Perspectives on Common Property Regimes in Ethiopia: A Critical Reflection on Communal Land Holding Rights in Borana Oromo Pastoralists Context

No Abstrac

Bigamous marriage and the division o f common Property under the Ethiopian Law: Regulatory Challenges and options

No Abstract

Effect of Processing on Anti-nutritional Factors and Sensory Qualities of ‘Hepho’, a Black Climbing Bean (Lablab purpureus L.) Flour

Food quality of most legumes depends upon the processing methods applied and presence or absence of anti-nutritional or toxic factors.  It is widely accepted that simple and inexpensive processing techniques are effective methods of achieving desirable qualities of processed legume seeds. The aim of this study was to evaluate the effect of processing on anti-nutritional factors (tannin and Phytate) and sensory characteristics (taste, bitterness, appearance, texture and overall acceptability) of hepho (Lablab purpureus L) flour. Hepho is the Afan Oromo name for black climbing bean which is an indigenous legume in Ethiopia. The processing techniques employed were traditional cooking (TC) and pressure cooking (PC) of the dehulled and undehulled hepho bean while the raw sample was served as a control. All the processing methods significantly reduced (P<0.05) the anti-nutritional factors under investigation. Of the two processing techniques, the reduction of the antinutritional factors by PC was evaluated to be higher than that of TC. The sensory analysis showed that there is no significant difference (P > 0.05) between dehulled TC and dehulled PC as well as undehulled TC and undehulled PC. But there is a significant difference (P<0.05) between dehulled and undehulled TC and PC methods. The overall acceptability rating was higher for dehulled seeds in both the treatments. From this it can be concluded that simple processing techniques can drastically reduce some anti-nutritional factors thereby increase the biological value of legumes and the same processing techniques can result in increase of the overall acceptability of dishes produced from legumes. Keywords: Hepho (Lablab purpureus L.), processing methods, ant-nutritional factors, sensory characteristics

Determinants of Urban Poverty: The Case of Nekemte Town, Eastern Wollega Zone of Oromia Regional State

The strategies aimed at reducing poverty need to identify and analyze the factors that influence poverty and could in turn be influenced by policy factors. In this regard, this study was conducted to identify and analyze the extent and determinants of urban poverty in the case of Nekemte town. The study used both primary and secondary data; where the primary data were collected from total of 203 randomly selected households in six urban kebeles of the town. The logit model was fitted to identify determinants of poverty. In this case the probability of a household being poor is taken as a dependent variable and the set of demographic and socio economic variables were explanatory variables. The basic needs approach was employed to identify households as poor and non-poor. Based on this and using the price deflated national average poverty line of birr 5,220 out of the 203 surveyed households, 42 per cent were found to be poor. The head count ratio, poverty gap, and severity indices of the survey households were 0.42, 0.032 and 0.01, respectively. The logit estimation result revealed that family size and rural-urban migration have positive and significant effect on the probability of a household being poor. The sex of the household head, education level, and salary employment were found to have negative and significant effect on poverty. Since most of the poor are concentrated around the poverty line as we observe from the poverty gap, policies should focus on absolute poverty rather than relative poverty among the poor. promoting female education should be an important element of poverty reduction policies this is because education and fertility are negatively correlated such a policy could also have an impact on household size which is another important determinant of poverty in Nekemte. Keywords: Poverty, urban, household and expenditur

Growth Inhibition of Grain Spoilage Fungi by Selected Herbs and Spices Essential Oils

Natural plant extracts are promising alternatives for chemical food additives and synthetic pesticides. In this study, essential oils of selected herbs and spices were tested for their antimicrobial activities against Aspergillus flavus and Aspergillus niger, two of the most common food spoilage  microorganisms. Agar disk diffusion assay was used for screening of the most effective essential oils, agar dilution assay was used to determine Minimum Inhibitory Concentration (MIC) of the essential oils and broth dilution assay was employed to the spore germination inhibition assay. Tests were also conducted to examine the effects of the essential oils for sorghum kernel protection against the tested fungi, and the optimal  protective dosages on the sorghum grains were also determined. From the preliminary tests, essential oils of Cinnamomum zeylanicum (Cinnamon) and Thymus schimperi (thymus) were found to be the most effective. However piper nigrum (black pepper) had no effect on the test organisms. In MIC, spore germination inhibition and grain protection assay, cinnamon essential oil was found to be superior where its MIC on the isolates was found to be 0.0156% and its optimum protective dosage on the sorghum grain was 5%. It inhibited spore germination at a concentration of 3ìL/mL. The effect of thymus oil was also very much comparable to these results (no significant difference at P>0.05). Finally, it was concluded that essential oil extracts of cinnamon and thymus can be a useful source of antifungal agents for protection of grain spoilage by fungi

Comment: Legal Aspects of Stock Market Development in Ethiopia: Comments on Challenges and Prospects

Ethiopia lacks the institutional and legal frameworks that regulate themarket for stock exchange, and in effect, the current stock trading activitymay grow into a largely unregulated space in which everyone speculatesand plays for short-term gains. Introducing stock market amidst theproliferation of companies in Ethiopia can thus benefit the economy. It isnatural to expect that both companies under formation and investors inexisting companies sell and transfer their shares to third parties giving riseto the availability of tradable shares in the market. This comment is amodest attempt to show the desideratum of introducing the legal andinstitutional frameworks governing stock market in Ethiopia. It tries toanalyze the existing legal framework on stocks and tries to juxtaposerelevant literature to give picture on the legal aspects of stock marketdevelopment. In view of the potential advantage and the concerns raised by stock market development, I argue that devising legal infrastructure that accommodates stock market in Ethiopia is a timely issue to catch up with the global trend, given the current demand for stock trading as revealed by the over-the-counter markets.Key words: Companies, over-the-counter, stock brokerage, stock market, Ethiopi

The role of religious epistemology in inter-religious dialogue

From the dawn of civilization, a multitude of religious has developed each very complex. These great differences among religions make it difficult to find a least common denominator or to talk at length of religion in general. On the other hand, focusing on just one specific religion often causes us to ignore or underestimate some of the very broad traits that religions seem to share. The fact remains that we will make no headway into the question of what makes a specific religion a religion if we do not seek some characteristics common to all religions. Religion is usually associated with the supernatural or the divine.505 However, the notion of a supernatural realm does not occur in the non-theistic schools of Buddhism and functions in very different ways, say, in Taoism, Hinduism, and Islam. These shortcomings suggest that religion is notoriously difficult to define. To me, religion is any action taken through every aspect of our being to release us from our weakness or imperfection, and bring us closer to the divine reality. In other words, it is a human inner desire or activity to unite with an absolute being. The examination of the intellectual dimension of religion that is, its key beliefs is most beneficial when it is guided and informed. Since epistemology is the theory of knowledge, one would therefore expect epistemological discussions of religion to concentrate on the question whether one could have knowledge of religious beliefs. Religious epistemology is simple to say that it is the epistemology of distinctively religious beliefs, but that will not be helpful in the absence of a definition of religious beliefs. Philosophers of religion might consider the epistemology of religious belief, pondering questions about the sources and justifications of religious knowledge. Fundamental questions regarding the nature of knowledge are likely to arise in any culture. After all, everyone has some stake in distinguishing truth from error, wisdom from ignorance, and the path to knowledge from the path to ignorance. Epistemologists have discussed, in addition to the defining conditions and the sources of knowledge, the extent of human knowledge. They have asked how far human knowledge can extend. Many philosophers find it obvious that we know at least some things, if only things about personal experiences or household physical objects. Others have claimed, however, that we really have no knowledge. Such philosophers admit that people typically feel confident that they have some knowledge, but these philosophers insist that our apparent cases of knowledge are mere illusions. Many epistemologists aim not to set knowledge beyond our reach or to escape the quest for knowledge but rather to make many of our ordinary claims to knowledge more secure by explaining knowledge. They seek to explain what knowledge consists in and how we get it.506 Therefore, a good deal of the task of general epistemology is to understand the nature of the various truth-relevant merits which beliefs can possess, the necessary and sufficient conditions for beliefs to possess those merits, and the virtues of mind and practice requisite and apt for their presence merits such as being reliably formed, being warranted, being entitled, being scientific, being rational, being justified and indeed being true. Epistemology in Western philosophical tradition has until recently offered a prominent definition of knowledge that analyzes knowledge into three essential components: justification, truth, and belief. According to this analysis, propositional knowledge is, by definition, justified true belief. Epistemologists typically focus on propositional knowledge. Knowledge that something is the case, as opposed to knowledge of how to do something. The content of propositional knowledge can be expressed in a proposition, that is, what is meant by a declarative sentence. Knowledge how to do something is by contrast, a skill or competence in performing a certain task. Within the last few decades, philosophers have discovers that these three conditions are not really sufficient for knowledge; something else is required. Genuine knowledge requires not only truth and belief, but also the satisfaction of the belief condition be appropriately related to the satisfaction of the truth condition. That is, on the traditional approach, genuine knowledge requires that a knower have an “adequate indication” that a believed proposition is true. The required “adequate indication”507 of truth, according to Plato, Kant, and many other philosophers, is evidence indicating that a proposition is true. These philosophers thus hold that knowledge must be based on evidence, or justifying reason. The kind of justification crucial to knowledge is called epistemic justification. Even if knowledge requires justification, a justified belief can be false. In allowing for justified false beliefs, contemporary epistemologists endorse fallibilism about justification. Reformed epistemologists contend that belief in the existence of God can, in some circumstances, have an epistemic status high enough to render it worthy of acceptance even if it has no support from the arguments of natural theology or from any other beliefs. The views of Alston and Mavrodes are sometimes said to display an affinity with Reformed epistemology, and Nicholas Wolterstorff has made significant contributions to its development. But Plantinga has clearly been the leading contemporary advocate of this school of thought in religious epistemology. During the earlier phase of their development, Plantinga concentrated on defending the view that theistic belief can be in certain conditions, is justified or rationally held even in the absence of any propositional evidence or supporting argument.508 For the conviction that theistic belief is properly basic, foundationalists carry out a reconstructive project that would put our revised doxastic structures on foundations so firm that they could withstand rather than ignore skeptical challenges. That is, for the classical foundationlist theistic belief requires support from propositional evidence or argument if it is to be rationally or justifiably held. However, it is fairly clear that belief in God’s existence does not satisfy this criterion; it is neither self-evident nor incorrigible nor evident to the sense for humans at any time in this life. The question of justification attracts philosophers especially in contemporary epistemology. And controversy of this question focuses on the meaning of ‘justification’ as well as on the substantive conditions of a belief’s being justified in a way appropriate to knowledge. William Alston, for instance, has introduced a non-deontological normative concept of justification that relies mainly on the notion of what is epistemically good from the view-point of maximizing truth and minimizing falsity. Alston link epistemic goodness to a belief’s being based on adequate grounds in the absence of overriding reason to the contrary. But for some epistemologists “Epistemic justification” means simply “evidential support” of certain sort.509 To say that s is epistemically justifiable to some extent for you is, on this view, just to say that s is supportable to some extent by your overall evidential reason. According to epistemologist, knowledge entails beliefs, so that I cannot know that such and such is the case unless I believe that such and such is the case. Robert Audi mentioned that knowledge arises in experience. It is constituted by conclusively justified true belief, meaning that: the believer may be justified by psychological certain of the true proposition in question and this proposition is so well-grounded as to be itself propositionally certain. And knowledge constitute by such belief may be called epistemic certainty. When we come to religious knowledge, Audi says that religious propositions are simply beyond the scope of human knowledge. But the point is why would it be thought that no religious propositions are known? The most common ground for holding this view is namely, that religious propositions, such as that God exists, cannot be known either a priori or on the basis of experience. The concept of justification or evidence would occur with the concept of belief in a more complex analysis of the concept of knowledge.510 In recent decades, questions of knowledge seem to have been marginalized by question of justification. As a matter of fact, however, epistemological discussion of religious belief, at least since the Enlightenment has tended to focus, not on the question whether religious belief has warrant, but whether it is justified. More precisely, it has tended to focus on the question whether those properties are enjoyed by theistic belief - the belief that there exists a person like the God of traditional Christianity, Judaism, and Islam: an almighty, all knowing, wholly benevolent and loving spiritual person who has created the world. The main epistemological question about religious belief, therefore, has been the question whether or not religious belief in general and theistic belief in particular is rational or rationally acceptable, or whether it is justified? In its primary sense, rationality is a normative concept that philosophers have generally tried to characterize in such a way that, for any action, belief, or desire, if it is rational we ought to choose it. Rationality is the use of reason to reach a certain level of reasonableness or unreasonableness. Many positive characterizations of rational beliefs have been proposed by beliefs that are either self-evident or derived from self-evident beliefs by a reliable procedure and beliefs that are consistent with the overwhelming majority of one’s beliefs.511 Analytic epistemology in the twentieth century was conducted as if there were a part from truth itself - just one truth-relevant merit in beliefs, that one typically called either “justification or rationality;”512 and since there was a great deal of disagreement on the answer to that question, there was a great flowering of theories of justification, or theories of rationality. According to Nicholas Wolterstorff, there are a large number of distinct truth-relevant merits in beliefs, and that neither “Justification” nor “rationality”513 picks out single such merit, both are highly ambiguous terms, each picking out a number of distinct merits. Religious beliefs are formed or evoked by experience of some sort, or by believing what is said in some discourse, or by reflection on the implications of some complex of beliefs that one has previously acquired. Here, we notice that there are no rational activities to understand or justify the experience. Richard Swinburne considered the nature of actual belief. He saw how in a sense all beliefs given rise to action and must be based on evidence. But he knows that not all beliefs are rational beliefs. For him a beliefs will fail to be rational if it is based on evidence in the wrong way or if it is based on the wrong sort of evidence. According to Swinburne beliefs are rational in so far as they are based on investigation which was, in the believer’s view, adequate, and if the believer believes it to be rational. Swinburne understand by religious beliefs as about transcendent reality, including his belief about whether or not there is a God, and his beliefs about what properties God has (what God is like) and what actions he has performed.514 According to John Hick, the issue is not whether it can be established as an item of indubitable public knowledge that God (or the divine or the Transcendent) exists, or most probably exists, but whether it is rational for those who experience some of life’s moments theistically to believe that God exists, and to proceed to conduct their lives on that basis. Hick looks at a rational belief in general way. For him “belief” can mean a proposition believed or it can be defined as an act or state of believing. The idea of evidence normally presupposes a gap between an observed fact, or body of facts, and an inferred conclusion. Therefore, our ordinary moment - to moment perceptual beliefs contradict the principle that all rational believing must be based upon adequate evidence. It is not that they are based upon inadequate evidence, but rather that the model of evidence-inference-belief does not apply here. Ordinary perceptual beliefs arise directly out of our experience, and it is entirely appropriate, proper, and rational to form these beliefs in this way. The relationship between experience and belief has been much debated in recent work in the philosophy of religion. This discussion has focused upon specifically theistic belief and Hick discusses also in these terms and his argument is that it is rational to believe in the reality of God. Alvin Plantinga argues on these manifestation-experiences that they are properly basic.515 That is to say, it is as rational for religious persons to hold these basic religious beliefs as it is for all of us to hold our basic perceptual beliefs. But, more basically, it is the biblical assumption translated into philosophical terms. According to Plantinga this experience is what justifies me in holding (the belief) that is the ground of my justification, and by extension, the ground of the belief itself. He then applies this principle to religious beliefs. In philosophy, experience is generally what we perceive by the senses what we learn from others, or whatever comes from external sources or from inner reflection. In the sense, experience is associated with observation and experiment. Empiricism stresses that our knowledge must be based on experience, but rationalism claims that experience is a potential source of error and prefers rational certainty to mere empirical generalization. In ordinary usage, for every experience there must be something experienced that is independent of the subject of experience. But in philosophy, the relation between experience as a state of consciousness and independent objects of experience becomes a focus of debate. There are many different kinds of experiences, but it is religious experiences that interest me here. From the point of view of epistemology the modifications of consciousness consisting our apparently perceptual experience are of importantly different kinds. In addition to true perceptions there are misperceptions, illusions, and hallucinations. Therefore, if anyone misled by any of these forms of perceptual error, he or she is then deluded. In each case the delusion consists in a mistaken implicit belief about the cause of the experience: Applying this concept of delusion to the realm of religious experience, we have to ask whether those who assume that their experience of living in God’s presence is caused by their being in God’s presence are believing truly or are, on the contrary, under a delusion. In modern philosophy of mind a major theme which bears on many theoretical issues, concerns the alleged privacy of an experience as an event knowable only to its possessor and the possibility of public access to that experience. There is much philosophical debate concerning precisely how perception is to be analyzed. In particular, questions are raised concerning the status of the phenomenon. But there is general agreement that in perception, objects present themselves to us in ways that enable us to know them. Similarly, in religious experience God presents himself in ways that enable us to know him and his actions. For Alston there are, it seems, important differences between ordinary perceptual or sense experience and religious experience. Sense perception is a common experience, whereas religious experience is less common, perhaps, even rare, sense perception yields a great deal of information about the world, whereas religious experience yields apparently little information about God, all humans have the capacity for sense perception, but many seem not to have the capacity for religious experience. These differences, however, do not show that religious experience has a structure unlike perception. For one thing, neither the frequency of an experience nor the amount of information it yields tells us anything about its structure. On the other hand, the limitation of the rationalist way is that the only truths capable of being strictly proved are analytic and ultimately tautological. But we cannot by logic alone demonstrate any matter of fact and existence; these must be known through experience. For sure if nothing were given through experience in its various modes, we should never have anything to reason about. This is as true in religion as in other fields. If God exists, God is not an idea but a reality outside us, in order to be known to men and women, God must therefore become manifest in some way within their experience. This conclusion is in line with the contemporary revolt against the rationalist assumptions which have dominated much of western philosophy since the time of Descartes.516 Descartes held that we can properly be said to know only truths that are self-evident or that can be reached by logical inferences from self-evident premises. Therefore, those who stress faith and attack reason often place a great deal of emphasis on religious experience. However, religious experience is by no means a purely emotional “happening”; rather, it involves concepts and beliefs about the being that is experienced. If we tried to separate religious experiences from such concepts and beliefs - from the religious belief-system, as we shall call it - then there would be no way saying who or what is that is experienced, or of explaining what sort of difference the experience ought to make to the person who has it. However, such a religious belief system needs to be understood; at least to some degree - it is hard to see how understanding it is not going to involve the use of reason. For Rationalisms, in order for a religious belief-system to be properly and rationally accepted, it must be possible to prove that the belief-system is true. Rationalism in this sense implies a reliance on reason, or intelligence, in deciding our beliefs and actions. The central idea of strong rationalism was stated forcefully by W. K. Clifford. According to his opinion, no religious belief-system is capable of meeting the high standard of proof that should govern all of our believing, and so a reasonable (and moral) person must do without religious beliefs. Among the objections to Christian belief, as well as to Judaic and Muslim, Characteristic of the modern intelligentsia is the objection that it is no longer rational, if ever it was, to believe that God exists. Therefore, the rational person will have to make his way in the world without supposing that there exists any God in whom he could trust.517 However, according to Nicholas Wolterstorff, to believe in God is our fundamental human obligation. Central to Christianity, Judaism, and Islam alike is the conviction that we as human beings are called to believe in God to trust in him, to rely on him, to place our confidence in him. Central also is the conviction that only by believing in God can the deepest stirrings of the human heart be satisfied. Duty and fulfillment here coalesce. The rationality of trusting someone presupposes the rationality of believing that person exists. John Locke was among the first to formulate articulately the evidentialist challenge to theistic belief. Reason is reasoning for Locke, and clearly he thinks of it as one among others of our belief-forming processes. Faith is another belief-forming process. It, by contrast, consists in accepting something “as coming from God.”518 However, for Locke it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a revelation, and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered. For evidentialist, one’s belief that God exists is rational only if it is formed or sustained by good inference by inferring it from others of one’s beliefs, which in fact provide adequate evidence for it. But, Wolterstorff, see no reason what so ever to suppose that by the criterion offered the evidentialist challenge is tenable. He see no reason to suppose that people who hold as one of their immediate beliefs that God exists always have adequate reason to surrender that belief or ought to believe that they do. However, for him those abstract and highly general theses of evidentialism no longer look very interesting, once we regard them in the light of the criterion offered. Therefore, for him the fact that it is not rational for some person to believe that God exists does not follow that he ought to give up that belief. But can we accept the Principle of Credulity? One problem is that whereas there is a fundamental uniformity about the way we report both ordinary perceptual experiences and the beliefs about objects of those experiences, there is quite a diversity of reports about religious experiences and the claim based on them. Person give incompatible descriptions of the Reality experienced. Therefore, where perceptions yield conflicting testimony, we must turn to other experiences and rational arguments to determine the truth of the various claims. That is, where there are different accounts, additional considerations must be introduced to help decide which, if any, of the religious experiences are veridical. Although the reports provide a prima facie ground for their acceptance, not all beliefs based on such experiences are true. Just as we at times doubt perceptual claims for good reason, we might do the same for claims based on religious experience. According to Hick, religion constitutes our varied human response to transcendent realit

Multinational Firm Growth and Sustainability Responses to Dynamics of Business Regulations in Host Market

Dynamics in business regulations measured by ease of doing business is a new approach that indicates countries’ business climate reforms toward suitability for investment growth. The present study took three variables from the ease of doing business data and evaluated them toward predictive power of FDI flow to 19 Sub-Saharan African countries by using fixed-effect model. Based on the analysis, the official time, procedures, costs, and minimum capitals in starting a business stage, enterprise registrations and official permissions of the firm establishment had a material effect on investment growth. Even though, on one side trade openness and the growing market size was seen as an opportunity, the deep-rooted corruption and landlocked was the trap for the smooth growth of firms in the region

Multinational Firm Growth and Sustainability Responses to Dynamics of Business Regulations in Host Market

Dynamics in business regulations measured by ease of doing business is a new approach that indicates countries’ business climate reforms toward suitability for investment growth. The present study took three variables from the ease of doing business data and evaluated them toward predictive power of FDI flow to 19 Sub-Saharan African countries by using fixed-effect model. Based on the analysis, the official time, procedures, costs, and minimum capitals in starting a business stage, enterprise registrations and official permissions of the firm establishment had a material effect on investment growth. Even though, on one side trade openness and the growing market size was seen as an opportunity, the deep-rooted corruption and landlocked was the trap for the smooth growth of firms in the region