The role of regulatory credibility in effective bank regulation

This paper develops a model of regulated Brownian motion with an endogenous profit term to analyze the role of regulatory credibility on the stability and productivity of the banking system. We show that when regulatory intervention is perfect and costless, the volatility of the system can be substantially reduced with no loss of productivity. In fact, perfect credibility can actually reduce the volatility of intrinsically risky banking systems below the volatility of intrinsically less risky systems as banks anticipate intervention and mitigate their investment behaviour accordingly. However, when the credibility of the regime is weakened because of increased uncertainty stemming from regulation, such as random costs or imperfect timing of regulatory intervention, both the stability and productivity of the financial system are impaired. Importantly, we find that in the presence of regulatory costs and imperfect credibility, there is no universal optimal intervention policy rule. The optimal regulatory system depends on the regulator’s level of absolute risk aversion

Convexity, magnification, and translation: the effect of managerial option-based compensation on corporate cash holdings

Using the distinctions among the convexity, magnification, and translation effects, we identify the pertinent parameters and examine empirically the relation between cash holdings and option-based managerial compensation. We show that changes in delta reduce the effects of magnification and convexity on managerial risk aversion. We also provide evidence that there is a negative relation between the option-based incentives delta and vega and cash holdings. These results are robust when incentives are extended to include all executive board members and when the sample is broken down according to different risk characteristics

Macroeconomic effects on emerging-markets sovereign credit spreads

This paper investigates the explanatory and forecasting power of macroeconomic fundamentals on emerging market sovereign credit spreads. We pay special attention to a new set of macroeconomic factors related to market values that reflect investor expectations concerning future economic performance. The model we propose captures a significant part of the empirical variation in spreads. Importantly, it also includes a powerful forecasting component that extends up to 12 months outside the sample period. The forward-looking variables that we construct are significant and complement and enhance the explanatory content of the conventional variables found in the extant literature

Modelling credit spreads with time volatility, skewness, and kurtosis

This paper seeks to identify the macroeconomic and financial factors that drive credit spreads on bond indices in the US credit market. To overcome the idiosyncratic nature of credit spread data reflected in time varying volatility, skewness and thick tails, it proposes asymmetric GARCH models with alternative probability density functions. The results show that credit spread changes are mainly explained by the interest rate and interest rate volatility, the slope of the yield curve, stock market returns and volatility, the state of liquidity in the corporate bond market and, a heretofore overlooked variable, the foreign exchange rate. They also confirm that the asymmetric GARCH models and Student-t distributions are systematically superior to the conventional GARCH model and the normal distribution in in-sample and out-of-sample testing

What Every Business Student Needs to Know About Information Systems

Whether Information Systems should or should not be part of the core business school curriculum is a recurring discussion in many universities. In this article, a task force of 40 prominent information systems scholars address the issue. They conclude that information systems is absolutely an essential body of knowledge for business school students to acquire as well as a key element of the business school\u27s long-run strategic positioning within the university. Originally prepared in response to draft accreditation guidelines prepared by AACSB International, the article includes a compilation of the concepts that the authors believe to be the core information systems knowledge that all business school students should be familiar with

Political connections and corporate financial decision making

This paper investigates whether and how political connections influence managerial financial decisions. Our study reveals that those firms that have a politician on its board of directors are highly leveraged, use more long-term debt, hold large excess cash and are associated with low quality financial reporting compared to their non-connected counterparts. These effects escalate with the strength of the connected politician and whether he or his party is in power. The winning party effect is observed to be stronger than victory by the politician himself. Overall, our paper provides strong evidence that political connection is a two-edged sword. It is indeed a valuable resource for connected firms, but it comes at a cost of higher agency problems