¿Cómo somos inmortales los mortales? Jan Patoĉka y el cuidado del alma

Jan Patočka elabora una crítica a la subjetividad absolutizada y cerrada sobre sí misma que constituye para él el núcleo de la crisis, no sólo de la ciencia, sino también de la cultura europea y que la fenomenología de Husserl no logra superar. Para ello, Patočka despliega, de la mano de Platón, la idea del alma abierta, de una subjetividad que no necesita buscar una salida hacia la realidad porque consiste justamente en esta apertura al ser; en primer lugar, al ser propio, que está siempre frente a la posibilidad de salir de sí y elevarse hacia horizontes que la trasciendan o de perderse en la caída de la clausura narcisista sobre sí misma. Esta idea de una racionalidad sustentada no en la subjetividad absoluta de la modernidad, sino en una constitutiva apertura al ser, que Patočka rastrea hasta los orígenes del pensamiento griego y, por tanto, en la raíz de la tradición occidental, es para él la clave de una comprensión de la existencia como cuidado del alma, que tiene profundas implicaciones éticas y políticas para el contexto present

Panopos' well: Notes on Interpretation of dialogue Lysis

The article deals with the interpretation of dialogue Lysis

Originaltext auf Tschechisch: Jak jsme my smrtelníci nesmrtelní? Jan Patočka a péče o duši (¿Cómo somos inmortales los mortales? Jan Patoĉka y el cuidado del alma.)

Jan Patočka elabora una crítica a la subjetividad absolutizada y cerrada sobre sí misma que constituye para él el núcleo de la crisis, no sólo de la ciencia, sino también de la cultura europea y que la fenomenología de Husserl no logra superar. Para ello, Patočka despliega, de la mano de Platón, la idea del alma abierta, de una subjetividad que no necesita buscar una salida hacia la realidad porque consiste justamente en esta apertura al ser; en primer lugar, al ser propio, que está siempre frente a la posibilidad de salir de sí y elevarse hacia horizontes que la trasciendan o de perderse en la caída de la clausura narcisista sobre sí misma. Esta idea de una racionalidad sustentada no en la subjetividad absoluta de la modernidad, sino en una constitutiva apertura al ser, que Patočka rastrea hasta los orígenes del pensamiento griego y, por tanto, en la raíz de la tradición occidental, es para él la clave de una comprensión de la existencia como cuidado del alma, que tiene profundas implicaciones éticas y políticas para el contexto presente

Who is Afraid of Being Smart?

Although the dialogue is formally aporetical, this paper argues that Plato succeeded in grapsing – between the lines – the phronesis Charmides is looking for. However, this is not possible by means of a definition, since phronesis is neither a thing nor substantial knowledge. It seems to be a sort of self-reference, an ability to project one’s acting in unpredictable situations, to judge if something was done well or wrong, to consider what one knows and what not. Hence phronesis is the ability which precedes and makes any knowledge possible and without which nobody can act well and be happy. In this sense the phronesis of this dialogue is closely connected with the Platonic concept of the good and has much in common with the Platonic concept of human "immortality"

Vědění a neznalost v Platónově dialogu Theaitétos

The paper examines what is the message of Plato's dialogue Theaitetus. It interprets the Socrates' midwifery as an allegory of Platonic dialectic; explains the hermeneutic character of the dialogue; depicts the structure of the genesis of knowledge; argues that the refutation of Protagoras' thesis "homo – mensura" turns out to be its endorsement; and shows that knowledge proper is possible only in mathematics

The Phenomenon as the Philosophical Problem

The proceedings from the colloquium is completed with a lecture by H.G. Gadamer (delivered at the occasion of his honorary doctorate at Charles University) and with a lecture by J.P. Vernant. It also includes the papers that were prepared for the conference but could only be delivered later at the conference in Neapolis devoted to J. Patočka (P. Ricoeur, D. Jervolino). The texts not only confront the conceptions of Patočka and Eugen Fink, but give also a vivid picture of great themes of phenomenology after Husserl and Heidegger

Polytropos Odysseus, polytropoteros Hippias, polytropotatos Sokrates

The paper attempts to figure out the message of the dialogue from its text alone, without recurring to other dialogues or to an "unwritten doctrine". Socrates defeats Hippias in the discussion not by a superiority in positive knowledge but by his wits. He implicitly shows the reader that it is wrong to believe with Hippias that the morality of the character would be an ability of the kind of a positive knowledge. The message of the dialogue results in understanding that the human wit is more than knowledge, makes it possible, and enables us to use it morally well or evil. It is wit which makes us human, not knowledge

Why to Go to Study with Euthydemus?

The paper attempts to show that the purpose of the Euthydemus is not to ridicule the sophist’s art of disputation, but rather to point out the problems which serious philosophical dialectics encounters in the very essence of language, especially as concerns initiating others into this highest of all human activities. As the author sees it, the dialogue denies the possibility of teaching philosophy as the supreme human virtue and way to bliss, while explaining the paradoxical characteristics of such a virtue. This special virtue, i.e. human rationality (phronesis), is inherent in human beings; one cannot learn it extrinsically, but merely cultivate it as such. The author finally suggests further consideration of whether Plato’s concept of phronesis can be identified with his idea of the Good