A Fear and Loathing of Detente: Perspectives on Criticisms of Henry Kissinger in The National Review and The New Republic

As National Security Advisor and (later) Secretary of State under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald R. Ford, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger was responsible for crafting policies aimed both at a diplomatic rapprochement with mainland China and seeking a strategic accommodation with the Soviet Union. However, many critics of this policy maintained that détente was a nouveau form of appeasement under an elaborate geopolitical scheme. One of the main targets of the Right was Kissinger who was believed to be the intellectual godfather of the Nixon and Ford foreign policy stratagems. This paper is a general analysis of the criticisms of Henry Kissinger in The National Review and The New Republic between 1970 and 1976. While their criticisms were salient among many voters and critics, writers often overstated and oversimplified many of the key areas of their disagreements with Kissinger on the overall détente policy

Closing in on a new treatment for sleeping sickness

A chemoproteomics approach has been employed to identify a kinase that could be used as a druggable target in efforts to develop new treatments for African sleeping sickness

Systems Engineering Using Heritage Spacecraft Technology: Lessons Learned from Discovery and New Frontiers Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced or heritage systems and the system environment identifies unanticipated issues that result in cost overruns or schedule impacts. The Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays resulting from advanced technology or heritage assumptions for 6 D&NF missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that the cost and schedule growth did not result from technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. Instead, systems engineering processes did not identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the system-wide impacts necessary to implement the heritage or advanced technology. This presentation summarizes the study s findings and offers suggestions for improving the project s ability to identify and manage the risks inherent in the technology and heritage design solution

Near-Earth Asteroid Scout

Near-Earth asteroids (NEAs) are easily accessible objects in Earth's vicinity. As NASA continues to refine its plans to possibly explore NEAs with humans, initial reconnaissance with comparatively inexpensive robotic precursors is necessary. Obtaining and analyzing relevant data about these bodies via robotic precursors before committing a crew to visit an NEA will significantly minimize crew and mission risk, as well as maximize exploration return potential. The NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory are jointly developing the Near-Earth Asteroid Scout (NEAS) utilizing a low-cost CubeSat platform in response to the current needs for affordable missions with exploration science value. The mission is enabled by the use of an 85-sq m solar sail being developed by MSFC (figs. 1 and 2)

Spatial and temporal variability in the relative contribution of king mackerel (Scomberomorus cavalla) stocks to winter mixed fisheries off South Florida

King mackerel (Scomberomorus cavalla) are ecologically and economically important scombrids that inhabit U.S. waters of the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) and Atlantic Ocean (Atlantic). Separate migratory groups, or stocks, migrate from eastern GOM and southeastern U.S. Atlantic to south Florida waters where the stocks mix during winter. Currently, all winter landings from a management-defined south Florida mixing zone are attributed to the GOM stock. In this study, the stock composition of winter landings across three south Florida sampling zones was estimated by using stock-specific otolith morphological variables and Fourier harmonics. The mean accuracies of the jackknifed classifications from stepwise linear discriminant function analysis of otolith shape variables ranged from 66−76% for sex-specific models. Estimates of the contribution of the Atlantic stock to winter landings, derived from maximum likelihood stock mixing models, indicated the contribution was highest off southeastern Florida (as high as 82.8% for females in winter 2001−02) and lowest off southwestern Florida (as low as 14.5% for females in winter 2002−03). Overall, results provided evidence that the Atlantic stock contributes a certain, and perhaps a significant (i.e., ≥50%), percentage of landings taken in the management-defined winter mixing zone off south Florida, and the practice of assigning all winter mixing zone landings to the GOM stock shoul

Planning and Estimation of Operations Support Requirements

Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimates during the proposal and early design phases, as well as project replans during the development phase, are heavily focused on hardware development schedules and costs. Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for realizing operations costs, can lead to de-emphasizing estimation of operations support requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific exploration of the solar system. Any LCC growth can directly impact the programs' ability to fund new missions, and even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) D&NF Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that 4 out of the 5 missions studied had significant overruns at or after launch due to underestimation of the complexity and supporting requirements for operations activities; the fifth mission had not launched at the time of the mission. The drivers behind these overruns include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground system development work. This paper updates the D&NF LCC study, looking at the operations (phase E) cost drivers in more detail and extending the study to include 2 additional missions and identifies areas for increased emphasis by project management in order to improve the fidelity of operations estimates

Heritage and Advanced Technology Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from NASA Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology systems or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced and heritage systems within the spacecraft and mission environment identifies unanticipated technical issues. Resolving these issues often results in cost overruns and schedule impacts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that optimistic hardware/software inheritance and technology readiness assumptions caused cost and schedule growth for four of the five missions studied. The cost and schedule growth was not found to result from technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. The projects institutional inheritance and technology readiness processes appear to adequately assess technology viability and prevent technical issues from impacting the final mission success. However, the processes do not appear to identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: an inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of development experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the system-wide impacts necessary to implement an advanced technology for space flight applications. The paper summarizes the study's lessons learned in more detail and offers suggestions for improving the project's ability to identify and manage the technology and heritage risks inherent in the design solution