10 research outputs found
Future Contingents and the Logic of Temporal Omniscience
At least since Aristotle’s famous 'sea-battle' passages in On Interpretation 9, some substantial minority of philosophers has been attracted to the doctrine of the open future--the doctrine that future contingent statements are not true. But, prima facie, such views seem inconsistent with the following intuition: if something has happened, then (looking back) it was the case that it would happen. How can it be that, looking forwards, it isn’t true that there will be a sea battle, while also being true that, looking backwards, it was the case that there would be a sea battle? This tension forms, in large part, what might be called the problem of future contingents. A dominant trend in temporal logic and semantic theorizing about future contingents seeks to validate both intuitions. Theorists in this tradition--including some interpretations of Aristotle, but paradigmatically, Thomason (1970), as well as more recent developments in Belnap, et. al (2001) and MacFarlane (2003, 2014)--have argued that the apparent tension between the intuitions is in fact merely apparent. In short, such theorists seek to maintain both of the following two theses: (i) the open future: Future contingents are not true, and (ii) retro-closure: From the fact that something is true, it follows that it was the case that it would be true. It is well-known that reflection on the problem of future contingents has in many ways been inspired by importantly parallel issues regarding divine foreknowledge and indeterminism. In this paper, we take up this perspective, and ask what accepting both the open future and retro-closure predicts about omniscience. When we theorize about a perfect knower, we are theorizing about what an ideal agent ought to believe. Our contention is that there isn’t an acceptable view of ideally rational belief given the assumptions of the open future and retro-closure, and thus this casts doubt on the conjunction of those assumptions
Bohrification of operator algebras and quantum logic
Following Birkhoff and von Neumann, quantum logic has traditionally been
based on the lattice of closed linear subspaces of some Hilbert space, or, more
generally, on the lattice of projections in a von Neumann algebra A.
Unfortunately, the logical interpretation of these lattices is impaired by
their nondistributivity and by various other problems. We show that a possible
resolution of these difficulties, suggested by the ideas of Bohr, emerges if
instead of single projections one considers elementary propositions to be
families of projections indexed by a partially ordered set C(A) of appropriate
commutative subalgebras of A. In fact, to achieve both maximal generality and
ease of use within topos theory, we assume that A is a so-called Rickart
C*-algebra and that C(A) consists of all unital commutative Rickart
C*-subalgebras of A. Such families of projections form a Heyting algebra in a
natural way, so that the associated propositional logic is intuitionistic:
distributivity is recovered at the expense of the law of the excluded middle.
Subsequently, generalizing an earlier computation for n-by-n matrices, we
prove that the Heyting algebra thus associated to A arises as a basis for the
internal Gelfand spectrum (in the sense of Banaschewski-Mulvey) of the
"Bohrification" of A, which is a commutative Rickart C*-algebra in the topos of
functors from C(A) to the category of sets. We explain the relationship of this
construction to partial Boolean algebras and Bruns-Lakser completions. Finally,
we establish a connection between probability measure on the lattice of
projections on a Hilbert space H and probability valuations on the internal
Gelfand spectrum of A for A = B(H).Comment: 31 page