a positive effect on R&D whereas a higher probability of deregulation adversely affects research spending. The start date for retail competition and level and policies for stranded cost recovery do affect spending. Second, the response of R&D to financial and other firm attributes varies with the state of deregulation and provides insights into firm behavior in a regulated context. Third, the institutional and competitive factors interact in a way that suggest that full deregulation, coupled with effective retail competition may mitigate the problem of declining electricity R&D by the utilities.Electricity Deregulation, Competition, R&D

A Solution to Concerns over Public Access to Scientific Data

To balance the public need for accountability and better policy decision making with concerns regarding burdens on scientists and scientific progress, the authors propose that increased access be limited to data relevant in analyzing regulations that would have an annual economic impact of at least $100 million. They also recommend establishing an agency to replicate key findings used to support regulations before they are finalized.Regulatory Reform

Should Researchers Be Required to Share Data Used in Supporting Regulatory Decisions?

The scientific establishment is deeply concerned over a proposed regulation that would require data to be shared on projects that are federally funded. Specifically, the proposed amendment to OMB Circular A-110 would require data collected by researchers at universities, hospitals, and non-profit institutions to be shared with interested parties if (1) the data are produced as part of a grant or agreement funded by the federal government; (2) the data are used in a published study; and (3) the data or study is used in formulating a policy or rule. Parties could request the data under the Freedom of Information Act. The proposed rule responds to a provision by Senator Richard Shelby in the 1999 Omnibus Spending Bill that requires data generated under federal awards at universities and non-profit institutions to be available to the public. This regulatory analysis develops an economic framework for evaluating proposals to provide greater access to research data. Our analysis also offers specific recommendations for improving OMB Circular A-110 as well as the broader regulatory process. We argue that the economic analysis of sharing research findings can be separated into three parts: the impact of requiring public access on incentives to produce data, research, and innovation; the impact of that requirement on the quality of research; and the impact of required access on the efficiency and transparency of policy. The economic analysis demonstrates that the standard property-rights framework used to justify time-limited property rights for the use of data is not sufficient for addressing broader problems in which research and data could be used to help inform public policy decisions. The value of sharing data for public policy must also be considered. A second conclusion is that traditional peer review done by scientific journals is not adequate for purposes of relying on research for major public policy decisions. A third conclusion is that scientists who are reluctant to share their findings are more likely to have errors in their analysis than the average researcher. A fourth conclusion is that requiring the release of data could slow the development of data and delay the publication of results. Although substantial costs and uncertainty may be associated with greater public access to data, our analysis suggests that academic norms alone provide very limited access to scientific data. We recommend improving Circular A-110 by narrowing and clarifying the scope of the proposed regulation. The proposed regulation should apply to economically significant regulations that have an annual economic impact of at least $100 million. In addition, we recommend that Congress create an agency that would be charged with replicating the findings of regulatory agencies before such regulations could be implemented. The recommendations concerning replication would require additional legal authority. Taken together, our recommendations would help lay the foundation for a regulatory system that is more accountable and has more scientific integrity.

The Economics of Building Codes to Resist Seismic Shock

This paper applies the theory of optimal investment under risk to the problem of evaluating building codes to make structures more resistant to earthquakes. A simple equation is derived that can be used to estimate the implicit values of the social costs of earth quake damages that are necessary to justify an increment to the seismic resistivity of a structure, and an illustrative empirical application is made to evaluate a recently proposed earthquake building code. The paper also examines the effects of earthquake prediction information on both private decisions regarding the structural integrity of buildings and the social attractiveness of seismic building codes

Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: A Tale of Death, Money & Taxes

Ever since Mancur Olson\u27s The Logic Of Collective Action was published in 1965, if not before, the traditional conception of politics in Western democracies has given pride of place to special interests -- small groups with high stakes -- seeking favors from legislators. These groups are able to solve the coordination and free-rider problems that plague larger group interests, and get their way in Congress and other legislative bodies by doling out campaign contributions and other benefits. The groups are the predator, legislators the prey. In this article we argue that in an important range of cases, the traditional conception gets it backward. Legislators who desire money will act rationally to set the conditions under which small groups with high stakes can form, in order to shake them down for contributions. We call this a reverse Mancur Olson or ex ante rent extraction phenomenon. Legislators become the predators, individuals and groups the prey. We illustrate it with an extended case study of estate tax repeal/non repeal, and suggest several extensions. The new conception changes our understanding of the political process