Reaction Functions of Bank of England MPC Members: Insiders versus Outsiders

In 1997, the Bank of England was granted operational responsibility for setting interest rates to meet a Government inflation target of RPIX 2.5 percent. As part of the shift towards independence, operational decisions on monetary policy were delegated to a Monetary Policy Committee. Using voting data obtained from Minutes of Monetary Policy Committee Meetings, I show that as a group, internally appointed MPC members (insiders) on average prefer higher interest rates than external appointees (outsiders). Further, ordered logit analysis demonstrates that insiders and outsiders are motivated by different concerns when setting interest rates, with the interest rate setting behaviour of outsiders being less easy to predict than those of insiders.Monetary Policy Committee, insiders, outsiders, voting

The Dissent Voting Behaviour of Bank of England MPC Members

I examine the propensity of Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (BoEMPC) members to cast dissenting votes. In particular, I compare the type and frequency of dissenting votes cast by socalled insiders (members of the committee chosen from within the ranks of bank staff) and outsiders (committee members chosen from outside the ranks of bank staff). Significant differences in the dissent voting behaviour associated with these groups is evidenced. Outsiders are significantly more likely to dissent than insiders; however, whereas outsiders tend to dissent on the side of monetary ease, insiders do so on the side of monetary tightness. I also seek to rationalise why such differences might arise, and in particular, why BoEMPC members might be incentivised to dissent. Amongst other factors, the impact of career backgrounds on dissent voting is examined. Estimates from logit analysis suggest that the effect of career backgrounds is negligible.Monetary Policy Committee, insiders, outsiders, dissent voting, career backgrounds, appointment procedures

Decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members

We examine the dissent voting record of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in its first decade. Probit estimates indicate the impact of career experience on dissent voting is negligible, whereas the impact of forecast inflation is pronounced. In addition to finding a role for dynamics, we also find a role for unobserved heterogeneity in the form of member-specific fixed-effects, suggesting previous literature characterizing voting behavior as largely determined by whether members are appointed from within or outside the ranks of Bank of England staff (internal and external members respectively) is overly simplistic.Bank of England, Monetary Policy Committee, career background effects, dissent voting, unobserved heterogeneity

Loyalty and longevity in audience listening: investigating experiences of attendance at a chamber music festival

There is currently much concern amongst arts organisations and their marketing departments that audiences for classical music are in decline, yet little research has so far investigated the experiences of long-term listeners for insight on audience development and retention. This paper presents a case study of the Music in the Round chamber music festival, conducted over a three year period which included the retirement of the host string quartet, the appointment of a new resident ensemble, and associated changes in audience attitudes and priorities. The interaction between individual listening and collective membership of an audience is discussed, and the potential considered for understanding classical concert-goers as ‘fans’ or ‘consumers’