Evolving Objective Standards: A Developmental Approach to Constitutional Review of Morals Legislation

This Note argues that the Supreme Court\u27s recent jurisprudence regarding morals legislation mirrors the findings of empirical research on moral and psychological development. Specifically, the Supreme Court upholds morals legislation only if it is justified by stage five reasoning. Part I examines significant Supreme Court cases related to morals legislation over the last 50 years and argues that the Supreme Court has consistently upheld morals legislation that is justified by stage five reasoning, while consistently striking down as unconstitutional morals legislation that is not. Part II argues that a developmental approach to constitutional review of morals legislation, while consistent with many aspects of the common responses to morality and the law after Lawrence, yields significant advantages over those approaches. Most significantly, Part II argues that a developmental approach lends reliability and determinability to the use of evolving standards in constitutional review of morals legislation, while still maintaining primary state control over public health, safety, and morals. Part III applies this framework to questions raised by Justice Scalia\u27s dissent in Lawrence, arguing that the Court is indeed likely to strike down certain laws as unconstitutional while others appear to pass developmental and constitutional muster

A Prudential Exercise: Abstention and the Probate Exception to Federal Diversity Jurisdiction

Ann-Marie Brege\u27s parents established an irrevocable trust in 1985, with Ann-Marie as sole beneficiary. When Merrill Lynch Trust Co. took over as trustee years later, however, the trust\u27s principal dropped sharply, losing over half its value in just a few years. Ann-Marie sued in Michigan probate court, alleging that Merrill Lynch had violated its legal duties in administering the trust. Since Ann-Marie was from New York and Merrill Lynch had its headquarters in New Jersey, Merrill Lynch had an apparently easy argument for diversity jurisdiction. In an unremarkable turn of events, Merrill Lynch filed a notice of removal to federal district court. Ann-Marie didn\u27t take Merrill Lynch\u27s removal sitting down. She filed a motion to remand to state probate court, arguing, inter alia, that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of the probate exception to federal jurisdiction. Merrill Lynch was taken aback-no court, Merrill Lynch argued, had ever applied the probate exception to a case that didn\u27t involve a will, estate, or some equivalent substitute. The federal court brushed Merrill Lynch\u27s argument aside and instead followed a line of case law that looks to the jurisdiction of probate courts under state law to determine the extent of the probate exception. Finding that Michigan gave its probate courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims involving the administration of trusts, the court granted Ann-Marie\u27s motion to remand