Paleomagnetic study of the Paleocene-Eocene Tarawan Chalk and Esna Shale: Dual polarity remagnetizations of Cenozoic sediments in the Nile Valley (Egypt)

A paleomagnetic study of the Paleocene-Eocene Esna Shale and Tarawan Chalk at the Dababiya and Qreiya sections near Luxor in central Egypt reveals stable normal and reverse polarity magnetizations. However, these (neritic) pelagic marine sediments have evidently been remagnetized because: 1) the stable magnetizations are carried by hematite with no evidence of a primary magnetic mineral like magnetite, 2) the magnetic polarity stratigraphy is not consistent between the sections and with patterns expected from global magnetobiostratigraphic time scales, and 3) the directions correspond to late Cenozoic directions and are far from expected early Cenozoic reference directions for Africa. Our interpretation suggests that reported paleomagnetic results from other Cenozoic sediments from the Nile Valley suffered a similar fate. We suggest that the remagnetization may be associated with weathering and fluid flow during Neogene uplift and rifting in the formation of the early Nile Valley

Wildlife friendly agriculture: which factors do really matter? A genetic study on field vole

The distribution of genetic differentiation and the directions of gene flow were determined mainly by landscape factors: thus the expectation that organic fields act as genetic reservoir was not met. The fact that agricultural area presented more sub-populations than the undisturbed one, together with the importance of connectivity and habitat size in shaping gene flow and genetic differentiation, shows that switching to organic farming might not be enough to ensure the conservation of species in the agricultural environment. These results emphasise the need to include landscape structure in management policies

Social Preferences and Voting: An Exploration Using a Novel Preference Revealing Mechanism

Public referenda are frequently used to determine the provision of public goods. As public programs have distributional consequences, a compelling question is what role if any social preferences have on voting behavior. This paper explores this issue using laboratory experiments wherein voting outcomes lead to a known distribution of net benefits across participants. Preferences are elicited using a novel Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is a more parsimonious mechanism than dichotomous choice referenda, but gives consistent results. Results suggest that social preferences, in particular a social efficiency motive, lead to economically meaningful deviations from self-interested voting choices and increase the likelihood that welfare-enhancing programs are implemented.Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, C91, C92, D64, D72, H41,

ANOMALIES IN VOTING: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS USING A NEW, DEMAND REVEALING (RANDOM PRICE VOTING) MECHANISM

This study investigates the influence of social preferences on voting decisions using a new Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is best thought of as a public goods voting extension of the Becker-DeGroot-Marshack mechanism for private goods. In particular, this mechanism is used to investigate experimentally whether voting decisions are affected by the distribution of net benefits associated with a proposed public program. Recent papers have shown that, in additional to selfishness, factors such as inequality aversion, maximin preferences, and efficiency may influence individual decisions. However, the effect of social preferences on voting, the predominant funding mechanism for public goods by legislatures and public referenda, has not been thoroughly examined. We first establish the presence of anomalous behavior in dichotomous voting, and introduce the RPVM as a more efficient mechanism to examine such anomalies. We show that it is demand revealing in the presence of social preferences and empirically consistent with dichotomous choice voting. Laboratory experiments involving 440 subjects show that when net benefits are homogeneously distributed, the new RPVM is demand-revealing in both willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA) settings, for both gains and losses. When the voting outcome potentially results in a heterogeneous distribution of (net) benefits, a systematic wedge appears between individuals' controlled induced values and their revealed WTP or WTA. With induced gains, the best-off subjects under-report their WTP and WTA in comparison to their induced value. Worst-off subjects express WTP and WTA that exceed their induced value. With induced losses a mirror image is evident. Best-off subjects over-report their induced value while the worst-off subjects under-report. Theoretical and econometric results presented in the paper suggest that these differences are caused by a concern for social efficiency.Institutional and Behavioral Economics,