Designing and evaluating social safety nets

"This paper reviews issues highlighted in the literature on the performance of commonly found social safety net programs in developing countries. It makes particular reference to food subsidies (universal and administratively targeted), public works schemes, and targeted human capital subsidies. Although this set of programs is not exhaustive, it does account for a large proportion of program types, and many of the issues raised here apply equally to other social expenditures." from Author's AbstractSafety nets ,evaluation ,Food subsidies ,Community participation ,Public works ,social policies ,Income distribution ,Poverty alleviation ,

On the targeting and redistributive efficiencies of alternative transfer instruments

The paper shows how the so-called distributional characteristic of a policy instrument can be additively decomposed into two components; one that captures the targeting efficiency of the instrument, the other its redistributive efficiency. Using these measures, the paper provides an interpretation of the commonly used leakage and undercoverage rates (and other indices based on these concepts) within standard welfare theory. An empirical application of the decomposition approach to Mexican data is presented.Welfare economics Mathematical models ,Mexico ,

Are the welfare losses from imperfect targeting important?

The authors evaluate the size of the welfare losses from using alternative “imperfect” welfare indicators as substitutes for the conventionally preferred consumption indicator. They find that whereas the undercoverage and leakage welfare indices always suggest substantial losses, and the poverty indices suggest substantial losses for the worst performing indices, their preferred welfare index based on standard welfare theory suggests much smaller welfare losses. They also find that one cannot reject the hypothesis that the welfare losses associated with using the better performing alternative indicators are zero. In the case of their preferred welfare index, this reflects the fact that most of the targeting errors, i.e., exclusion and inclusion errors, are highly concentrated around the poverty line so that the differences in welfare weights between those receiving and not receiving the transfers are insufficient to make a difference to the overall welfare impact.Welfare economics. ,Poverty. ,Consumption (Economic theory). ,

Program participation under means-testing and self-selection targeting methods

"Using data that enables us to distinguish between the different components of program participation (i.e., knowledge, application, and acceptance), we investigate the determinants of household behavior and program implementation in a social safety-net program that combines administrative and self-selection targeting methods. High undercoverage of eligible households primarily reflects lack of knowledge and binding budget constraints in poor areas. High leakage to ineligible households reflects the combination of their high levels of knowledge, application, and acceptance. Lowering undercoverage will require greater program awareness among the poor living in nonpoor areas and this is likely to come at the expense of substantial leakage to the nonpoor unless improvements are made to the verification process. Our results also suggest that in the presence of a budget constraint, the administrative selection process gives priority to the poorest households and those with children." Authors' AbstractMeans testing ,Targeting performance ,Social safety nets ,Oportunidades ,households ,

A cost-effectiveness analysis of demand- and supply-side education interventions

This paper is concerned with the issue of the most cost-effective way of improving access to education for poor households in developing countries. We consider two alternatives: (1) extensive expansion of the school system (i.e., bringing education to the poor) and (2) subsidizing investment in education by the poor (i.e., bringing the poor to the education system). To this end, we evaluate the Programa Nacional de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA), a large poverty alleviation program recently introduced in Mexico that subsidizes education. Using double-difference regression estimators on data collected before and after the program for randomly selected control and treatment households, we estimate the relative impacts of the demand- and supply-side program components. Combining these estimates with cost information, we find that the demand-side subsidies are substantially more cost-effective than supply-side expansions.Progresa. ,Education Mexico. ,Investments. ,Poverty alleviation Mexico. ,Subsidies Mexico. ,

Evaluating transfer programs within a general equilibrium framework

The authors set out a general equilibrium model for the evaluation of a domestically financed transfer program, which helps to combine the results from a computable general equilibrium model with disaggregated household data.Using a Mexican cash transfer program as an illustration, they use the approach to show that the substantial welfare gains that result from the switch from universal food subsidies to targeted cash transfers reflect both the improved targeting efficiency of the latter as well as a relaxation of the trade-off between equity and efficiency objectives when designing tax systems.Subsidies Mexico. ,Transfer payments. ,Equilibrium (Economics) Models. ,

Evaluating transfer programs within a general equilibrium framework

The authors set out a general equilibrium model for the evaluation of a domestically financed transfer program, which helps to combine the results from a computable general equilibrium model with disaggregated household data.Using a Mexican cash transfer program as an illustration, they use the approach to show that the substantial welfare gains that result from the switch from universal food subsidies to targeted cash transfers reflect both the improved targeting efficiency of the latter as well as a relaxation of the trade-off between equity and efficiency objectives when designing tax systems.FCND ,Subsidies Mexico. ,Transfer payments. ,Equilibrium (Economics) Models. ,