Virtue reversed: Principal argumentative vices in political debate

Contributing to an understanding of the true virtues of argumentation, this paper sketches and exemplifies a theoretically reasoned but simple typology of argumentative vices or ‘malpractices’ that are rampant in political debate in modern democracies. The typology reflects, in negative, a set of argumentative norms, thus making a bid for something that civic instruction might profitably teach students at all levels about deliberative democracy

Norms of Legitimate Dissensus

Argumentation theory needs to develop a tightly reasoned normative code of reasonableness in argumentation so that reasonableness is severed from the goal of reaching “consensus,” as in Habermas and others, or of “resolving the difference of opinion,” as in Pragma-dialectics. On one hand, given degenerative trends in present-day public debate, there is a need for argumentation scholars to enter the public sphere and try to lay down such a code as a common ground of controversy; on the other hand, argumentation theory should recognize that in important respects public controversies cannot be modeled as collaborative enterprises, because dissensus between groups or individuals is legitimately and ineradicably inherent in political and other practical issues in the public sphere. Perhaps the way to develop such a code is not top-down from abstract principles assumed to be axiomatic, but bottom-up from scrutiny of significant authentic examples of public argument. Examples will be drawn from the long-standing controversy over immigration policies, etc., in a European country. Sidelights will be thrown on such theoretical issues as argument evaluation, the “relativism” charge against theories holding that argument strength may be audience-dependent, the characteristic nature of pro and con arguments in practical reasoning, and resources available for legitimate political controversy

Types of Warrant in Practical Reasoning

The concept of warrant reflects Toulmin\u27s general insights that validity in reasoning comes in many forms, and that reasoning in most fields cannot possess the necessity and certainty characteristic of the \u27Rationalist\u27 paradigm. However, there is a scarcity of concepts in one part of Toulmin\u27s theory of argument. While the pedagogical applications of Toulmin\u27s model offer a fine-grained system of warrant types for propositions (sign warrants, causal warrants, etc.), they have only one category of warrant for practical claims (proposals for action) – the \u27motivational\u27 warrant. Fortunately, ancient rhetorical thinking can help us correct this insufficiency. For example, the author of the rhetorical textbook used by Alexander the Great proposed a typology of practical warrants. His approach highlights what I propose to call the \u27multidimensionality\u27, and hence what modern moral philosophers call the \u27incommensurability\u27 of warrants – the absence of a common measure allowing for a \u27rational\u27 balancing of conflicting warrants. The widespread occurrence of multidimensionality in practical argument lends support to Toulmin\u27s general anti-rationalist view of reasoning. Moreover, while multidimensionality prevents \u27rational\u27 balancing, it legitimizes and even necessitates the use of rhetoric in practical reasoning

Macro-Toulmin: the argument model as structural guideline in academic writing

Attempts to use Toulmin\u27s argument model in teaching argument have had mixed success. We suggest using it specifically to teach academic writing. Moreover, we think it should be used to teach what major constituents are characteristic of academic wri ting, rather than how to make each individual point. For example, one important feature of academic writing is that the writer should carefully discuss the warrant for the data she uses, whereas debaters in practical argument are rarely required to do so . Extensive experience from the teaching of academic writing along these lines will be drawn upon